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Certain ideas persist for a long time. I was 18, deeply engaged in environmental issues, and convinced 
that biology was the only subject worth studying. My aunt Aud and uncle Ketil planted an idea in my 
head: maybe it is better to learn skills that can be useful for solving environmental problems, not only 
understanding them? Full of doubts and opposition, I entered a technical university – and left with a 
diploma in planning. The same idea has motivated my choice of topic for this PhD thesis, ecosystem-
based management. It was introduced as an approach for solving persistent environmental problems. 
The extent to which it has is disputable. I was therefore interested in studying what are the conditions 
under which it actually can work as intended. My suspicion was that the major problems are political 
and organisational, not the lack of knowledge about the ecosystems. This suspicion is strengthened af-
ter doing the research.  
As a planner, my major interest was strategic planning. I liked looking into uncertain futures, analys-
ing options and trying to plot a course in a long-term perspective. I could also witness the problems of 
trying to realise good intentions from higher-order plans. As long as external winds blew our way and 
we managed to mobilise internally, my organisation could perform fairly well. At the worst, a plan 
could become completely undermined by external forces and series of small decisions pointing in dif-
ferent directions than the strategic course. Practical experience taught me that what happens after plan-
ning is what finally determines the results; that was not a part of my studies. Such experiences also 
motivated my angle on ecosystem-based management: if the oceans are in peril, then ecosystem-based 
management must lead to the implementation of measures that actually can halt the deterioration. 
I feel privileged who have been granted four years from Norwegian College of Fishery Science to dive 
deeper into issues that have been a part of my prior practice. First, I will extend my thanks to my 
supervisors Peter Arbo and Bjørn Hersoug. Speaking from long experience in research, they have been 
inspiring guides into different theory traditions and the crafts of conducting research and writing up a 
scientific paper. I am also grateful to Alf Håkon Hoel, who was the first one who put me on the trace 
of implementation theory. Harald Sætren at the University of Bergen really got me on the track by en-
thusiastically receiving me with a pile of implementation books, and imperiously pointing at Winter’s 
model for implementation studies. I could do nothing than comply with the advice from a scholar like 
him, and I have had no regrets. Moreover, I will thank the members of the MARA research group, es-
pecially Maaike Knol, for comments to my manuscripts, and to Svein Jentoft and Knut H. Mikalsen 
for encouraging comments during my midterm-evaluation.  
My Faculty generously gave me a grant that made it possible to be a guest researcher at Dalhousie 
University for one semester. I had a very pleasant stay at the Marine and Environmental Law Institute 
due to the hospitality and support of Aldo Chircop, Meinhard Doelle, Lauri MacDougall, Phillip Saun-
ders and David VanderZwaag. My wife Eline managed to stay with me for some weeks, making the 
PhD work a pleasant experience of a new country for both of us. She has given me full support for the 
thesis work during its ups and downs, for which I am very grateful.  
Tromsø, December 2018 





Ecosystem-based management (EBM) is a holistic approach for nature management that aims at 
achieving the good health and sustainable use of ecosystems. A key undertaking is to assess the cumu-
lative impacts of all human activities affecting an ecosystem. This should be the basis for prioritising 
and allocating responsibilities for taking action on influences that threatens good ecosystem health. At 
this, EBM needs to integrate across ecosystem components, industries and their administrations, and 
different sciences and knowledge holders. It is a complex and challenging concept: understanding eco-
systems and human impacts upon them is complicated, there are demanding needs for collaboration 
and harmonisation of approaches and policies, and there are many conflicting interests that need to be 
balanced. It should therefore be no surprise that implementation of the concept has been slow.  
EBM originated on land in the US in the beginning of the 1990s and was introduced into the oceans 
some 10 years later. There seems to be agreement on its basic definitions, despite the many forms 
EBM takes when interpreted by different actors and adapted into different contexts. Several interna-
tional organisations have made recommendations. These are clear on the need to assess ecosystem 
conditions. However, several of them are unclear when it comes to the formulation and implementa-
tion of policy measures that can address the negative influences on the ecosystems. The selection of 
policy is a political process, not a technical issue or an automatic result of knowledge about the state 
of the ecosystems. It is inevitable that disagreements will arise, possibly leading to conflicts, deadlock 
and unresolved ocean problems. While participation in planning is widely recommended, a critical is-
sue seems to be how to avoid conflicts, and how to make decisions when conflicts arise. 
EBM is strongly dependent on assessments. Strategic environmental assessment (SEA) is a family of 
tools for assessing the impacts of strategic initiatives, often referred to as policies, plans and program-
mes. SEA is well suited for appraising cumulative impacts in regional assessments, which is a key un-
dertaking in EBM. It also has the proactive role of incorporating environmental knowledge into the 
preparation of strategic initiatives. This can contribute to making the results from EBM planning and 
decision-making mainstreamed into strategic initiatives of different sectors. Environmental impact as-
sessment (EIA) assesses concrete project proposals. Its role in EBM is to follow up prior SEAs and 
strategic, ecosystem-based plans in assessments prior to the potential approval of projects.  
International maritime and environmental law define obligations for states to undertake assessments. 
The Biodiversity Convention is the most relevant instrument in the Arctic Ocean because it is specific 
about SEA and EIA and applies to all maritime zones. Apart from this, there are very few legal obliga-
tions to undertake SEA. EIA, on the other hand, is a legally binding obligation, though it is unclear 
what this implies in practice. Thus, there is a mismatch in the assessment needs of EBM and the status 
of SEA in international law. It would be an advantage for EBM to strengthen the role of strategic as-
sessments. The most interesting legal option for doing so is the negotiations in the UN on marine bio-
logical diversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction.   
Implementing EBM will usually require some sort of national framework before planning for concrete 
ocean areas can begin. Norway introduced a policy for EBM in 2001 and has later made planning a 
routine in three management areas, one of which is the Barents Sea. The government prepared the 
Barents Sea management plan in a top-down manner. Most of the 157 measures in the plan have been 
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put into practice. This indicates that the plan may have reduced the pressures on the ecosystem. Im-
portant reasons for the implementation results are the insights and political legitimacy achieved by a 
strong reliance on knowledge, the collaborative style of involving the relevant ministries and the han-
dling of conflicts with authoritative decisions from a government in a majority position.  
Canada enacted EBM obligations in 1996 and started trial projects in five ocean areas. The federal 
government delegated planning to the regional branches of one ministry alone. They worked with 
other government bodies and stakeholders in consensus-based collaborative planning. The plans for 
the Eastern Scotian Shelf and for the Placenta Bay/Grand Banks did not result in the implementation 
of any new policy measures. A major reason is that the federal Canadian government did not attempt 
to overcome administrative and political fragmentation by a whole-of-government approach. Moreo-
ver, the participants in the planning concealed disagreements and conflicts in high-level and non-com-
mittal statements, resulting in plans that were unclear and not implementable. Conflict with one minis-
ter and changes in the ocean policy of the Canadian government contributed to the closure of the two 
initiatives. Since 2013, integrated ocean management is no longer a priority in Canada. Instead, the top 
priority is to designate marine protected areas according to international obligations.   
The Canadian and Norwegian plans have been studied with a combination of implementation theory 
and case study methodology. This is a promising combination that can contribute to more systematic 
learning from such processes and better, empirically based recommendations on how to proceed in 
practice.  
A major conclusions from the comparison of the cases is that the national governments should take an 
active leadership role in ecosystem-based management for large ocean areas. There is a need to set up 
collaborative structures across all relevant sectors and levels of government, to find mechanisms for 
sharing responsibilities for assessments and formulating policy, and to establish mechanisms for solv-
ing disagreements. Collaborative planning by consensus according to a governance approach does not 
seem feasible for solving disagreements and conflicts, according to the Canadian experiences. Listen-
ing to stakeholders and subsequently negotiating compromises over conflicts within the government 
do, according to the Norwegian case. This is in contrast to many recommendations of governance 
based approaches in EBM.  
The case comparison also rejects general conclusions contending that national ocean policies formally 
embedded in law tend to be more successful in the longer term than those solely based on executive 
action. Even though a legal base may be needed in many jurisdictions, the cases rather demonstrate 
that the political will to address ocean conflicts is a critical factor for achieving results.    
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The main topic of this thesis is the implementation of ecosystem-based ocean management (EBM). 
This is an integrated approach to nature management that is highly reliant on assessments. In this 
chapter, I will briefly introduce how EBM emerged from a call for integration, and present an over-
view of the complex set of environmental problems it is supposed to contribute solving. This is fol-
lowed by the research questions and an overview of the rest of the thesis. 
1.1 The call for integration 
 
“Hundreds of scientists from many countries (…) examined the state of knowledge of the 
world’s oceans and the ways in which humans benefit from and affect them. Their find-
ings indicate that the oceans’ carrying capacity is near or at its limit. It is clear that urgent 
action on a global scale is needed to protect the world’s oceans from the many pressures 
they face.”  
 
Former UN General Secretary Ban Ki-Moon in the preface to the first World Ocean As-
sessment (UN, 2016).  
Unfortunately, this message from Ban Ki-Moon is not unique. Over the years, numerous studies have 
appeared about environmental and resource problems in the oceans, followed by appeals to take action 
(MEA, 2005; Halpern et al., 2008; Rogers & Laffoley, 2013). The perceived nature, scale and severity 
of the problems have changed over time. Today, many problems are no longer confined to local areas, 
but affect larger regions or even the whole ocean system. There may be more in the pipeline if the pro-
spects for a ‘blue economy’ succeed in intensifying uses of the oceans, as signalled globally (OECD, 
2016), in Europe (European Commission, 2017) and in Norway (NFD, 2017). The challenge will be to 
accommodate new uses with the existing ones, without continuing the degradation of the ocean envi-
ronment.   
The traditional approach to environmental problems has been to confront them one at a time. Legal 
regimes and political initiatives at all levels have evolved for the management of living marine resour-
ces, for combating pollution and climate change, and for the regulation of industries and activities 
causing the problems (Birnie et al., 2009). Such initiatives have enabled progress on a number of is-
sues when counter-measures have been implemented effectively. Industrial discharges have been re-
duced, sewage in fiords and bays cleaned up, levels of banned substances in marine organisms have 
declined, and stocks of fish and marine mammals have recovered when managed properly (UN, 2016). 
Thus, the state of the oceans would have been much worse without the measures already introduced to 
address old problems such as pollution. However, old problems grow in states to which industrial pro-
duction has moved, where affluence increases and environmental policies are weak. Some well-known 
problems such as climate change and overexploitation of fish stocks remain unresolved. In addition, 
new problems such as plastic and noise pollution emerge because of new knowledge about their extent 
and impacts.     
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The Brundtland Commission in 1987 raised serious concerns about the inadequacy of traditional ways 
of addressing issues in isolation. Instead, it introduced sustainable development as an overarching, in-
tegrative concept. The Rio Conference in 1992 defined the term as the integration of three independent 
and mutually reinforcing pillars: economic development, social development and environmental pro-
tection (Birnie et al., 2009, p. 116). The message about the need for more integrative approaches to the 
management of nature and human activities permeates the documents from the conference. In the fol-
lowing years, EBM emerged on the international scene as one approach to integrated management. It 
has also been referred to as the ecosystem approach. For consistency, I will use EBM unless when re-
ferring to sources that use different terminology. 1  
 
 
Figure 1: EBM is an integrated approach that takes all components of the ecosystem into account 
(lower panel) as well as all sectors of society causing impacts on the ecosystem (upper panel) 
Source: The Norwegian Ministry of Environment 
 
EBM has an important scientific foundation in ecology, which introduced the ecosystem as a concept 
for understanding how species are interlinked in food webs, and how the living and non-living envir-
onment interact. The defining characteristic of EBM is that it makes the whole ecosystem the object of 
management, not its individual components. Figure 1 illustrates this as integration across the lower 
panel. Managing an ecosystem requires a holistic assessment of the cumulative impacts of all the pres-
sures acting upon it. In order to keep the impacts at acceptable levels, the relevant sectors of society 
must be addressed and take the requisite measures. In Figure 1, this means integrating across the upper 
panel. These holistic ambitions require coordination and collaboration between many knowledge-hold-
ers, industries and regulators, who operate in different sectors and at different levels, from the local to 
the global.   
 
                                                     
1 EBM and the ecosystem approach now «are often used interchangeably, and they mean generally the same 
thing» (UNEP 2011, see also Arkema et al (2006), Arctic Council (2013), Carlisle (2014) and Link & Bowman 
(2017)). Ecosystem approach is the dominating terminology in the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) 
and the UN General Assembly.  
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Assessments have become a key mechanism for informing decision-makers and for strengthening the 
relationship between science and policy. A generic definition states that assessments are formal efforts 
to assemble selected knowledge with a view towards making it publicly available in a form intended 
to be useful for decision-making (Mitchell et al., 2006). If the environment is the topic, environmental 
assessment is the common term. EBM depends on environmental assessments. With its ambition of 
integration, there is a corresponding need for integrated assessments (UNEP & IOC-UNESCO, 2009). 
These should cover integration across sectors and ecosystem components, as indicated above, and to a 
certain extent also the three pillars of sustainability. Moreover, there is a need to appraise policy res-
ponses. An analogy can illustrate this. If we compare the oceans with patients suffering from a number 
of diseases, as the World Ocean Assessment tells (UN, 2016), assessments can establish the diagnosis. 
They must clarify causes and effects of the diseases and their severity so the doctors can prioritise 
which to treat first. The doctors will usually need to consider several alternative treatments. They must 
make their choice based on an assessment of which treatment will work best for the patient. There 
may also be other considerations, such as cost limitations and side effects of the treatment on others. 
This analogy can serve as a first introduction to the breadth of assessment tasks needed in EBM.   
1.2 A complex set of environmental ocean problems  
An integrated approach for managing the cumulative effects on the ecosystem of all human activities 
must deal with very complex issues. Based on the World Ocean Assessment (UN, 2016), the environ-
mental problems in the oceans can be summarised under four headings:   
Harvesting and other forms of direct mortality. Fisheries, hunting and whaling increase the mortality 
of the targeted species. The fraction of fish stocks within biologically sustainable levels decreased 
from 90% in 1974 to 67% in 2015 (FAO, 2018). Many stocks of marine mammals that are no longer 
harvested have still not recovered to their former abundance. In addition to targeted species, non-target 
fish, marine mammals, turtles and seabirds are caught as by-catch. Incidental mortality can also follow 
from, for instance, ships striking marine mammals and underwater blasts.   
Pollution. On land, agriculture, industrial activities, urban developments and systems for the disposal 
of sewage and waste are major sources of harmful substances. Their emissions are transported towards 
the oceans by winds, precipitation, groundwater and rivers, and mixed in the oceans by the currents. 
At sea, major sources of pollution include all kinds of vessels, oil and gas production, aquaculture, 
dumping of waste, and activities interacting with the seabed, such as drilling, dredging and mining. 
The impacts of the harmful substances produced are complex. Excess input of nutrients causes eutro-
phication with algae blooms that, in serious stages, deplete the oxygen in the water. Eutrophication 
was traditionally a problem only in freshwater and coastal areas. Today, hypoxic dead zones also oc-
cur seasonally in the open ocean. Marine organisms are exposed to a cocktail of hazardous substances 
such as heavy metals, persistent organic pollutants, radionuclides, and oil and oil products. High con-
centrations may be lethal. However, major concerns are related to a number of sub-lethal effects that 
may lead to diseases and effects on reproduction and survival. Sewage and aquaculture introduce wa-
terborne pathogens and medicines, including antibiotics. Plumes of silt from activities affecting the 
seabed may physically cover bottom-living organisms and redistribute harmful substances. Huge 
quantities of plastics and other forms of marine debris have more recently caught wide attention. Un-
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derwater noise is another large-scale problem that has become a high-profile issue quite recently.2 Fi-
nally, the introduction of non-native species by for instance vessels, aquaculture and restaurants can be 
seen as a form of biological pollution.    
Habitat loss. Approximately 40% of the world’s population lives within 100 km of the shores. Their 
settlements lead to fragmentation and loss of habitats such as wetlands, seagrass and mangrove, and 
long coastlines with artificial structures. This affects marine species depending on such habitats, such 
as fish. Invasive species, disturbance from humans and urbanization threaten seabirds in their breeding 
and nursery areas. In the oceans, bottom trawling has affected large portions of the fishing grounds. 
Permanent marine installations and extractive industries also contribute to the disturbance of benthic 
habitats.  
Climate change. Heat from global warming is absorbed and stored in the oceans. This has led to pro-
found changes in physical conditions. Marine ecosystems change accordingly in terms of species com-
position and distribution. Temperature stress and mass mortality of corals, which create a particularly 
species-rich habitat, are serious concerns. In addition to climate change, the emission of CO2 into the 
atmosphere also causes ocean acidification. This may lead to the breakdown of calcareous skeletons 
and shells of certain marine organisms, with mostly unknown effects on species composition.   
Most of what is known about the impacts on ecosystems concern the direct impacts, which in many 
instances are well documented, as indicated above. However, impacts propagate to other species in the 
food web. For instance, the large-scale removal of biomass by fisheries and prior culling of marine 
mammals have indirect effects on other species through predator-prey relationships. Such higher order 
indirect impacts are hard to understand due to limited knowledge about the structure and functions of 
food webs. Trying also to assess indirect impacts on human society adds new layers of complexity and 
uncertainty. Examples include the positive and negative health effects of consuming seafood, reduced 
food security for small-scale fishers due to overfishing, and flooding of coastal settlements due to sea-
level rise and storms. The simultaneous occurrence of many activities, leading to cumulative impacts, 
is a related problem for understanding and assessment. “Those multiple pressures interact in ways that 
are poorly understood but can amplify the effects expected from each pressure separately” (UN, 
2016).   
1.3 Aim and scope of the thesis 
This PhD thesis is about ecosystem-based management and environmental assessments. More specifi-
cally, this introduction and the three articles submitted will contribute to answering the following re-
search questions:  
1. How has the concept of ecosystem-based management emerged, and what characterises the 
approach? 
 
2. What is the role of environmental assessments in ecosystem-based management and what is 
the legal status of assessments?   
 
                                                     
2 Underwater noise was the topic of the 19th meeting of the United Nations Open-Ended Informal Consultative 
Process on Oceans and the Law of the Sea in June 2018. See http://enb.iisd.org/oceans/icp19/ 
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3. What are the conditions for implementing the policies formulated in ecosystem-based plans 
for large marine areas?   
The first research questions is addressed only in this introduction. The second is addressed in the intro-
duction and in Paper 1. As will be seen, EBM as such only has a soft law status in international law. A 
reason for discussing the legal status of environmental assessments, is to see the extent to which the 
assessment part of EBM has a stronger legal status than the concept itself. The third research question 
is addressed by the two last papers.   
The first paper presents and discusses the international regime for environmental assessments in the 
Arctic Ocean. This is the legal framework for environmental assessments in this region, also applied to 
EBM. I wrote the article as a contribution to the global process of negotiating a new treaty for the pro-
tection of biodiversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction, and to the work of the Arctic Council on 
improving regional marine governance in the Arctic Ocean. Originally, the intention was to follow up 
with studies at the international level on the role of the Arctic Council in promoting EBM. However, 
the Arctic Council stated that the 17 large marine ecosystems in the Arctic (Figure 2) “represent the 
appropriate and primary units for applying the ecosystem approach to management” (PAME, 2014). 
 
 
Figure 2: Large marine ecosystems in the Arctic as defined by the Arctic Council. 
(Skjoldal & Mundy, 2013) 
 
This inspired a shift in focus from studying the international regime for EBM, to studies of how EBM 
is put into practice in such large marine ecosystems. As Chapter 2 will demonstrate, there is a rich nor-
mative literature about EBM, exploring what the concept could mean and recommending how it could 
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be operationalized. I was interested in complementing this with empirical research about what has 
been done in practice, and what has been achieved. Paper 2 therefore examines the extent to which 
policy formulated in the Norwegian Barents Sea Management Plan (BSMP) has been implemented, 
and explains the results based on implementation theory. This was a single case study that allowed for 
certain analytical generalisations. I was interested in building a broader empirical basis for generalisa-
tions about which approaches to EBM may work under what conditions. Paper 3 therefore focuses on 
the Canadian Eastern Scotian Shelf Integrated Management Plan (ESSIM), supplemented by another 
case from Canada, the Placenta Bay/Grand Banks Integrated Management Plan (PB/GB). Finally, the 
Norwegian and the Canadian cases are compared. 
The major part of the research for this thesis has already been published in international journals. In 
accordance with the requirements for a PhD at the University of Tromsø – The Arctic University of 
Norway, the purposes of this introduction are to supplement the papers by situating the articles in the 
wider research field, demonstrating the connections between the papers, and to present and discuss the 
methods applied. The structure of the thesis is as follows:   
Chapter 2 is about EBM. It explains the evolution of the concept, the normative definitions and recom-
mended approaches. This addresses research question 1.  
Chapter 3 discusses the role of environmental assessments in EBM. This addresses research question 2 
and builds a bridge between Paper 1 and the rest of the thesis. 
Chapter 4 starts with some reflections on the problem of implementing EBM before turning to a re-
view of prior attempts to study implementation. This is background to research question 3 and Papers 
2 and 3. There is also an overview of the theoretical framework applied.  
Chapter 5 contains a reflection on the methodology in the research papers  
Chapter 6 summarises the results, situates the results in the context of prior research, and points to fur-





2 Ecosystem-based ocean management  
 
There are many deep roots of EBM involving scholars from a number of countries and disciplines, 
such as ecology, natural resource management and urban and regional planning (Slocombe, 1993; 
Kidd et al., 2011). Still it is probably right to trace the direct origins of the concept to developments in 
the US, where it evolved on land. Starting the history in this particular social and political context may 
shed light on why the concept originated and why it was coined in the way it was. From these origins, 
it has spread internationally, and been received and translated into multiple contexts (Simmons et al., 
2006; Kingdon, 2010). This diffusion process is far too complicated to map here. Instead, I will go 
back to the international developments briefly introduced in Chapter 1 and explain how marine EBM 
emerged on the international scene. From there, I will introduce and discuss definitions, principles and 
recommended approaches.  
2.1 The origin on land in the US 
During the 1980s, “ecosystem management” emerged in opposition to traditional nature management 
in the US (Grumbine, 1994; Cortner & Moote, 1999; Layzer, 2008, pp. 9 - 41). The traditional nature 
management was based on a view in ecology that considered nature as consisting of confined, self-
regulating ecosystems. These were “the basic units of nature” (Tansley 1935, cited in Likens, 1992). 
According to the theory, ecosystems were undergoing successional development towards a climax 
stage that represented a stable equilibrium. The ideal state of ecosystems was usually defined with ref-
erence to prehistoric times, when humans did not disturb natural processes. Already in the 1960s and 
1970s, biologists challenged this “balance of nature” paradigm (Ladle & Gillson, 2009). The alterna-
tive view that emerged contended that ecosystems can be defined on all geographical scales, from a 
single drop of water to the whole biosphere, and therefore have a nested or hierarchical organisation. 
They are not confined, but open to exchange with neighbouring systems. Instead of being in balance 
around a prehistoric equilibrium, they are dynamic and in a continuous flux of variability and evolu-
tion. These changes in basic ecological understandings challenged attempts to protect parts of nature 
enclosed in parks and reserves, without linkages to the wider landscape. When aiming for a constant 
state of ecosystems was unattainable, and future states seemed unpredictable, the goals of management 
became more open and subject to societal values. These were in a flux following the rise of the envi-
ronmental movement after the 1960s. The public along with the new discipline of conservation biol-
ogy criticized existing management practices for not curbing biodiversity losses. They contended that 
traditional resource management that aimed at maximizing the output of commodities, such as timber 
or meat, delivered brittle, vulnerable ecosystems. These could flip into persistent, degraded states 
when triggered by disturbances that they could previously absorb (Holling, cited in Layzer 2008).  
A parallel critique emerged from planners and regulators. They saw local government control over 
land use policies as leading to urban sprawl that fragmented the landscape. Similarly, they criticized 
the impacts of wide-reaching water management projects driven by agricultural and urban expansions. 
Federal regulations and administrations, on the other hand, were criticized for being unable to address 
complex, interlinked problems. Critics contended that the federal level centralized decisions without 
taking local conditions and views into account. Moreover, top-down, expert-driven regulations created 
local resistance and adversarial mechanisms for resolving disputes by frequent appeals and litigation. 
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According to Layzer (2008), an anti-environmental reaction emerged in the early 1990s, deeply polar-
izing issues of land use and natural resource management. The incorporation of stakeholder participa-
tion and collaborative planning therefore seemed like a natural reaction to avoid future backlashes.   
During the 1990s, there was growing support in the US for “ecosystem-based management”. This was 
the new term introduced to emphasize that it was human behaviour that should be managed, not whole 
ecosystems directly (McLeod et al., 2005). The ecological basis for the concept was clarified, and sev-
eral partly overlapping definitions were compiled (Christensen et al., 1996). However, there was also 
reluctance to lock such a complex concept to a single definition, so several authors rather promoted 
principles and characteristics (Kidd et al., 2011, p. 4). Layzer (2008, pp. 22 - 23) in her review of these 
early steps, emphasized three common features that separated EBM from other new approaches at that 
time:    
• Ecological planning and management on a landscape scale, typically involving coordination 
across political boundaries  
• Collaborative planning in which public officials, private stakeholders and scientists assemble 
voluntarily to reach a consensus on promising solutions  
• Adaptive management that can accommodate learning from implementation, and flexible ap-
proaches based more on incentives than deterrence  
Around 2000, marine scientists, managers and policy makers in the US also started to support EBM 
(Layzer, 2008; Wondolleck & Yaffee, 2017). American authors have produced a large literature that 
has influenced global understandings, including one of the first text books, “Ecosystem-based man-
agement for the oceans” (McLeod & Leslie, 2009). The influence from the US has also been substan-
tial through the large marine ecosystem (LME) programme, which originated from the US National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. Since its earliest inception in 1984, it has evolved into a 
global movement with the participation of 110 developing countries in 22 LMEs around the globe, 
provided with $3.1 billion in financial support from the Global Environmental Facility (Sherman & 
Hamukuaya, 2016).  
2.2 International origins of ecosystem-based ocean management 
On the international scene, there are two major strands of marine governance that have produced a 
cross-sectoral and a sectoral approach to EBM, respectively (Garcia et al., 2014).   
The first of these is the international sustainability agenda. The Brundtland report from 1987 not only 
introduced the term sustainable development into high-level international politics, but also applied the 
term “ecosystem approach” (Engler, 2015). At the 1992 UN conference on the environment and devel-
opment in Rio, the states adopted several foundation stones for EBM, without explicitly using the 
term. Agenda 21, which was the action programme from the conference, highlighted the deterioration 
of ecosystems as a major challenge for humanity. In marine and coastal area management, it called for 
new approaches “that are integrated in content and are precautionary and anticipatory in ambit”.3  
Moreover, the Rio declaration on environment and development formulated several legal principles of 
                                                     
3 Section 17.1 in Agenda 21, adopted at UNCED Rio de Janeiro 3 to 14 June 1992. Available online at 
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/Agenda21.pdf Accessed 13 Nov 2018. 
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relevance for EBM, most clearly, that “states shall cooperate in a spirit of global partnership to con-
serve, protect and restore the health and integrity of the Earth’s ecosystems”.4  
At the Rio conference, states could also sign the Convention on Biodiversity (CBD). The treaty text 
does not explicitly mention EBM. The concept was introduced into the Convention in 1995, when the 
conference of the parties stated, “the ecosystem approach should be the primary framework for action 
to be taken under the convention”.5 Following a series of expert meetings, the parties in 2000 adopted 
a definition of the ecosystem approach, a set of 12 principles (the Malawi principles), and operational 
guidance in five points.6 The definition mandates a general area of application by its reference to inte-
grated management of land, water and living resources. It is also meant to encompass all relevant sec-
tors. In parallel, the parties launched an initiative for work on marine and coastal biodiversity in 1995, 
the so-called Jakarta Mandate. The content of this has evolved over time. Today it is one of the seven 
thematic programmes of the Convention. Furthermore, there are 24 cross-cutting programmes, one of 
which is the Ecosystem Approach.7  
In the fisheries sector, there is a strong tradition of single species management. In the 1960s, scientific 
interest in multispecies relations emerged (Link, 2010). Interest in how to manage multiple fish stocks 
in connection grew, though this still is a challenge for the sector. The scope in fisheries management 
was considerably broadened when the krill fisheries in Antarctica prompted the adoption of the Con-
vention on the Conservation of Atlantic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) in 1980. This was the 
first international convention to formulate important elements of EBM through its requirement to con-
sider the ecosystem when harvesting (Wang, 2004a; Maes, 2008; Birnie et al., 2009, p. 592).8 The 
Convention thus became a precursor to what would become the ecosystem approach to fisheries 
(EAF) (Garcia et al., 2003). The international sustainability agenda and CBD were important drivers 
for the evolution of EAF. An important milestone was reached with the adoption of the UN Fish Stock 
Agreement in 1995. It introduced new obligations for sustainable use in the global fisheries regime, a 
precautionary approach, and obligations towards the whole ecosystems in which fisheries operate. 
                                                     
4 Principle 7. Several other principles are also relevant for EBM, especially the coupling of environmental pro-
tection to development (principle 4), the role of science (principle 9), the participation of citizens (principle 10), 
the precautionary principle (principle 15) and environmental impact assessment (principle 17). The Rio Declara-
tion is the most significant universally endorsed statement of general rights and obligations of states regarding 
the environment (Birnie et al., 2009, p. 112). The declaration is legally non-binding. However, several of the 
principles have since attained the status of customary law and have thus become legally binding.  
5 COP 2, decision II/8, Jakarta 1995. Available at https://www.cbd.int/decision/cop/default.shtml?id=7081  
6 COP 5, decision V/6, Nairobi 2000. Available at https://www.cbd.int/decision/cop/default.shtml?id=7148 . See 
also the background recommendation V/10 from the Subsidiary Body of Science Technology and Technical Ad-
vice, available at https://www.cbd.int/recommendation/sbstta/default.shtml?id=7027 . The Convention’s account 
of how it developed its ecosystem approach can be found at https://www.cbd.int/ecosystem/background.shtml   
7 See overview of the structure of CBD’s work at https://www.cbd.int/programmes/   
8 Article II requires that harvesting shall be conducted in a manner that maintains the ecological relationships 
between harvested and other species, and which prevents irreversible changes to the marine ecosystem, including 
when the effects of other human activities and environmental changes are taken into account. Note also the the-
matic scope in Article I, which is all species of marine living organisms, not only fish. The Convention text is 
available at https://www.ccamlr.org/en/organisation/camlr-convention-text#II  Both Garcia et al. (2003) and 
Birnie et al. (2009, p. 660) comment that CCMLR has not managed to live up to its EBM principles in practice. 
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However, it did not explicitly refer to the term EAF.9 Another important development in the global 
fisheries regime was the adoption of the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries by the Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the UN (FAO). The Code collated legally binding and non-binding ele-
ments in one document. This was taken further when a conference in Reykjavik in 2001 adopted a 
declaration that recognized the EAF as a form of fisheries governance framework (FAO, 2001). The 
FAO later produced guidelines for the practical implementation of these high-level policy goals (FAO, 
2005).    
With these two developments in place, the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannes-
burg in 2002 could “encourage the applicability by 2010 of the ecosystem approach, noting the Rey-
kjavik Declaration on Responsible Fisheries in the Marine Ecosystem and decision V/6 of the Confer-
ence of Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity“.10 The plan also promoted “integrated, mul-
tidisciplinary and multisectoral coastal and ocean management at the national level”. This was an im-
portant milestone in the evolution of marine EBM and signalled that the time for implementation had 
come.  
Since 2002, high-level declarations from UN conferences on sustainable development11 and annual 
resolutions on oceans and fisheries12 have continued to refer to integrated, ecosystem-based app-
roaches. A number of international organisations and states have included EBM and EAF in their 
norms and work programmes. Thus, there has been growing support for EBM in international law, 
policy and practice (Wang, 2004a; Maes, 2008). However, what we find is soft-law, indicating policy 
directions and aspirational goals (Engler, 2015). EBM has still not achieved the status of customary 
international law and is not a standard feature of modern environmental treaties, even though elements 
can be found (Trouwborst, 2009). One reason is that most of the relevant treaties were adopted prior to 
                                                     
9 See particularly the preamble, arts 5, 6 and 7(2)f. The obligations include assessing the impacts of fishing on 
the ecosystem. Measures that could avoid species to be threatened or other harmful impacts should be adopted 
where necessary. The treaty text is available at http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/conven-
tion_overview_fish_stocks.htm    
10 See 30(d) in the Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, UN 
A/CONF.199/20, available at http://www.un-documents.net/jburgpln.htm  
11 In «The future we want» from 2012, the section on oceans and seas (para 158 – 177) refer to the commitment 
to “effectively apply an ecosystem approach and the precautionary approach in the management (…), of activi-
ties having an impact on the marine environment”. See  https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/fu-
turewewant.html  In 2015, the UN adopted Agenda 2030, containing sustainable development goals. Goal 14.2 
about sustainable management and protection of marine and coastal ecosystems has an indicator that measures 
the proportion of EEZs managed according to “ecosystem-based approaches”. See https://oceanconfer-
ence.un.org/sdg14  The UN Ocean Conference in 2017 was dedicated to Goal 14. It intended to mobilize volun-
tary commitments, i.a. on «ecosystem approaches». See https://oceanconference.un.org/coa/MarineCoastal (All 
web sites accessed 27 June 2018) 
12 The annual resolutions from the UN General Assembly on “Oceans and the law of the sea” and “Sustainable 
fisheries” routinely encourage states and international organisations to apply ecosystem approaches. The Oceans 
resolution from 2006 (61/222) is of particular interest since it contained the results of discussions at a special 
session about the definitions and principles of ecosystem approaches. In the resolutions from 2017, the following 
articles illustrate the UN engagement more recently: the preamble and art. 232 - 235 of the Ocean resolution 
(72/73), as well as art. 13, 14, 17, 170, 175 and 178 of the Fisheries resolution (72/72). All resolutions are availa-




the evolution of EBM. Another reason may be the problems of defining the concept and its implica-
tions, as the next sections will discuss.   
2.3 Definitions and principles  
The diffusion of EBM means that many actors have taken up the concept, each needing to fill it with 
content. At the international level, definitions and approaches have been discussed by, for instance, 
parties to conventions (CBD, CCAMLR and OSPAR), in the UN system (the General Assembly, 
United Nations Environmental Programme [UNEP] and FAO), by intergovernmental organisations 
(the International Council for the Exploration of the Seas [ICES], regional seas organisations, regional 
fisheries bodies), by the EU and by international non-governmental organisations (International Union 
for Conservation of Nature [IUCN], SeaWeb, WWF). There are even more definitions at the national 
level and in the scientific literature (McLeod et al., 2005; Arkema et al., 2006; Long et al., 2015). It is 
therefore necessary to conduct analyses across sources. This was undertaken by an Expert Group on 
EBM in the Arctic Council in order to formulate guidance for the organisation’s work (Arctic Council, 
2013).13 Like many others, the group distinguished between a definition and a number of principles. 
Their selected definition stated that:  
“Ecosystem-based management is the comprehensive, integrated management of human 
activities based on best available scientific and traditional knowledge about the ecosys-
tem and its dynamics, in order to identify and take action on influences that are critical to 
the health of ecosystems, thereby achieving sustainable use of ecosystem goods and ser-
vices and maintenance of ecosystem integrity.“ 
Another influential definition, which was not considered by the Arctic Council expert group, is a con-
sensus-statement among US scientists (McLeod et al., 2005):  
“Ecosystem-based management is an integrated approach to management that considers 
the entire ecosystem, including humans. The goal of ecosystem-based management is to 
maintain an ecosystem in a healthy, productive and resilient condition so that it can pro-
vide the services humans want and need. Ecosystem-based management differs from cur-
rent approaches that usually focus on a single species, sector, activity or concern; it con-
siders the cumulative impacts of different sectors.” 
One could add more definitions, but these suffice to highlight the key characteristics of EBM. Firstly, 
a unique feature is that the whole ecosystem is considered as the object for management, not merely 
single species, habitats or concerns. The goal is to maintain the health of the ecosystem,14 while allow-
ing sustainable use. The reason for doing so is not unique to EBM. International environmental law is 
predominantly anthropocentric (Birnie et al., 2009, pp. 596 - 600); so is the rationale for caring for the 
                                                     
13 The sources were CBD, OSPAR, UNEP, Seaweb, the US Commission on Ocean Policy, and internal uses in 
the Arctic Council, see pp 21-23 in the report.  
14 Integrity, structure, function, productivity and resilience are other normative characteristics of goals for the 
ecosystem that can be found for instance in Grumbine (1994), Arctic Council (2013) and Engler (2015).  
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ecosystems when referring to them as providers of the services humans want and need.15 Secondly, in 
order to ensure the health of the ecosystem, the cumulative impact of all kinds of human activities 
must be assessed. This is the basis for identifying the activities that cause the most severe negative im-
pacts, and thus for pointing out who should have the responsibility to take the appropriate actions 
needed. These characteristics can be seen as two requirements for integration, as illustrated in Figure 
1: integration across all components of the ecosystem (lower panel) and across all relevant sectors or 
human activities that affect the ecosystem (upper panel). A third integrative feature related to govern-
ance largely follows from these two: in order to assess the state of the ecosystem and human impacts 
upon it, there is a need to mobilize knowledge from a broad range of sciences, but also from other 
forms of knowledge. In order to take action, industries and regulating authorities must be engaged. 
These may operate at different levels, from the local to the global. Thus, EBM has been characterised 
as a multi-knowledge, multi-sector and multi-level approach (Arbo & Thủy, 2016).   
It is my understanding that these three requirements for integration are key characteristics of EBM that 
seem to be generally accepted, even though the wordings and nuances of the definition vary. What 
else to include in a definition is a matter of taste - whether one prefers a lean definition, focusing on 
these essentials, or a more comprehensive one that adds other principles and approaches. The origin of 
such add-ons can often be attributed to sources other than EBM, for instance, the need to find facts be-
fore making decisions (Faludi & Waterhout, 2006), or ideals about participation reflecting a general 
governance turn (Kidd et al 2011). However, one can argue that it is the combination of all these ele-
ments that describes EBM comprehensively, thereby giving a clearer direction for implementation 
than a lean definition.16  
The Expert group also compared long lists of principles,17 finally synthesizing them into nine as com-
mon elements of a potential approach by the Arctic Council:  
1. EBM supports ecosystem resilience in order to maintain ecological functions and services. 
2. EBM recognizes that humans and their activities are an integral part of the ecosystem as a 
whole (…). 
3. EBM is place-based: it applies to geographic areas defined by ecological criteria, and may re-
quire efforts at a range of spatial and temporal scales.  
4. EBM balances and integrates the conservation and sustainable use of ecosystems and their 
components.  
                                                     
15 The terminology of ecosystem services gained public recognition with the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 
(MEA, 2005). The term ecosystem services goes beyond direct utility, which is covered by MEA’s category pro-
visioning services (can also be referred to as ecosystem goods), and cultural services that provide non-material 
benefits, such as aesthetical and spiritual appreciation and knowledge. Humans also have indirect utility of basic 
ecological functions (regulating services that maintain environmental quality and supporting services such as 
primary production and nutrient cycling). Across these categories, there are non-use values related to the exist-
ence of ecosystem components and utility for future generations.  
16 Examples of scientific literature addressing EBM principles are Rosenberg and Sandifer (2009), Engler 
(2015), Long et al. (2015) and Rudd et al. (2018). 
17 The Group elicited principles from the Ecological Society of Amerika (Christensen et al., 1996), CBD’s Ma-
lawi-principles, the 2006 UN Open-ended informal consultative process on oceans and the law of the sea (see 
footnote 12), WWF and an Arctic Council report (Hoel, 2008). See Arctic Council (2013), pp 23 – 27 with origi-
nal principles and pp 13 – 19 for the joint analysis. Principle 6 and 8 are modified based on underlying princi-
ples, while some of the others are slightly edited.  
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5. EBM aims to understand and address the combined, incremental effects (known as “cumula-
tive impacts”) that multiple human activities impose upon ecosystems, resources and commu-
nities. 
6. EBM is knowledge-based: decisions should be based on information that seeks to incorporate 
and reflect scientific knowledge as well as expert, traditional and local knowledge.  
7. EBM is inclusive and encourages participation at all stages by various levels of governments, 
indigenous peoples, stakeholders (including the private sector) and other Arctic residents.  
8. EBM is transboundary: there is a need to consider connections among ecosystems, including 
exchanges between the oceans, land and the atmosphere. Partnerships across such boundaries 
can contribute significantly to the success of EBM efforts. 
9. Successful EBM efforts are flexible and adaptive because human activities and ecosystems are 
dynamic, the Arctic is undergoing rapid changes, and our understanding of these systems is 
constantly evolving.  
At this level of principles, interpretations and opinions are more divided. For instance, it is surprising 
that the Group did not include the precautionary principle, which is considered essential to EBM 
(Trouwborst, 2009). It is also noteworthy that even though it emphasized inclusiveness, it did not refer 
to collaborative planning and decision-making, as this approach is controversial (Layzer, 2008). Re-
garding humans as a part of the ecosystem, this is uncontroversial as long as it refers to humans as re-
ceivers of amenities from ecosystems and sources of influence upon them (Grumbine, 1994; Cortner 
& Moote, 1999). However, subsuming human activities and regulatory institutions into the ecosystem 
(Garcia et al., 2003) may be viewed as integrative by some, reductionist by others. When the integra-
tion is furthered to attempt the interdisciplinary concept of socioecological systems and resilience the-
ory, reactions from the social sciences can be harsh (Olsson et al., 2015). There are also tensions 
within principles that can easily lead to disagreements. For instance, the role of traditional knowledge 
versus science may not be easy to negotiate, including which methods should be accepted or who 
should have a final say in case of conflicting views (Sejersen, 2003). Another example is the alloca-
tion of roles to the different participants mentioned in principle 7, as illustrated in Paper 3.   
Whereas the definition above concerns fully cross-sectoral EBM, any individual sector could also ap-
ply it. Referring to Figure 1, it would mean that one sector in the upper panel takes responsibility for 
its impacts on the whole ecosystem in the lower panel. The EAF, supplemented by an ecosystem app-
roach to aquaculture (FAO, 2010), seem to be the only sectoral approach that exists internationally.18 
It has been suggested that it is not fruitful to create a sharp divide between single-sector and multi-sec-
toral EBM; rather there is a continuum from single-species management to gradually increasing com-
plexity with more fish species, more ecosystem components and more sectors and sea users involved 
(Dolan et al., 2016). This understanding opens up an incremental development of EBM, gradually ex-
panding from the existing management structures and approaches to something more cross-sectoral 
and challenging (Yaffee, 1999; Hilborn, 2011; Agardy et al., 2016). Sectoral approaches can contrib-
ute to the broader mandate of sustainable use. However, for the full consideration of all impacts and 
                                                     
18 There is no comprehensive international regulatory regime for the oil and gas sector into which such an app-
roach could be incorporated (Hoel et al., 2009). However, the International Petroleum Industry Environmental 
Conservation Association has paid some attention to EBM (IPIECA, 2007). The shipping industry has a global 
regulatory regime, but it seems that it has not tried to define an ecosystem approach to shipping. Nevertheless, 
the International Maritime Organization has been the forum for developing a comprehensive set of treaties and 
other instruments addressing environmental impacts from shipping. Dolan et al. (2016) still refer to all sectors. 
This may imply that more sectoral approaches exist at the national level.  
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user conflicts, some form of integrated planning and decision-making becomes necessary. This moves 
the management into the domain of cross-sectoral EBM (Cowan et al., 2012).  
2.4 Ecosystem-based management in practice 
There are many faces of EBM, depending on how it is adapted to different contexts. “Although there 
are common elements that should guide the core of EBM in all cases (…), EBM will look different in 
different places, tailored to the unique mix of ecological, social and political conditions in a specific 
geographical area” (Agardy et al., 2003). This is a stated reason for a reluctance in the EBM literature 
to be prescriptive about how to proceed in practice. As an alternative, some authors have argued that 
identified principles and criteria should guide managers (Arkema et al., 2006). Others have identified 
key elements and actions that are consistent with EBM (McLeod et al., 2005). Still there are further 
recommendations from several international organisations, private foundations and academics. In this 
section, I will review some of those put forward by international conventions and organisations. 
At the global level, the CBD is most important to consider due to its early adoption of EBM and its 
wide-reaching influence. The parties to the Convention consider “the implementation of the ecosystem 
approach and all principles (…) as voluntary instruments.”19  In their last decision on EBM from 2008, 
20 they recognized the needs to translate the normative framework into guidelines adapted for specific 
biogeographical regions and circumstances, instead of “one-size-fits all” solutions. The basis for this 
should be learning-by-doing and case studies submitted by the parties. In the meantime, capacity 
building should remain the priority, with the preparation of easy-to-understand communication materi-
als and manuals through an Ecosystem Approach Sourcebook and other mechanisms. Ten years later, 
the guidance in the Sourcebook on the CBD website is a long list of possible tasks under the headings 
“Problem definition” and “Creating a management plan”. 21  The “Tools and approaches” section reel 
off long lists of short bullet points with names of methods that may be applied, while only a handful of 
marine case studies can be found.22 The thematic programme for marine and coastal biodiversity 
brings no more clarification: it contains references to the ecosystem approach as a kind of high-level 
inspiration, but no guidance on its marine applications. 23  
The regional level is an important arena for promoting EBM. There are primarily three mechanisms 
for regional collaboration globally (Rochette et al., 2015):   
• The Regional Seas Programmes, most of which are supported by the United Nations Environ-
mental Programme (UNEP)  
• The Large Marine Ecosystems programme, supported by the US National Oceanic and At-
mospheric Administration (NOAA) and the Global Environment Facility (GEF)24  
                                                     
19 COP 7 in Kuala Lumpur 2004, decision VII/11, art. 3. 
20 COP 9 in Bonn 2008, decision IX/7. This is the last COP decision on the ecosystem approach, according to 
this web site https://www.cbd.int/ecosystem/decisions.shtml (accessed 14 Nov 2018). 
21 See https://www.cbd.int/ecosystem/sourcebook/default.shtml . 
22  Case studies can be accessed here: https://www.cbd.int/ecosystem/sourcebook/search/default.shtml As of 14 
Nov 2018, there were 54 case studies registered, four of which related only to marine and coastal biomes. 
23 See https://www.cbd.int/marine/resources.shtml  
24 GEF is a global mechanism for assisting developing countries in addressing global environmental concerns, 
such as the degradation of international waters. It adopted the concept of LMEs in 1995. GEF only finances the 
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• Regional fisheries bodies, several of which are supported by the UN Food and Agriculture Or-
ganization (FAO)  
All of the supporting organisations promote EBM; the first two cross-sectoral EBM, the third EAF. I 
will here compare the two recommendations for cross-sectoral EBM. In addition, I will include the 
framework of the Arctic Council since this is a peculiar organisation with a high-level engagement for 
EBM in a region where the abovementioned regional organisations are scarce (Boxes 1 - 3).25  
 
                                                     
portion of LME initiatives that produce global or transboundary benefits, not purely national benefits (Carlisle 
2014). See https://www.thegef.org/   
25 The Expert Group referred above has not developed the Arctic Council framework described here. It is the 
product of a sub-group under the Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME) working group of the 
Arctic Council. See https://www.pame.is/index.php/projects/ecosystem-approach    
Box 1: Arctic Council’s framework for EBM (PAME 2014)  
1. Identify the ecosystem as a geographical entity based on ecological criteria. 
2. Describe the ecosystem:  
• Biological and physical characteristics.  
• Relevant management systems and participants.  
3. Set ecological objectives 
• Include species and habitats and the overall desirable status of the ecosystem/level of pressures. 
• Translate ecological objectives into management objectives.  
4.  Assess the ecosystem in an integrated ecosystem assessment 
• Gather status and trend observations of all relevant ecosystem components.  
• Measure or estimate the impacts of various human activities and their cumulative impacts. 
• Include socioeconomic factors as driving forces for uses and impacts, and as consequences for soci-
ety arising from the altered provision of ecosystem goods and services.   
5. Value the ecosystem 
• Identify and value its goods and services so that economic, social and cultural values may be more 
fully incorporated into mainstream socioeconomics.  
6. Manage human activities to achieve and maintain the agreed ecological objectives.  
• Managers apply adaptive methods for shaping human behaviour tailored to shifting ecological and 
social conditions.  
• Make the best use of available scientific and other knowledge; the outcomes of integrated assess-
ments need to be translated through a scientific advisory process into clear and transparent advice to 
inform adaptive management. 
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Box 2. The Large Marine Ecosystems and the Global Environment Facility approach 
The LME approach consists of five interdependent modules (Wang, 2004b; Carlisle, 2014; Sherman, 2014): 
 
Fig 3: The LME modules and the indicators associated with each (Mahon et al 2009). 
The productivity module focuses on oceanographic variability and plankton, which can be related to the 
carrying capacity of the ecosystem.  
The fish and fisheries module focuses on the abundance and health of fish and shellfish. Consideration of 
their competitors, prey and predators opens up wider biodiversity issues.  
The pollution and ecosystem health module focuses on marine pollution and contaminants. It may extend 
to any other issue related to marine ecosystem health, such as habitat integrity, invasive species or eutrophi-
cation.  
The socioeconomics module concerns the value of ecosystem goods and services provided by an LME. It 
also concerns other measures of human well-being related to the use of resources, such as distribution and 
equity.    
The governance module concerns the formal and informal arrangements that influence human behaviour 
with an impact on the LME. It includes laws, politics, market forces and cultural norms.   
The Global Environmental Facility has supported several projects that have applied the five modules, though 
this is not required. To get support, however, the projects must prepare certain strategic documents, into 
which information from the modules may be incorporated (Carlisle, 2014):   
• Transboundary Diagnostic Analysis, which is an environment assessment of an international wa-
ter area. The participating countries identify and prioritize major concerns, and determine their im-
pacts and root causes.  
• Strategic Action Plan, which is a joint program of action agreed among the collaborating coun-
tries. The countries very often also develop national action plans.  
• Monitoring and Evaluation Plan for measuring progress, consisting of process indicators, stress 




In the next sections, I will discuss the approaches in the light of themes that are of theoretical interest. 
I will look at underlying assumptions, where the approaches agree and differ and how they relate to 
common debates from the wider literature. I will first look at two of the issues in what I have called 
the core characteristics of EBM, the thematic scope and governance. I continue with the operationali-
zation of processes and steps prescribed, make some observations in light of planning and decision 
theory, and finally position EBM towards other marine policies and frameworks. The description is 
primarily based on the reading of the normative documents, not on studies of how they may be put 
into practice.  
2.5 Thematic scope   
All the frameworks include assessing the state of the marine biophysical environment, the cumulative 
impacts, and identification of the sources of impacts from different human activities. These issues are 
key in the recommendations and recommended as the basis for formulating objectives. To a certain 
extent, the frameworks also consider social and economic issues. The Arctic Council approach elabo-
rates extensively on the biological aspects and recommends setting ecological objectives. It mentions 
«socioeconomics in the broadest sense» under valuation of the ecosystems, without any more specifi-
cation or methodological guidance. Socioeconomics are also mentioned as driving forces and among 
the possible impacts to consider in assessments. The UNEP guidelines recommend the integration of 
assessments so they include social and economic dimensions, but does not go into more detail on how. 
Under objectives, there is reference only to biological issues. The LME framework seemingly has the 
clearest focus on socioeconomics by devoting one of its modules to this topic. However, «the socioec-
onomics module is perhaps less well developed than the three natural science modules» (Carlisle 
2014).  
These thematic scopes support the general characteristic that the ecosystem occupies the centre stage 
in EBM, while the social and economic aspects are relegated to the background (Kittinger et al., 2014; 
Box 3: UNEP’s framework for EBM (Agardy et al., 2011) 
1. A visioning phase establishing the foundation for EBM: 
• Identify the geographical area and key concerns. 
• Build interest among sectors and stakeholders, and create organisational mechanisms for the work. 
• Take stock of the ecosystem and existing management practices. 
• Establish overarching goals.  
2. A planning phase charting what to do:  
• Assess the ecosystem in an integrated manner. 
• Evaluate governance options, and create a framework for multi-sector management involving govern-
ments and their agencies, the private sector and civil society. 
• Identify precise and measurable objectives  
• Prioritize the most severe threats; evaluate management options and trade-offs. 
• Choose management strategies for implementation.  
 3. An implementation phase in which EBM is applied and adapted:  





Arbo & Thủy, 2016). The assessments may incorporate socioeconomic issues as an analytical element, 
but they are not considered objectives on equal terms with the need to maintain or restore ecosystems 
in a healthy state. This should be no surprise. One could rather argue that this is a distinctive feature 
that makes EBM an ecosystem approach, different from integrated management with an equal focus on 
the three pillars of sustainability. In the sustainability discourse, EBM can thus be seen as an approach 
that can contribute to «environment first», as advocated by for instance Grumbine (1994). The distinc-
tion is clear at a conceptual level, though it may be hard to draw sharp lines in practice, as I will come 
back to in Section 2.9.  
2.6 Governance 
The Arctic Council framework recommends identifying relevant management systems including re-
sponsible agencies and jurisdictional aspects, as well as the indigenous people and the stakeholders 
residing in the defined area. There is no more guidance on how to do this or for what purpose.  
The UNEP guidelines recommends undertaking a governance assessment at an early stage and identi-
fying gaps. They maintain having the right governance arrangements as “critical”. The stated reason is 
the need to implement a diverse mix of regulations that can address threats to the ecosystems. There is 
only very general guidance as to what this could mean in practice.  
The purpose of the LME governance module is to formulate effective strategic interventions address-
ing the drivers of human activities degrading the ecosystem (Carlisle, 2014). Juda and Hennessey 
(2001) suggested that the characteristics of the governance system should be mapped and monitored in 
as it evolves, in parallel to the modules addressing the natural system. Despite these intentions, the so-
cioeconomic and governance modules are “clearly the ones having received the least attention” 
(Rochette et al., 2015).   
UNEP and the LME framework are clear on the purpose of having effective governance arrangements. 
They also describe the challenges involved in coordinating different levels and sectors in implement-
ing a set of agreed measures. However, the guidance provided is not very specific. The UNEP guide-
lines identify a diverse menu of strategies consisting of watershed management across drainage basins 
and integrated coastal zone management, mostly at the landside, and marine spatial planning, marine 
protected areas and fisheries management in the oceans. The tasks and parties involved in the strate-
gies raise different needs for governance arrangements. The guidelines give hardly any guidance on 
which approaches and methods may lead to successful outcomes under what conditions.  
Participation and conflict resolution are other topics that would merit better treatment in such guiding 
frameworks. “There appears to be a firm belief in the simple idea that by bringing actors together and 
ensuring adequate information about the vulnerability of the ecosystems and the many benefits that 
healthy ecosystems provide, everybody will understand the urgency of conservation measures” (Arbo 
& Thủy, 2016). What happens when different interests appear and conflicts arise, merit investigation 
as a basis for further guidance. From other policy arenas, there is a large literature about stakeholders 
analysis and mapping (Pomeroy & Douvere, 2008; Reed et al., 2009), the problems of recognizing dif-
ferences and reaching a consensus (Lewins, 2001; Ansell & Gash, 2008; den Broeder et al., 2016) and 
dilemmas arising between democratic ideals and practical constraints (Linke & Jentoft, 2016; 




2.7 The policy cycle and the planning process 
The definitions of EBM are clear in statements about what is the key activity of the approach: the 
management of human activities that affect the ecosystem. This requires a basic understanding of the 
need to formulate and implement management measures. The assessment of ecosystems is a necessary 
step in the process since it establishes a diagnosis. However, the goals are not achieved until a treat-
ment is prescribed and the patient is in good health, to use the analogy from Chapter 1. In order to 
make this operational, the frameworks should somehow relate to a standard policy cycle (Figure 4).  
The first five elements of the Arctic Council framework relate to planning. The emphasis is on finding 
facts and making assessments. It is unclear if, and how, the framework intends to proceed also to for-
mulate and adopt policy. The closest to formulating policy is the setting of objectives. Objectives and 
assessments are apparently meant to be sufficient to proceed to element six, in which “managers apply 
methods for shaping human behaviour that are adaptive” while being advised by scientists.  
 
Figure 4: It is common to present the policy process as a sequence of steps, linked in a cycle that im-
plies adaptive management through feedback processes. The blue boxes show different types of scien-
tific advice. Source: Connors 2014.26 
The UNEP guidelines separate a planning phase from implementation. During planning, assessments 
and the setting of objectives are meant to be followed by the identification and evaluation of manage-
ment options. These are called broad management strategies, and include marine spatial planning, ma-
rine protected areas and fisheries management. However, each of these strategies need new cycles of 
planning in order to designate concrete actions. Trade-offs should be analysed and decisions made, but 
                                                     
26 Available at https://blogs.egu.eu/geolog/2016/09/14/geopolicy-science-and-the-policy-cycle/  
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it is unclear by whom. The guidelines consider the implementation phase as essential to avoid a situa-
tion wherein “EBM will remain a theory and not an actual practice”. However, the description of what 
to do during implementation is very brief.  
The modular LME approach alone is hard to grasp as a tool for planning and implementation. The fo-
cus is on developing indicators for monitoring and assessment. First when the information from the 
modules is coupled with approaches from planning and policy-analysis, there is a chance of producing 
tangible results. GEF’s requirements for support do this by creating a logic sequence of actions for 
adaptive management (Sutinen & Hennessey, 2005). Standing alone, however, the five modules form 
a compartmentalized structure that does not facilitate the types of integrated assessment and actions 
that are required to bring about change (Mahon et al., 2009; Fanning et al., 2013).  
The Arctic Council framework in practice promotes EBM primarily as a natural science initiative that 
creates facts combined with normative judgement.27 There has been similar criticism of the LME ap-
proach (Mahon et al., 2009; Rochette et al., 2015). An evaluation of the GEF supported LME projects 
concluded that while they had generated a wealth of useful scientific information, relatively little had 
been achieved in terms of improved practices, new management actions and protection of priority sites 
(Bensted-Smith et al 2010). The UNEP guidelines, on the other hand, advocate the formulation and 
implementation of measures. 
It is tempting to compare these frameworks with EU’s Marine Strategy Framework Directive, even 
though it is a piece of legislation created in a peculiar constitutional context (Box 4).28 The point to 
make in this context is the structuring of the tasks in order to formulate a programme of measures that 
can achieve Good Ecological Status. The approach works in the sense that all European coastal states 
are obliged to follow the Directive under the control of the European Commission, which shall ap-
prove their implementation of critical steps. The cyclical nature of the Directive allows for adaptive 
management with learning and improvements in later cycles.  
2.8 Ecosystem-based management and planning theory 
EBM relies heavily on planning and decision-making. Underlying the practical side of how to pro-
ceed, addressed in the previous section, there are theoretical insights from planning and decision the-
ory. Discussing how the academic literature on EBM relates to discussions in these traditions could 
have been the subject for a thesis in itself. Here I will make some straightforward observations. A first 
one is that there seem to be very few references to these traditions in the EBM literature. Kidd et al. 
(2011) is one exception.29 Inspired by their description, I will look at issues of comprehensiveness, the 
role of experts versus stakeholders, and issues of power. 
                                                     
27 Note also the fact sheets of the Arctic Large Marine Areas at https://pame.is/index.php/projects/ecosystem-
approach/arctic-large-marine-ecosystems-lme-s  As of November 2018, they contained only biological infor-
mation, nothing about assessments and management activities. 
28 See http://ec.europa.eu/environment/marine/eu-coast-and-marine-policy/marine-strategy-framework-di-
rective/index_en.htm (source of the figure in Box 4) and http://ec.europa.eu/environment/marine/eu-coast-and-
marine-policy/implementation/reports_en.htm (accesssed November 2018)   
 
29 I deliberately restrict my observations to the EBM literature since I have the impression that planning theory 





In the modernist tradition of the 20th century, a rationalistic model that drew upon science dominated 
the planning. One of its characteristics was the ideal of achieving a complete overview as a basis for 
rational decisions (Banfield, 1959). The planners should compile and analyse as much information as 
possible and develop all feasible alternative solutions to the planning problem, each to be assessed 
against a wide set of criteria. Based on clearly articulated goals, they could then calculate the optimal 
solution. Decisions were often associated with a top-down approach and a belief in command-and-
control. The antithetic alternative to this was incrementalism, or the noble art of “muddling through” 
                                                     
is about the ecosystem approach, whereas Chapter 2, which contains this discussion at pp 43 – 54, mostly is 
about marine spatial planning. 
Box 4: EU’s Marine Strategy Framework Directive 
 
Fig 5: The content and timelines of the first cycle of marine strategy development. Source: EC28 
The Directive establishes European marine regions and requires cooperation between neighbouring states, 
preferably through regional seas conventions. Each coastal state is to develop a marine strategy that: 
• Assesses the current environmental status of its marine waters, the impacts of human activities upon 
that quality, and the socio-economics of the uses of the waters. 
• Determines what “good environmental status” means in relation to 11 criteria (“descriptors”).  
• Sets appropriate environmental targets and associated indicators to achieve good environmental sta-
tus (GES) by 2020. 
• Establishes a monitoring programme for the ongoing assessment and regular update of targets.  
• Develops a programme of measures in order to achieve good environmental status by 2020. 
The EU Commission shall assess the programmes of measures, which are to be implemented by the member 
states. The strategies must be kept up-to-date and reviewed every six years. The second cycle started in 2018.     
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in small steps in a flexible manner (Lindblom, 1959). This has the advantage that it requires neither a 
comprehensive overview, clear goals, holistic decisions nor control. However, the result would be 
floating with the currents, critics argued, unable to follow a long-term, desired course. Etzioni (1967) 
launched an early compromise with his mixed scanning, distinguishing between long-term strategic 
planning and short-term operational decisions.  
Looking at EBM, it is not easy to position the whole tradition in this landscape. On the one hand, there 
is an ambition to achieve a comprehensive understanding of the ecosystem, often promoted by scien-
tists. There are frequent references to knowledge gaps as obstacles to implementation (Knol, 2010a). 
Several authors have a strong belief in setting clear goals, and seem to believe in their ability to guide 
later developments (Leslie & McLeod, 2007; Cormier et al., 2017; Domínguez-Tejo & Metternicht, 
2018). On the other hand, system thinking and theories of complexity in biology fostered views that it 
was not possible to understand and predict dynamic ecosystems. This led to ideas on the adaptive 
management of ecosystems (Holling, 1978), which is frequently referenced in the EBM literature.30 
Thus, many authors underscore that the lack of full information is not an excuse for lack of implemen-
tation (Murawski, 2007; Patrick & Link, 2015; Skern-Mauritzen et al., 2018). It is probably right to 
say that the EBM literature contains a tension between the willingness to decide and act, and the need 
to compile comprehensive data (see Paper 2).   
The rationalistic tradition also had a strong imprint of science and expert knowledge as value-free. 
However, criticism from for instance environmental groups arose against the great modernist narra-
tives about progress, which planning should assist in realizing. Planners were met by demands for 
open and inclusive processes that would recognize different values, ways of reasoning and positions to 
contested issues. Communicative planning was a reply to such demands and builds on deliberation and 
dialogue (Sager, 2013). One of its branches is collaborative planning, which is often strongly consen-
sus-seeking. Negotiated consensus solutions between stakeholders, this tradition argues, will be more 
robust and implementable than top-down decisions made by governments (Innes & Booher, 1999). In 
such models for planning, the role of the planner changes from that of authoritative, neutral expert to 
facilitator of the processes.  
Looking at the EBM literature, there is an inherent tension between these two roles (Kidd et al., 2011). 
There is a strong underlining of science as the basis for EBM, most notably, ecological science 
(Christie, 2011). However, science can also be put on the same footing as traditional and local know-
ledge, all viewed as different types of expert knowledge (Arctic Council, 2013). There seems to be al-
most universal recommendation of participatory approaches in the normative guidance for EBM, indi-
cating that the traditional role of experts is not acceptable anymore. Exploring the balance in real situ-
ations should be one of the tasks for empirical investigations. A related issue is the relationship be-
tween experts and decision-makers. In a clear-cut rationalistic view, there is hardly a need for politi-
cians; if the planners get enough information, they can objectively decide what is best. Even though 
this is seemingly not acceptable any more, it is remarkable to see how little attention some of the app-
roaches above pay to political deliberation and decision-making. This is also the case in “integrated 
ecosystem assessment”, which has become a popular framework for scientific work related to EBM 
(Levin et al., 2009; Harvey et al., 2017). Its relation to political processes and public deliberation is 
                                                     
30 It is a parallel to argumentation for adaptive approaches in planning theory due to uncertainty in understanding 
and predicting human society. 
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unclear. After an initial scoping workshop that sets the objectives, the rest of the work described is sci-
ence alone.  
Conflicts and power relations have been important issues in many planning debates. Participants in 
planning processes do not meet on an equal footing. Regulatory arrangements aimed at solving one 
problem tend to produce solutions that benefit the powerful (Young et al., 2018). Collaborative pro-
cesses that should empower the weakest (Arnstein, 1969), may instead increase the influence of pow-
erful groups (McKenna & Cooper, 2006). There was early criticism of EBM for neglecting politics 
and power (Slocombe, 1993). From my reading, this still seems to be a valid criticism of the later liter-
ature from the oceans. Regardless of the planning model preferred, studies of power relations offer an 
important dimension for understanding the outcomes of political processes. There is a rich tradition in 
planning theory as well as political sciences for theorizing about, and studying power relations in, 
planning and decision-making. Such insights should also influence the behaviour of planners (Sager, 
2013). 
2.9 Positioning EBM in the ocean management landscape 
The UNEP guidelines refer to EBM in relation to other approaches to ocean management. This merits 
more discussion. In Figure 6, I have placed EBM, including any sectoral approach, in the context of 
some other approaches mentioned above.   
Integration may mean many different things in different policy contexts. Underdal (1980) proposed 
three general requirements for a policy to qualify for the term: it should be comprehensive by integrat-
ing issues and actors over wider geographical areas with a long-term perspective; it should base decisi-
ons on an overall evaluation of policy alternatives, not on individual perspectives; and it should aim 
for consistency across different policy levels and sectors. Sustainable development is an ambitious 
attempt to integrate along all of Underdal’s requirements (Birnie et al., 2009). Its three pillars integrate 
development and environmental protection, from global to local levels. It aims at equity by balancing 
wealth differences today and by taking future generations into account. It requires integrated assess-
ments for evaluation and integration into all policy sectors (Runhaar, 2016; Persson et al., 2018). The 
integration of ocean management for the purpose of sustainable development may therefore be consid-
ered an upper integrative level of ocean management ambitions (Figure 6). 
As referred to above, EBM may be seen as an attempt at integration whose main focus is on the envir-
onmental pillar of sustainability. The social and economic pillars may be facilitated by other policy 
instruments and sectoral policies, such as Blue growth. However, EBM does not disregard social and 
economic dimensions, as can be seen from the definitions and recommendations above. The extent to 
which it incorporates them may represent a gradual transition towards integrated management. While 
this may be clear at a conceptual level, it may be hard to draw sharp lines in practice. For instance, 
Norway bases its ocean policy on EBM, while Canada’s Oceans Act aims for integrated ocean man-
agement. Nevertheless, the Norwegian management plan for the Barents Sea contained at least as 
much socioeconomic information as the Canadian plan for the Grand Banks/Placenta Bay, and the 
2020 revision aims at including more. Both plans, however, have a solid foundation in assessing and 






Figure 6: The relation between EBM and other marine management approaches or frameworks.  
 
EBM can be implemented by non-spatial as well as spatial approaches. Examples of mostly non-spa-
tial approaches are pollution abatement, setting of quotas and technical regulations in fisheries, climate 
change mitigation and climate adaptation policies. For spatial implementation, marine spatial planning 
is a prominent approach (Douvere, 2008; Ehler & Douvere, 2009). Some authors try to make the link 
even stronger by advocating “ecosystem-based marine spatial planning” (Gilliland & Laffoley, 2008; 
Katsanevakis et al., 2011; Ansong et al., 2017). However, marine spatial planning can also contribute 
to achieve a broader range of objectives, such as maximizing the economic opportunities presented by 
the sea (Jay et al., 2013). The distinction from EBM may be conceptually clear, but again, reality may 
be more complex. For instance, several authors have categorized the Barents Sea management plan as 
marine spatial planning (Ehler & Douvere, 2010; Collie et al., 2013; Jay et al., 2013; Domínguez-Tejo 
et al., 2016). While it surely is a case of EBM, it is a matter of definition if it is also a case of marine 
spatial planning, since there is no comprehensive, cross-sectoral system for such in place. The same 
authors neglect that in the coastal zone, Norway has a cross-sectoral system for spatial planning as an 
extension of comprehensive land use planning (Johnsen & Hersoug, 2014). This is not ecosystem-
based; there are no requirements to proceed according to EBM and no formal connections to the man-
agement plans in the oceans. Some may therefore prefer to call it ocean zoning or allocation of ocean 
space as technical concepts, stripped from the normative content of marine spatial planning defini-
tions. 
Marine spatial planning may allocate marine space for many purposes, one of which is the many-fac-
eted category of marine protected areas (Cicin-Sain & Belfiore, 2005). There may also be designation 
of marine protected areas because of separate planning and decision-making processes. Allocation of 
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such areas has received much attention in recent years. One of the drivers is CBD. Its Strategic Plan 
for Biodiversity, adopted in Aichi in 2010, contains a target saying that 10 per cent of coastal and ma-
rine areas shall be conserved through well-connected systems of protected areas and other effective 
area-based conservation measures (Target 11).31 The plan does not refer to EBM, under either ratio-
nale, goals or mission, despite it once being CBD’s primary framework for action (see Section 2.2). 
Among the 20 Aichi targets, there is one single reference to “ecosystem based approaches”, related to 
marine harvesting (Target 6). EBM seems to remain only as a high-level ambition, not anything to im-
plement in practice. One can observe the same shift at the national level. The top priority in Canadian 
ocean policy is to achieve Aichi Target 11, while the legislated ambition of integrated ocean manage-
ment in practice has been abandoned (Paper 3). Australia also has left an integrated and ecosystem-
based ocean policy for the traditional sectoral approaches, and a narrower focus on conservation issues 
and designation of marine protected areas (Vince et al., 2015). These examples illustrate how some of 
the former frontrunners in EBM have shifted their attention from the top of the ladder to the bottom in 
Figure 6. 
Marine spatial planning “is increasingly seen as a practical, operational approach to implement rather 
vague notions of marine EBM” (Ehler & Douvere, 2010). Similar reasoning may have contributed to 
the shift towards marine protected areas. It is hard for any jurisdiction to be equally strong on all levels 
of the ladder in Figure 6; there may be good reasons for focussing efforts on any level, depending on 
the needs, context and resources available. 32 However, one should be conscious about the fact that in-
tegration and possibilities for solving several issues are lost when approaches with a narrower focus 
replace those with a broader view. By moving from EBM to marine spatial planning, there is a risk of 
losing the links to ecosystem considerations and non-spatial approaches for solving ecological prob-
lems. If marine spatial planning simply concerns the zoning of physical ocean space, it may primarily 
be a vehicle for introducing new industries into the oceans, such as aquaculture (Johnsen & Hersoug, 
2014) or offshore wind farms (Jay, 2010b), without creating too much conflict with other interests. 
Similarly, marine protected areas on their own are insufficient for marine conservation unless imple-
mented within a broader place-based management system (Jay et al., 2013). Like the argument about 
encircling parts of nature into reserves on land (see Chapter 1), it is even more important in a fluid 
ocean to ensure adequate protection of species and ecosystems outside reserves (Allison et al., 
1998). Moreover, designating such areas are frequently considered as a sectoral approach for conser-
vation (Vince et al., 2015). Thus, there is a risk that planning for marine protected areas in separate 
processes, particularly if in a rush to reach a quantitative target, may lead to conflicts, loss of legitima-
cy and solutions that undermine the conservation objectives (Agardy et al., 2016; Gray et al., 2017). 
Making EBM synonymous with marine protected areas has been called “the most widely held miscon-
ception regarding ecosystem-approaches” (Murawski, 2007).   
                                                     
31 The Johannesburg Plan of Implementation from Rio contained commitments to establish national networks of 
marine protected areas by 2012. This was not met (Jay et al., 2013). Aichi target 11 thus is a renewal and con-
cretization of prior commitment, with 2020 as the new time horizon. 
32 The EU has developed policy or legislation for all the elements in Figure 6: the Integrated Maritime Policy 
creates a coherent overarching framework. The Marine Strategy Framework Directive containing EBM is often 
termed its environmental pillar. The Maritime Spatial Planning Directive sets minimum requirements for marine 
spatial planning. The Habitats Directive and the Birds Directive mandate the designation of marine protected 
areas. Thus, the European coastal states have legal and/or policy incentives to implement at all levels.   
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3 The role of environmental assessments in ecosys-
tem-based management 
The review of the World Ocean Assessment in Chapter 1 illustrates how environmental problems arise 
from an array of societal sectors (UN, 2016). The integration of environmental objectives into the poli-
cies and practices of those that cause environmental degradation has played an increasingly important 
role since the publication of the Brundtland report in 1987 (Persson et. al 2018). A large number of 
policy tools are in use to achieve environmental policy integration, or “mainstreaming of the environ-
ment”, as it is also referred to (Runhaar 2016). Environmental assessments, containing both environ-
mental impact assessment (EIA) and strategic environmental assessment (SEA), are process-oriented 
tools that work through the provision of environmental information to decision-makers. Central to 
their functioning is that they try to anticipate the impacts of different types of initiatives. The rationale 
is that it is better to prevent harm than to repair the negative consequences (Glasson et al., 2012).  
3.1 Different assessments and ecosystem-based management 
The origin of EIA and SEA is usually traced back to the adoption of the US National Environmental 
Policy Act in 1969 (Glasson et al., 2012, pp. 32 - 40). The Act required a detailed statement on the en-
vironmental impact of proposals, on any adverse effects that cannot be avoided, and on alternatives to 
the proposed action. The statement should be prepared in a systematic, interdisciplinary manner and 
made available to the public. This initiated an international diffusion of EIA. However, other states 
have shied away from certain traits of the US form, not least because of the extensive litigations that 
have followed over the interpretation and workings of the system (ibid). 
Over the years, there has been a proliferation of assessment tools. For an overview, one can distin-
guish between: 
• The subject of assessment and the related assessment tools (level of assessment).
A distinction is drawn between concrete projects and strategic initiatives that are usually re-
ferred to as policy, plans and programmes. The different natures of these require different
tools for undertaking assessment. Projects are assessed using EIA and related approaches.
SEA is a broad family of tools for assessing strategic initiatives (Sadler et al., 2010).
• What types of impact to include in the assessment (thematic scope of assessment).
SEA and EIA, by definition, cover environmental impacts. These can comprise effects on the
biophysical surroundings alone, or include wider types of impact (Morgan, 2012). A number
of specialised assessment tools have emerged according to the types of impact they cover.33
Instead of splitting up assessments according to type of impact, one assessment may also inte-
grate all relevant impacts.
• National (domestic) or transboundary assessments (jurisdictional scope of assessment).
Assessments may cover only impacts in the state where the initiative is located, or include
33 Examples include social impact assessment, health impact assessment, cultural and historical impact assess-
ment, climate change assessment, biodiversity assessment, technology assessment, trade assessment, regulatory 
impact assessment, human rights impact assessment, cultural impact assessment, post-disaster impact assessment 
and gender analysis (Morgan, 2012). 
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extraterritorial impacts on other states or areas beyond national jurisdiction. Specialised as-
sessment tools are available for transboundary assessments at both project and strategic level. 
All these forms of assessments are relevant to EBM. Firstly, SEA is relevant in the preparation and 
final assessments of strategic initiatives, such as EBM. SEA is also a tool for regional assessments, 
which place-based EBM requires. In a sequence of assessments, EIA comes at a later stage in the fol-
lowing-up of strategic EBM initiatives. Secondly, in Chapter 1, I argued that EBM requires integrated 
assessments. I wrote that they should somehow include integration across the three pillars of sustaina-
bility. The reason is the distinction between integrated management for sustainable development and 
EBM (see Section 2.8). This has its parallel in the distinction between (fully) integrated assessments 
and environmental assessments. Building up integrated assessments may occur in many stages, from 
narrower to broader assessments (see example in Figure 7). Thirdly, transboundary assessments are 
highly relevant in the fluid oceans, probably even more than on solid earth.     
 
Figure 7: The preparation of the Barents Sea management plan was informed by SEAs for individual 
sectors, which were later combined in an assessment of cumulative impacts from all sectors.  
(Ministry of Environment, BSMP 2006) 
A UN report that assessed marine assessments, categorized them according to a distinction between 
status and trend assessments, impact assessments and response assessments (UNEP & IOC-UNESCO, 
2009). This cuts across the three categories above.34 A common recommendation for EBM is to start 
                                                     
34 As an example, a strategic-level assessment may contain status and trend assessment, impact assessment and 
response assessment. Readers of the «assessment of assessments» report should be aware of the context in which 
the Group of Experts wrote these definitions. The mandate from the UN General Assembly was to take stock of 
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with an assessment of the ecosystem (see Section 2.4). One way to do this is to assess the status and 
trends of ecosystem components and integrate the findings across the whole ecosystem. In its pure 
form, such an assessment would contain no information about what explains the observed status and 
trends since it would not make the links to human activities and their impacts on the ecosystem. Im-
pact assessments, on the other hand, starts with an initiative – a policy, programme, plan or a project - 
and assess its impacts on the ecosystem. However, EBM requires a diagnosis to be set for the state of 
the ecosystem. A pure status and trend analysis of the ecosystem therefore has limited relevance: as-
sessing impacts and their significance is required too. At this, the distinction from the classical impact 
assessment is blurred and of little relevance for EBM. However, the legal trigger for impact assess-
ments is an initiative for a policy, plan, programme or a project, not anything related to the ecosystem. 
This creates an important distinction as regards legal assessment obligations, and may be the source of 
subtle nuances in what and when to assess in a planning process.35  
Response assessments can assess to what extent measures aiming to avoid harm, or enhance benefits, 
actually achieve this. An environmental response assessment requires multidisciplinary collaboration 
(Christie, 2011). Broadly speaking, there is a need to identify cause – effects connections in two steps. 
The first step involves understanding how the policy instruments of governments (or private entities) 
influence the behaviour of target groups (Bemelmans-Videc et al., 1998; Lascoumes & Le Gales, 
2007). Instruments can be positive incentives as well as sanctions, and include information, economic 
means or legislation. In the context of EBM, a target group will typically be owners and employees in 
maritime industries, or others engaged in activities that more indirectly affect the marine environment. 
The second step is to assess how changes in the target group’s behaviour leads to changes in the ma-
rine environment.36 These two steps must be combined in order to appraise whether a programme of 
measures is likely to improve the environment (ex-ante assessment), or whether it has done so after 
being implemented (ex-post evaluation). The first step is typically the domain of law, economics and 
social sciences. The second step is the domain of the natural sciences.  
Despite the apparent relevance of environmental assessments to marine developments, authors pro-
moting integrated ecosystem assessments seem to pay no attention to the wider assessment literature 
(Levin et al., 2009; Samhouri et al., 2014). Like a mirror image, the academic and professional com-
munity specializing in assessments seldom considers marine assessments.37 Thus, the situation seems 
                                                     
assessments that could serve as the basis for a regular process of what would become the World Ocean Assess-
ment (see Chapter 1). The order from the UN General Assembly was that the regular process should include so-
cio-economic aspects. The reasoning in the report on assessment terminology therefore points in the direction of 
fully integrated sustainability assessments.     
35 Status of the (marine) environment reports often assess status and trends, identify impacts and their significan-
ce, and conclude with a suggested programme of measures. This line of assessment is highly relevant for EBM. 
While the status and trend analysis and impact identification may not be the subject of a mandatory assessment 
obligation, a suggested programme of measures typically will be. That would be an initiative for doing some-
thing and will require an SEA, or trigger EIAs if the suggested programme also contains concrete projects. 
36 A number of end-points for analysis can be defined. Here I refer to outcome in the model of Søren Winter, see 
section 4.3 and Papers 2 and 3.  
37 A review of SEA literature by Fischer and Onyango (2012) found that some attention had been paid to fisher-
ies, but no other marine industries or topics. Another indication is that the International Association for Impact 
Assessments, which organizes this group of professionals, hardly addresses marine assessments at its annual 
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like another illustration of how the marine community ends up building its own traditions at sea (Jay, 
2010a). There are at least two reasons for trying to close the gap between marine assessments and the 
wider assessment community. Firstly, there are obvious possibilities for learning and collaboration 
across different scientific traditions and the land – ocean divide. For instance, there have been exten-
sive discussions about the theoretical foundations of impact assessments since the late 1990s, reflect-
ing theories of planning and decision-making such as those referred in Section 2.7 (Fundingsland 
Tetlow & Hanusch, 2012; Morgan, 2012). Another example is the problems EBM has in moving from 
assessing the ecosystem to formulating programmes of measures, in which SEA can play an important 
role (see below). Secondly, there are legal norms relating to SEA and EIA that have relevance for land 
as well as oceans. This legal assessment regime is in evolution. It has bearings on assessment require-
ments in EBM today, and may have even more in the future (Sander, 2018).  
3.2 The role of strategic environmental assessments  
EIA evolved some 20 years before SEA and has a more solid position in international norms and prac-
tice (see Paper 1). However, it is SEA that has most relevance for EBM, most obviously because EBM 
is a strategic approach. SEA covers a broad family of different tools with different names, forms and 
areas of application (Dalay-Clayton & Sadler, 2005; Fundingsland Tetlow & Hanusch, 2012). Among 
its origins are policy analysis and planning, which were increasingly driven by sustainability concerns. 
Another driver was the problems with the narrow, project-specific focus of EIA. Prior to a project, 
there will be higher-level decisions that set the course for later developments. Such decisions need to 
be informed by environmental analysis in the same manner as project-level decisions. Instead of trying 
to fix problems in the final phases of a chain of actions, the idea was that “upstreaming” of the envir-
onment into earlier phases would be more proactive in addressing root causes. There also was a per-
ception of project level assessments being inappropriate for addressing cumulative impacts from many 
projects and large-scale environmental change, such as climate change.      
The idea that planning and decision-making occur in different tiers, or levels, has played an important 
role in the evolution of SEA. It was recognized early that distinct types of assessment tools are needed 
for different tiers. Policies and legislation are usually considered as the upper, most strategic tiers 
(Sadler et al., 2005). National frameworks for EBM are a prominent example. States apply a diverse 
set of tools, of a very different nature from EIA, in assessing policies.38 As a contrast, procedures for 
assessing plans and programmes are mostly extended versions of EIA, including in international legis-
lation. Another implication of tiers relates to the implementation of strategic initiatives. This can be 
achieved when processes are deliberately linked by transferring information and issues from one level 
to another, referred to as “tiering” (Morrison-Saunders & Arts, 2004; Arts et al., 2011). For example, 
it is expected that cross-sectoral, strategic EBM plans should have bearings on lower level plans and 
activities in sectors. However, attempts to link can also move upwards when detailed planning reveals 
the need for strategic initiatives, and horizontally at the same level. A Norwegian example of three de-
cision-making processes at approximately the same level, are the EBM-based management plans, 
                                                     
conferences (see the topics at http://www.iaia.org/annual-conference.php). Similarly, in two specialized assess-
ment journals, Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal and Environmental Impact Assessment Review, there 
are long intervals between each time an article from the marine realm appears.   
38 The Norwegian version is Utredningsinstruksen (Instruction for official studies). See English guidance on the 
2016 update in DFØ (2018). Due to the Instruction, all Norwegian white papers have a final chapter that sets out 
the relevant impacts of the proposals.  
 
30 
strategy policy documents for the petroleum sector, and the political platforms of coalition govern-
ments. The interplay between these decision arenas, each involving the cabinet and the political par-
ties, gives strategic guidance to a cascade of later decisions, ultimately determining the environmental 
impacts of offshore petroleum activities.  
“Policy”, “plan” and “programme” are shorthand terms for very different initiatives operating in di-
verse contexts. The need for SEA to be fit for purpose in these complex settings has become some-
thing of a mantra (Fundingsland Tetlow & Hanusch, 2012). This has spurred a major shift away from 
the understanding of SEA as essentially the same as EIA, only applied to different types of initiatives 
(Partidário, 2015; Noble & Nwanekezie, 2017). EIA has the reactive role of appraising final project 
proposals for their impacts, offering no possibilities to influence the planning processes that develop 
the proposals. Its assumed effect is based on the rationalistic assumption that more and better infor-
mation leads to better decisions, which thereafter may lead to modifications in the project. An alterna-
tive view applied to SEA is that it should work proactively in the earlies possible stages of planning, 
exploring and assessing options and alternatives by means of a broad set of methods and approaches. 
The purpose is to ensure that environmental and sustainability considerations are taken into account in 
the initiatives being prepared. 39 SEA should be strategic, not because it focuses on higher level initia-
tives, but because it should focus on strategic decisions and try to influence them (Noble & 
Nwanekezie, 2017). The integration of assessment, planning and decision-making has thus been 
viewed as the key to success for SEA. The question is how to achieve this in practice (Fundingsland 
Tetlow & Hanusch, 2012).   
Assessing and managing cumulative impacts is a major rationale for EBM. The assessment part of this 
has received considerable attention in the assessment community at least since the mid-1980s 
(Connelly, 2011). However, despite the efforts, understanding remains weak and progress slow 
(Sinclair et al., 2017). A recurrent theme has been that cumulative impacts are best addressed on a 
larger scale than in EIA of individual projects. Regional (environmental) assessment has therefore 
been advocated as a special form of SEA, partly based on experience from the oceans (Gunn & Noble, 
2009; Baker & Kirstein, 2011; Fidler & Noble, 2012; Willsteed et al., 2017). Such assessments may 
cover the impacts of one sector with all its projects and activities upon the defined geographical area, 
or include all relevant sectors. In the ocean communities, on the other hand, EBM and marine spatial 
planning have spurred a proliferation of efforts to characterise and map cumulative impacts since the 
mid-2000s (Halpern et al., 2008; Halpern & Fujita, 2013). Meta-studies indicate that ecosystem res-
ponses to multiple stressors tend to be non-additive and non-linear, meaning that surprises and possib-
le regime shifts may occur (Crain et al., 2008; Darling & Côté, 2008; Kraberg et al., 2011). Scientists 
have made progress in methods and tools to quantify and map cumulative impacts on global and re-
gional scales in a standardised, comparable manner. However, there is insufficient reflection on the 
                                                     
39 This view of SEA has influenced international law. The SEA Protocol to the Espoo Convention states that its 
objectives is to ensure that environmental and health considerations are «thoroughly taken into account in the 
development of plans and programs», whereas it shall contribute to the consideration of such concerns «in the 
preparation of policies and legislation» (art 1a and b, italics added). By these means, environmental concerns 
including health are to be integrated into measures and instruments designed to further sustainable development 
(art 1e). The softer requirement towards policies and legislation reflects that the formal application of SEA on 
policies and legislation was controversial during the negotiations of the Protocol. EU’s SEA directive art 1 also 
aims at integration of environmental considerations into plans and programs (Sadler et al., 2005). 
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possible linkages to different planning and decision-making contexts, which is a topic extensively dis-
cussed in the assessment literature. The common interest in assessing cumulative impacts on a re-
gional scale should be a good basis for collaboration across the traditions.  
3.3 The role of environmental impact assessment  
EIA assesses concrete projects, which may come late in a policy process. With successful tiering, EIA 
can function as a tool for following-up strategic EBM plans that have been informed by SEA. EIA 
may be required in many phases of a project’s life cycle. For example, the Norwegian Petroleum Act 
requires strategic, regional assessments prior to decisions that may lead to the opening up of new areas 
for the industry (Jakobsen, I., 2013). Later, EIA is required prior to the development of oil and gas 
fields and for decommissioning installations (Jakobsen, M.Z., 2013). Extensive environmental man-
agement systems and monitoring are also required. However, requirements for which marine activities 
must undertake EIA and SEA are highly variable across sectors and geographical areas, as pointed out 




4 The implementation problem 
 
Despite the support from the UN system and other international organisations, implementation of 
EBM has been slow. An in-depth review by CBD in 2008 concluded that “the ecosystem approach is 
not applied systematically to reduce the rate of biodiversity loss, but there are many examples of suc-
cessful application”.40 A similar evaluation of the implementation of EAF in 33 countries found that 
no countries were rated “good”, while over half received “fail” grades (Pitcher et al 2009). Despite 
much guidance, most countries did not meet their commitment to implement the approach for all their 
fisheries by 2010 (Fletcher & Bianchi, 2014).  
Regarding the Marine Strategy Framework Directive, the European Commission recently assessed 16 
EU member states’ programmes of measures (European Commission, 2018). The assessment demon-
strates that the likelihood of actually achieving good environmental status varies considerably between 
descriptors (Figure 8) and states. 
  
Figure 8: Timelines for achieving good environmental status on selected descriptors, as reported by 
the EU member states (European Commission, 2018).  
                                                     
40 The evaluation was made by the Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Technical and Technological Advice, see re-
port from its meeting in Bonn in May 2008, available at https://www.cbd.int/doc/meetings/cop/cop-09/offi-
cial/cop-09-02-en.pdf (accessed November 2018).  
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4.1 Discussions about EBM implementation  
The slow implementation of marine EBM has prompted discussion about why this is the case. One of 
the questions raised is whether the concept itself has become sufficiently mature. A forceful contribu-
tion in this debate was Steven Murawsky’s repudiation of ten myths that in his opinion had “surfaced 
as arguments to delay, constrain or oppose implementation” (Murawski, 2007). Among these were the 
supposed lack of definitions, principles and good practices, and the allegation that the concept itself 
was too difficult. Murawsky argued that there should be no need for a revolutionary paradigm shift in 
management institutions and science support, as called for by some authors (Grumbine, 1994; Berkes, 
2012). An evolution of existing practises and institutions would be the way to go, and this process had 
already started. At the same time, the article identified management challenges, such as the opposition 
from sectoral governance institutions to share power, the problem of evaluating and harmonizing con-
flicting agendas, and the political system’s reluctance to make decisions in controversial and uncertain 
circumstances. Eight years later, two other NOAA scientists argued that several impediments to EAF 
had been resolved (Patrick & Link, 2015). Some remaining myths that they rejected, were that EAF is 
not applicable in data-poor conditions, that it leads to lower quotas and too restrictive regulations, that 
it cannot tackle multiple objectives and different interests rationally and that it would be too expen-
sive. Their basic assertion was that implementing EBM is feasible with information, tools and app-
roaches that are currently available (see also Tallis et al., 2010).   
However mature, it is a challenge to apply an approach that is full of inherent policy paradoxes 
(Cortner & Moote, 1999, pp. 57 - 72), or tensions that need to be balanced. Some of the paradoxes are 
related to decision-making. Like the discussions in planning (see Section 2.8), they concern the role of 
experts and the way to combine long-term consistency needed in EBM with flexibility and adaptation 
to new circumstances. Other issues relate to how conflicts can be addressed, and who has the authority 
to make decisions when management becomes inclusive and collaborative. There are also paradoxes 
related to scale, such as the centralization or decentralization of management responsibilities, and the 
short-term political agendas versus the long time-lags needed to see the effects of human interven-
tions. Finally, paradoxes of sustainability involve the inherent tensions between economic develop-
ment and environmental protection. Similarly, Engler (2015) argues that EBM deliberately has been 
kept open and unclear in order to get support from groups with opposing interests, and in order to fit 
into different contexts (see also Yaffee, 1999). Objectives also become unclear because of unclear def-
initions of the terms that should define desired states of the ecosystem, such as health, integrity, resili-
ence and ecosystem services. Following the arguments of these authors, one may still argue that EBM 
is ready for implementation. However, the concept is open to different interpretations, and there is a 
need for balancing different interests. Doing this is a political process. Studying implementation of 
EBM therefore inevitably must involve studying political processes. 
4.2 Prior studies of implementation 
There is a difference between studying the implementation of EBM per se and studying implementa-
tion of concrete plans applying EBM, though there are connections. Studying the implementation of 
EBM per se can be a complex undertaking because it is an example of an idea that migrates interna-
tionally, gets translated and adapted differently. Such processes have been studied in various policy 
sectors as policy diffusion (Simmons et al., 2006), policy transfer, or policy borrowing and lending 
(Sahlin-Andersson & Engwall, 2003; Steiner-Khamsi, 2012). Learning and emulation are probably the 
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most relevant mechanisms in the case of EBM (Simmons et al 2006). States are no longer the only ac-
tors, but operate aside a plethora of non-state actors at all levels (Abbott & Snidal, 2009). Thus, frame-
works for EBM may be implemented by many actors at any level, in processes involving a standard 
policy circle (Figure 9).   
 
Figure 9: A governance framework developed for the Caribbean LME region illustrates how decisions 
are made and implemented at different levels (policy cycles). These are interlinked, with impulses po-
tentially going in all directions (Fanning et al., 2007, 2013).  
The sovereign national state, however, is the basic unit of the international system. The result of im-
plementing EBM at this level would be the adoption of a national law and/or policy framework for 
EBM (see Papers 2 and 3). Mandates should be allocated, procedures devised, and national waters 
may be divided into management areas. The further implementation of the national policy will include 
new policy circles in the designated management areas, each with assessments, formulation of policy 
interventions, decisions and implementation. Plans for larger ocean areas, which is the focus for my 
research, will often be strategic. The implementation of strategic plans may include new planning and 
decision-making processes (cf. the concept of tiers in Section 3.2), which finally may conclude with 
the designation of concrete measures. All that has been described so far, however, is still “EBM on pa-
per”. First when concrete measures are put into action in what may be termed a final implementation 
process, there is a possibility of actually having implemented something that may lead to improve-
ments in the state of the ecosystems.   
The normative literature on EBM, which defines the concept and discusses possible approaches, is a 
necessary phase in the evolution of a relatively new approach. With more attempts to implement 
EBM, there will also be possibilities for empirically testing such recommendations. Christie et al. 
(2009) contended that “the shift toward EBM has proceeded largely on theory with little analysis of 
field efforts”. The question is if analyses of practice has improved later so the advice may be better.  
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For understanding planning for large ocean areas, there is much background information in studies un-
dertaken at the regional and national levels. Such literature may also contain experience from planning 
for concrete ocean areas (Christie et al., 2009; Fanning et al., 2013; O'Higgins et al., 2014). Several 
comparative analyses have been undertaken (Juda, 2003; Hoel, 2008; Rosenberg et al., 2009; Cicin-
Sain et al., 2015), often ending up with recommendations. Rosenberg et al. (2009), for instance, sug-
gested a framework for implementation, consisting of strong political leadership, a hierarchy of objec-
tives, defined planning and management regions, and a monitoring and management review process.  
There is also a rich literature addressing EBM applied to large ecosystems. Hartig et al. (1998) is an 
early example that summarised experience from ecosystem-based planning in the Great Lakes be-
tween the US and Canada. The article is interesting in the context of this thesis because it focussed on 
remedial action plans and provided advice in eight points on what could contribute to effective imple-
mentation. However, much of the literature from marine applications do not build on such post reflec-
tions of results. Arkema et al. (2006) studied 49 management plans with the purpose of evaluating to 
what extent they lived up to definitions of EBM, not what were the results. It is common to report 
about methods and approaches applied during the preparation of plans (see referendes in Paper 2 and 
3), or the results of planning (von Quillfeldt et al., 2009; Backer et al., 2010). Unless followed up by 
later studies, we miss the information about the possible later implementation processes, the results 
thereof, and the linkage between the approaches chosen and the results. Studies that focus on proces-
ses contain a similar problem. Wondolleck and Yaffee (2017) presented case studies from the US sys-
tematically according to five types of initiatives varying in scale (transnational to local) and type of 
initiative (regulatory, non-regulatory, top-down, bottom-up, community-based). 41 The book ends in a 
set of interesting, practical advice to participants in EBM processes. However, there is almost no in-
formation about how the processes described in the cases actually may have contributed to solving 
ocean problems. It is also questionable whether all the cases are cases of EBM. Smith et al. (2017) 
also provide a structured presentation of Australian cases, varying in spatial scale and levels of gov-
ernance. They conclude the discussion with key learnings and necessary components for better imple-
mentation of EBM as such.  
A main impression from reading literature about the implementation of EBM is that most of it is con-
cerned about conditions for the implementation of the approach per se. There are many recommenda-
tions for what to do in order to implement EBM successfully, also based on comparisons of countries 
and cases. A question that most authors leave unanswered, is how general such recommendations are: 
what are the conditions under which they apply? Moving to planning and implementation of policy 
measures in concrete ocean areas, there still seem to be few studies linking approaches and methods to 
the evaluation of results after implementation of policy measures. It might still be too early for such 
studies to appear. Another reason may be that there is no joint research platform for implementation 
studies that can lead to cumulative results.  
4.3 Theoretical framework 
My interest in seeing practical results of EBM led me to implementation theory early in my research 
process. The implementation literature may leave an impression that implementation studies were an 
                                                     
41 The book presents just a selection of cases they have investigated, see http://webservices.itcs.umich.edu/dru-
pal/mebm/?q=node/68 The web site presents cases from different parts of the world, though there is still a pre-
dominance from the US.  
 
36 
intellectual fad that went out of fashion after having gone through three stages of development 
(Winter, 2012; Hill & Hupe, 2014; Offerdal, 2014). The first phase in the 1970s was characterised by 
explorative, mostly descriptive studies of single cases. The most famous of these was ‘Implementa-
tion’ by Pressman and Wildavsky (1973/1984). In the second phase, attempts for theory development 
and guidance for research resulted in confrontations between top-down and bottom-up perspectives. 
The third phase aimed at synthesis in a general theory of implementation by the use of more quantita-
tive analyses of explanatory variables (Goggin et al., 1990). This proved futile, and the tradition 
seemed to be out of fashion and allegedly dead by the turn of the century. Sætren (2005), however, 
found an exponential growth in the number of journal articles on implementation, but in journals other 
than what he termed the traditional core of political science, public administration and public policy. 
Instead, implementation studies had moved into the journals of primarily health and education, as well 
as law, environment and economics. Sætren also nuanced the conventional story by tracing the origins 
of implementation studies back long before the 1970s, though often studied under other names and 
from different angles.  
Oceans did not appear on Sætren’s list. A more specific search in the database that he had built up re-
sulted in just a handful of ocean studies related to implementation.42 My own literature searches also 
were mostly in vain. Thus, it seemed that I had no theoretical basis apart from the general implementa-
tion theory to build upon. However, Sætren advised me to apply a framework for implementation stud-
ies developed by Winter (Figure 10).  
 
  
Figure 10: Winters framework for studies of implementation (Winter & Nielsen, 2008; Winter, 2012) 
Papers 2 and 3 explain the framework. Briefly summarised, the purpose is to explain the results of im-
plemented policies, which may have been formulated in plans. The results can be measured as output, 
                                                     
42 Harald Sætren, personal communication. 
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referring to the actual regulations and services put into practice. Alternatively, the impacts of the pol-
icy can be traced further towards outcome, which refers either to the extent to which the goals of a 
plan have been achieved or to the extent to which the problems motivating it have been solved. In or-
der to explain these results, the whole policy process must be considered, not the implementation pro-
cess alone. Policy formulation covers the agenda setting, scientific advice, formulation of policy res-
ponses, public debates and, finally, the adoption of a policy. Policy design focuses on the characteris-
tics of the adopted policy, most fundamentally on whether the means makes it likely to meet the ends. 
The implementation process covers the activities of usually several organisations to put the policy into 
practice. All these processes occur within a certain socio-economic and political context.   
 
It is noteworthy how Winter’s framework tries to overcome previous stalemate positions and problems 
in implementation theory. Firstly, it was an attempt to build a bridge between the striding factions of 
top-down and bottom-up analysts by including «street-level-bureaucrats». Lipsky (1980/2010) intro-
duced this term for studying the policy implications of how actors at the lowest level of public-sector 
hierarchies operate. They have to apply discretion when rendering services to their clients and thus be-
come the ultimate implementers of public policies. A top-down view may tend to take a control per-
spective on how they modify policy instructions. A bottom-up perspective may more easily portray 
them as the real heroes who find practicable solutions for meeting the needs of their target groups, de-
spite impossible policies and working conditions (Meyers & Nielsen, 2012). Unfortunately, there are 
just a few studies on street-level bureaucrats working in environmental management (Sevä & Jagers, 
2013) and resource management (Sandström, 2011). Secondly, Winter has been very clear in his rejec-
tion of the earlier attempts to build grand theories of implementation, which he called “utopian”. The 
attempts to generalise  came too early and aimed too broadly. Instead, both he and other scholars 
called for focussing on more restricted issues (Winter, 2012; Hill & Hupe, 2014; Sætren, 2014). This 
resonates well with ideas about developing middle-range theories in social sciences (Merton, 1968).   
It is also worth underlining that Winter has provided a roadmap for investigations of implementation, 
highlighting factors that often explain the results, not an all-inclusive theory. The framework covers 
all the elements of a standard policy circle as possible explanations to the implementation results (Fig 
4), though focussing mostly on the implementation processes. This also makes it open towards incor-
porating theories from other policy disciplines that have specialised in other parts of the policy pro-
cess. Examples include agenda setting (Kingdon, 2010), policy change (Sabatier, 1988), planning the-
ory (see Section 2.8), policy diffusion (Simmons et al., 2006) and policy instrumentation (Bemelmans-
Videc et al., 1998; Salamon, 2002; Lascoumes & Le Gales, 2007), to mention a few that have caught 





5 Materials and methods  
 
The format of articles in international journals offers limited room for thorough descriptions and dis-
cussions. In this section, I will therefore present and reflect upon the methods that I have applied. As 
with the subject matter of the articles, they are different. The paper on assessments is dominated by 
juridical methods concerned about the status of legal sources and the rules for interpretation. However, 
it also contains some social science sections. The papers on EBM apply social science methods only. 
Here, I present and discuss them in the same outline, concluding with a joint discussion at the end of 
the chapter.  
5.1 Luggage and lenses  
First, I will provide some reflections on my own position as a researcher. The technological university 
where I started my higher education exposed me to a tradition with a realist view on science. The 
world around us can be taken for granted and described objectively if we apply standardised methods. 
Those of us who majored in planning had to change this perspective. We had to realise how differently 
people perceive situations and how their different motives and goals affect their positions. Reading 
philosophy of science introduced me to deeper debates about how such subjectivity also affects sci-
ence. Like many other social scientists, I now believe that there is an element of social construction in 
our accounts and analyses. The knowledge that scientists produce is not independent of the intellec-
tual, cultural and personal luggage that we carry with us. This provides us with certain lenses by which 
we observe the real world. It does not mean that I have not done everything possible to check the facts 
that I present. However, the questions raised, the emphasis of certain facts over others, the interpreta-
tions and the conclusions, are mine (Hersoug 2005). The reply to objections that may be raised is to be 
transparent about what I have done, and to explain my position.  
Another part of my personal luggage is my relation to political processes. I have had the privilege of 
working closely with elected politicians, often in direct dialogue. This made me sensitive to some dif-
fuse, but still important borderlines: those between politics and professional advice, between values 
and neutral facts and between normative and descriptive reasoning. What I could offer to my political 
superiors very much boiled down to reasoning around ends and means. This was just part of their rea-
soning. The political mindset also includes issues like values, justice, equity, legitimacy and balancing 
of interests. In political debates, I could hear them apply this type of argument when trying to state the 
reasons behind the discretion that they applied when confronted with dilemmas and trade-offs. This 
background probably gives me a quite different attitude compared to people who have worked solely 
in professional settings. It explains some of my questioning of the lack of political involvement in the 
Canadian plans that I studied, and gives me a general scepticism towards technocratic systems where 
experts take over the actual policymaking. 
The research for the thesis has made me reflect upon the difference between being an insider and be-
ing an outsider. In Norway, my personal experience with EBM planning was a useful luggage when I 
was performing my research on the later processes. I also had cultural, organisational and political ref-
erences that made it relatively easy to understand what had happened. To some extent, I was an insider 
in Canada too, coming from a country with many similarities and belonging to a wider marine com-
munity. This was valuable for getting access to interviewees. In most other issues, I was an outsider. 
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Prior to my arrival, I only had superficial knowledge about Canada and its history, culture, legisla-
tions, political organisation and planning traditions. I needed to understand such topics in order to un-
derstand what I encountered, and I kept grappling with this context throughout my stay. However, 
there were also advantages of coming from the outside. Issues that insiders take for granted, were not 
to me. This made me ask questions that many Canadians would probably not rise. Canadian scholars 
have harshly criticized their federal government for lack of engagement and consistency in marine and 
coastal affairs (Mercer Clarke, 2010; Jessen, 2011; Ricketts & Hildebrand, 2011). At the same time, 
the approaches taken to participation and decision-making seem to be taken for granted (Kearney et 
al., 2007; Rutherford et al., 2010), to the extent that I wondered whether I should call it a ruling Cana-
dian paradigm. To the best of my ability, I have also tried to apply a critical attitude to the Norwegian 
case that I have studied. 
The very different results of the Norwegian and Canadian plans, combined with my own national 
background, made the communication of my research a fine balance. One of the reviewers of Paper 3 
thought that I presented the Norwegian case as “the golden standard” against which Canada should be 
measured. This was not my intention, and it prompted me to write more about the context that could 
explain the Norwegian results. Although I deliberately try to avoid using expressions like “success” 
and “failure”, it is hard to avoid all sorts of normative judgements. This can be sensitive since there is 
a tendency in both countries to present their national practices as “world leading”. However, my main 
concern is not to pass on judgements, but to learn from practice in order to improve it.  
5.2 Research problems and choice of method  
From the outset, it was clear that a quantitative method would not fit the type of problems that caught 
my interest; studying EBM at the current stage of knowledge invited questions of what and how in-
stead of how much. The question for the social science part of the work was more of a matter of find-
ing an appropriate theory and selecting among qualitative methods. After deciding to study implemen-
tation processes, I started reading implementation theory and found that case studies were a major tool 
in that tradition. Since interviews would be an important source for acquiring data, I also needed to go 
into methodological advice on how to conduct interviews.  
My own research process illustrates a general issue when attempts are made to describe processes: 
they are seldom linear with the different steps occurring in a neatly ordered sequence, but iterative and 
with several feedback loops. This applies to the research process that I will describe in the following 
sections, as well as standard flow charts of EIA (see Figure 1 in Paper 1) or reconstructions of a partic-
ular planning process (see Fig 7).  
The choice of juridical methodology for exploring the international legal regime for EIA and SEA was 
rather obvious. However, I also decided to bring in terminology and some results from the assessment 
literature, since much of the juridical literature tends to focus on legal provisions without considering 
experience with the application of the tools.  
5.3 Case study methodology  
Case studies are applied for many purposes, which resonates with different approaches to qualitative 
research in social sciences. The aim of idiographic studies is to describe unique cases, as opposed to 
nomothetic studies that seek universal laws or generalisations. 
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Flyvbjerg (2006) made a strong case for idiographic case studies. They can provide the basic, context-
ual experience from which humans can learn and generalise their skills, finally becoming “real ex-
perts.” He also disputed that social sciences can produce predictive theory; they have nothing else to 
offer than concrete, context-dependent knowledge, which case studies are especially well suited to 
produce. Thus, he argued for case studies described in thick narratives that reveal real-life complexi-
ties and contradictions. Rather than trying to close them by summing up and generalising, they should 
be kept open so that the readers are invited to decide the meaning of the cases themselves. Readers 
who are willing to go into this reality will develop a sensitivity to the issues at hand, which they can-
not obtain from theory. However, his opposition to generalisations only applies to “hard” theories, 
comprising explanations and predictions. He found a “soft” understanding of theory acceptable, accor-
ding to which case studies can be used to test propositions or hypotheses. This applies also to single-
case studies. 
George and Bennett (2005) were exponents of nomothetic ambition. Social sciences should aim to 
build theory that can explain, ultimately also predict, although they recognized the difficulty of this 
ultimate step.43 They belong to a tradition that resulted from criticism of early case studies for produc-
ing incomparable results that did not lead to an accumulation of knowledge. That provided poor sup-
port for decision-making. The alternative is structured, focussed comparison, relying on a combination 
of within-case analysis based on, for instance, process tracing and cross-case comparison where the 
same questions are asked to all the cases. The research should be theory-based, and can serve a num-
ber of purposes in developing and testing theories. However, they rejected the utility of general 
(grand) theories. Instead, they called for middle-range theories, with contingent and specific generali-
sations within clearly circumscribed sub-classes of general phenomena. Cases should be studied as in-
stances of such phenomena; they are “cases of” something that should be defined from the outset to-
gether with the research objective. In making explanations, researchers should apply variables that 
have theoretical interest. Scholars must clearly specify the scope or domain of their generalisations, 
for instance, to what range of institutional settings, cultural contexts, time-periods or geographical ar-
eas they apply. By gradually testing prior explanations and variables to new cases, they can gradually 
expand the scope of the generalisations.44  
My reading of previous case studies on EBM marks my own attitude to these seemingly different 
methodological stances to case studies. For learning from the practices of EBM, there must be some 
level of generalisation based on common questions and approaches. I therefore see a clear benefit in 
applying George and Bennett’s “structured and focussed approach”. However, I have several ques-
tions regarding their method, which primarily relate to how far it is possible to explain and predict and 
the possibilities of building theory. Predicting is problematic because of human reflexivity. George 
and Bennett themselves mentioned strategic interactions and self-fulfilling or self-defying prophecies 
                                                     
43 Se pages 67-71, 74-76, 119 and 129-131 in the book for the arguments referred in this paragraph. 
44 A careful reading reveals common ground too between Flyvbjerg, and George and Bennett (G&B). G&B’s 
reflections on what type of knowledge the practitioner needs (p. 269 - 273), resonate much with Flyvbjerg’s 
praise of the true expert knowledge. Moreover, they both call for “thoroughly executed case studies” (Flyvbjerg) 
that for instance include clear criteria for case selection. G&B accept the value of historical exploration of single 
cases, which Flyvbjerg promotes, though they aim beyond that. The main difference to Flyvbjerg seems to be 
their assumptions on the extent to which explanations are possible. Flyvbjerg, on his side, accepts some level of 
“soft” theory, but I find him vague in describing what types of inferences he, after all, thinks are possible.   
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as examples thereof. Making predictions in social sciences is, therefore, far more complicated than in 
natural sciences. Common to the two strands of science, however, is the occurrence of accidental cir-
cumstances, raising a more fundamental philosophical issue about the extent to which the world is 
ruled by laws or mere coincidence. Even though prediction may be an ambition, explanations of his-
torical cases may be the only thing achievable. My question is, what are the types of explanations and 
theories that we may end up with in the span between the historians’ idiographic explanation of one 
unique event and nomothetic law-like explanations? George and Bennett gave a sympathetic answeer 
to this question by insisting on making contingent generalisations. My uncertainty on these issues is a 
major reason why I only introduce some of the basic principles of structured and focussed comparison 
in Papers 2 and 3, and just briefly refer to the possibility of further theory development. Thus, I can 
summarise my take on George and Bennett’s approach as “yes, let us try it and see how far it can go”. 
I have followed their basic recommendations on how to conduct case studies according to a “building 
block approach”, albeit without some of the rigour of formal methods that they recommend.  
In paper 3, I demarcated the sub-class of cases that I study to EBM of large marine areas within single 
national states. Thereby I restrict my conclusions to this sub-class. The reasons for being so specific 
are the warnings against grand theories and studies that are too ambitious. The same warning can be 
found in the implementation literature, which, according to later self-reflection, attempted to general-
ise too early and too broadly (Sætren, 2014). Moreover, adopting a narrow scope can avoid mixing up 
causal mechanisms from different classes of cases (Mahoney & Goertz, 2006). The advice is that it is 
best to start a research initiative being specific and eventually generalise to a broader population of 
cases later.  
As mentioned above, the diverging purposes of case studies is a problem for accumulation of know-
ledge. A question is whether the purpose of my studies, implementation, would just be another in-
stance of each investigator choosing topics according to their special interests, thereby continuing the 
tendency to non-accumulative studies. In one sense, the answer is yes. However, with the scant empir-
ical literature on EBM, there may be a need for many questions to practice. Moreover, I have chosen 
to base my research on a well-established theory and an explicit research framework. The questions I 
ask about results and the distinction made between output and outcome are central to any attempt to 
evaluate results. This use of theory makes it easier to accumulate across former as well as future stud-
ies, compared to studies that either do not relate to older theory or develop their own.    
5.4 Documents as data sources  
For the exploration of the legal status for conducting EA in the Arctic Ocean, reading juridical litera-
ture guided me in my search for legal sources. The literature consisted of specialised analyses of EIA 
norms in international law (Koivurova, 2002; Holder, 2004; Bastmeijer & Koivurova, 2008; Craik, 
2008), as well as more general literature on environmental law (Atapattu, 2006; Birnie et al., 2009). 
The purpose of the paper made me select legal sources on the basis of two criteria: (1) whether the in-
strument considered provisions or norms relevant for EA and (2) whether its geographical scope in-
cluded the Arctic Ocean. The geographical scope meant that I excluded several instruments that are 
often a part of juridical literature about EA. The most prominent exclusions were the regional seas 
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conventions, which are not relevant in this context,45 and EU legislation on EIA and SEA, which is not 
applicable to the two European coastal states of the Arctic Ocean, Norway and Greenland. I was more 
in doubt whether I should completely disregard the Madrid Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty, since its 
provisions on EIA from another pole are highly relevant for discussing assessment regimes in areas 
beyond national jurisdiction. I ended up excluding it because my analysis is about the current legal sta-
tus (de lege lata), with only some principal remarks at the end about possible alternative approaches 
(de lege ferenda). Such exclusions are unavoidable when interpreting the international legal status 
across instruments. I will later come back to the implications that my choice of region, and thus instru-
ments, has for generalisations to other areas.  
For the studies of the implementation of management plans, I only used publicly available documents. 
The core documents were the plans; three white papers from the government in Norway and the major 
reports from the two project organisations in Canada. Moreover, I used policy documents from the two 
governments, which were most numerous in Canada. In Norway, I also read recommendations from 
committees in the Parliament (komitéinnstillinger), official transcriptions of interpellations and de-
bates in the Parliament and the political platforms of all governments since 2001. Moreover, I search-
ed in databases with all Norwegian newspapers as a supplement to these official sources, and for the 
preparation of some of the interviews. Finally, I searched extensively in the academic literature. Much 
of this was background information and was only referred to in the papers when I used it directly.   
5.5 Interviews  
The purpose of the research interview is to produce knowledge. The tradition that I lean on is an alter-
native to a positivist view on knowledge and method (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). It underlines the 
notion that knowledge is not given, accessible to the interviewer as a gold nugget, but co-produced in 
the interplay between the interviewer and the interviewee. This happens through their conversation, in 
which language is the tool to mediate meaning. The interview occurs in a particular context, raising 
the issue about the transferability of the knowledge produced beyond that context. Conducting an in-
terview also raises ethical questions about consent, confidentiality and power relations between the 
interviewer and the interviewee. Instead of relying on prescribed methods, Kvale and Brinkmann’s 
pragmatic approach considers interviewing as an art and a craft that the researcher has to learn and re-
fine by experience.  
Preparations 
Based on my research questions, it was rather obvious that I would need to conduct in-depth inter-
views. Initially, I read all the literature I found about BSMP, in parallel with the literature on imple-
mentation theory. As I read, I started working on a questionnaire. This was quite open for the first in-
terviews, but evolved until I had a standardised set of questions adapted to what type of interviewee I 
would meet (civil servant, politician or stakeholder). I brought tables to the interviews containing all 
the 157 “government will” bullet points from the white papers. Thus, I could ask systematically about 
the implementation of each of them. Building on the experience from Norway, I developed a question-
                                                     
 45 OSPAR covers just a section of the Arctic Ocean, and has no explicit rules on EIA in order not to interfere 
with EU legislation. In contrast, most other regional seas conventions do have rules on EIA, cf. provisions com-
piled in Annex 1 in Craik (2008).  
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naire in Canada that was even more structured according to the research questions and Winter’s frame-
work for implementation studies. This was published as an appendix to Paper 3, and hopefully will be 
of help for future research.     
When selecting interviewees, I was concerned about getting access to key informants who had played 
major roles in the processes I studied. Another concern was achieving a broad representation of differ-
ent interests. I started in November 2015 with a former coordinator of the Management Forum, fol-
lowed by the coordinators of the inter-ministerial Steering Group and a former statssekretær (secretary 
of state)46 who had coordinated the work in the government. I asked all of them about candidates for 
other interviews, which I continued to do with later interviewees (“snowball sampling”). In Canada, 
the coordinators of ESSIM were my key informants who started the chain of tips for interviewees. I 
also had an early interview with a senior manager in DFO at federal level, who had worked in inte-
grated ocean management for almost 20 years. Interviewing can continue for eternity. I stopped when 
I had a broad representation of organisations and interests, and when I experienced a saturation level; 
interviewees tended to repeat what I knew before and only added marginal new information. In Can-
ada, a return ticket to Norway also defined how long I could continue.   
I approached most interviewees by first sending an e-mail, sometimes after an introductory telephone 
conversation. In the e-mail, I described the purpose of the project, introduced issues often raised in im-
plementation theory and explained the treatment of interview data. I promised to keep the personal 
identities of the interviewees concealed. If they agreed to participate, which most of them did, I also 
sent the questions from the interview guide so that they could be prepared for questions about events 
several years back in time.  
Semi-structured depth interviews 
The interviews typically took place at the workplace of the interviewee, either at a meeting room or at 
their offices. This gave me some glimpses of them in their working environment, although it by no 
means meant that I observed them systematically (Creswell, 2013, pp. 134 - 139). I also had a handful 
of telephone interviews for logistical reasons. A typical interview lasted from one to one and a half 
hour. I also had several follow-up interviews. In addition, I inquired a number of organisations and in-
dividuals about more limited issues.  
The typical course of an interview was that I started explaining the background of the project, asked 
for permission to record the conversation when that was relevant, and explained how I would treat the 
data. The interviewees would then clarify their stance to degrees of anonymity, and willingness to fu-
ture uses of the information in research. Then I asked the interviewees to explain their personal back-
ground and role towards the relevant plan. From there, I started with the questions from the interview 
guide. Interviewing is improvisation. It is a continuous balance between steering from the interviewer, 
and letting the interviewee respond freely (Flick, 2009, pp. 170-172). The responses from the inter-
viewee meant that I had to decide, often in a split of a second, how to react. I could stick to the pre-
formulated questions; dig deeper into issues they raised, asking for clarifications or more information; 
or confront their statements with critical questions. On a few occasions, the interviewees took off com-
pletely from the start. I had to wait until they were finished with their initial statements before I could 
                                                     
46 A Norwegian statssekretær is not exactly the same as what may be associated with the English term state sec-
retary. The position exists in all the Norwegian ministries. He or she in practice acts as a kind of deputy minister, 
though without being a formal member of the government, and without any mandate to replace the minister.    
 
44 
start with the pre-formulated questions, which had been partly addressed already according to the in-
terviewees’ own logic and order. Thus, during the course of the interview, I had to prioritise what was 
the most important to address from that particular interviewee. When we did not cover all the priori-
tised questions, most interviewees agreed to continue afterwards, either by answering to the e-mail or 
by additional interviews. In fact, most of them were concerned about me getting the information I 
needed.   
 
I always took notes during the interviews. Gradually, I also started to record them in order not to lose 
information and to be more present and concentrated during the conversation. In Canada, I recorded 
all the interviews, with the additional motive that the conversations were in a foreign language.  
Transcriptions  
Oral language, as most people speak, is full of imprecise expressions, filler words and incomplete sen-
tences. Speech is also associated with bodily expressions like gesticulation, mimics and postures. 
Transcription means transforming these messages into a written format, which can have many forms, 
with which I experimented. 
In Norway, I promised to send my transcripts to the interviewees so that they could make corrections 
or provide supplementary information. My intention was that they should approve a final version. By 
this, it would become citable without any more contact, also for further research, unless they had res-
ervations. About one-third of the interviewees did not respond back with adjustments and final ap-
proval. Some of these explained that it would require too much time. The final version followed a tem-
plate with the interviewee’s background, the circumstances behind establishing the contact, questions, 
place and duration, and remarks about changes in the final version, before the final transcripts.   
In the early interviews in Norway, where I only took notes, I made minutes from the conversation in a 
journalistic manner. The transcripts thereby became shorter than the complete conversation. They did 
not quote the interviewees in their exact wording, and lost much of the detailed interplay between 
them and me. However, it was an efficient way of transcribing, which ensured a focus on what I found 
to be the main issues. When I started to transcribe from recordings, a few times using professional 
transcribers, I could get accurate word-by-word minutes of the conversation. However, I made some 
grammatical and other edits so that sentences became coherent and deleted parts of the interviews that 
had no or peripheral interest.  
I experienced active information management twice during the review of the transcripts. The first was 
from a ministry, where I, to my surprise, had met five interviewees instead of one. The interview be-
came difficult because of the interplay with many people, restricted time and my attempts to raise sen-
sitive questions. It took weeks and several reminders before they returned an edited version, which 
was shortened, corrected and more official in style. Among the deletions were references to a couple 
of sensitive issues and some informal remarks like a joke, which probably was quite informative to 
their attitudes. The other instance was after interviewing a former minister. He talked quite openly 
about his relation to civil servants, other ministers and civil society organisations, including how he 
solved a delicate political conflict. I was very concerned about not missing what such a high-ranking 
interviewee said, and sent an almost verbatim transcript back to him. We had agreed to have a follow-
up interview. Five minutes before that interview should start, he e-mailed me a file with short, written 
replies to all the questions I had sent him in advance. He then explained that this was what I could 
quote without asking him; everything he had said in the first interview was background information 
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for my personal information. Besides, he had reacted against the transcript’s oral language. We then 
continued with the follow-up interview, where he expanded on the replies he had just sent to me. Nev-
ertheless, when I later asked for permission to quote a couple of sentences from the first transcript, he 
immediately consented. These examples illustrate how the information achieved by interviewing may 
be sensitive to the approach applied. Informally and back-stage, I could get more information than 
what could be documented in writing, despite my efforts to explain that a research interview is differ-
ent from an interview with a journalist, meant for publication. Similarly in Canada, a revealing mo-
ment took place in a tea kitchen, when the interviewee made a joke to characterise Canadian ap-
proaches to ocean planning (“holding hands, singing Kumbaya”).  
Working with the transcripts this way was very time consuming. In Canada, I therefore decided to 
change the approach. I did not promise to send the transcripts back to the interviewees. Instead, I 
promised to ask for permission if I were to quote them directly. This saved much time compared to the 
processes I got involved in after the Norwegian interviews. I also relied more on the interplay between 
the recordings and the transcripts, writing up the transcripts mostly in telegram style, with references 
to time on the recordings. Thereby, I could go back and listen to the parts that were most interesting, 
which I often did during the writing of Paper 3, which also saved time.  
Discussion of methodology  
The size and representativeness of the population interviewed are an issue in quantitative as well as in 
qualitative interviews. In Norway, I achieved a full representation of the secretaries of state coordinat-
ing the work internally in the government, a good representation of all the major sectoral administra-
tions, and some major interest organisations (Appendix 1). In Canada, I also managed to get a fairly 
diverse representation from administrations and stakeholders (Appendix 1). I could have covered more 
representatives from industries and sectoral administrations in the provinces that actually had partici-
pated in the planning. Moreover, it would have been interesting to interview former politicians about 
the reasons for their distant roles. However, the experience of reaching saturation level was the major 
criterion to stop interviewing. I consider the representation good enough to provide an overview of the 
processes, as I have done in Papers 2 and 3.   
Most of my interviews could be classified as elite or expert interviews (Aberbach & Rockman, 2002; 
Berry, 2002; Flick, 2009, pp. 165-169; Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009, p. 158), conducted with former 
members of governments, high-level administrators, well-educated specialists and CEOs/general sec-
retaries of interest organisations. Even the active fisher who had been at the ESSIM table, turned out 
to have a master’s degree in ocean management. Interviewing usually implies a power imbalance in 
favour of the interviewer (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009, p. 52). Elites and experts have mechanisms to 
counter this, which raises several challenges for the interviewer (ibid). I experienced surprisingly few 
problems getting through their doors (Goldstein, 2002). The presentation of the good knowledge I pos-
sessed, inter alia through the interview guide, was probably important. This also meant that several in-
terviewees considered our conversations interesting; this was visible through their reasoning, willing-
ness to give me additional time and explicit acknowledgements. The general impression also was that 
I left most interviews with a feeling of having experienced frank information sharing, although the op-
posite also could be the case (cf. above). This does not mean that they told me everything that could be 
relevant. Civil servants in the Norwegian government were very loyal towards their political superiors, 
and revealed little information, for instance, about assisting their ministers in negotiations at the Prime 
 
46 
Minister’s office. Some of the former members of governments also explicitly refrained from reveal-
ing what they referred to as internal matters from the government.   
Interviewing exposed me very directly to the subjectivity of sources. Interviewees could, for instance, 
reason about their own and others’ motives, how they explained events and how they evaluated their 
own influence. I also had to take into consideration how well they could remember events often 10 – 
20 years back in time. The most assuring was when they had checked information before they met me, 
or brought documents to substantiate what they said. Rather often, I got reservations about how ex-
actly they remembered certain events, as well as tips about how to check the information. Thus, I al-
ways had to evaluate the information achieved, including the role and possible motives of the inter-
viewee. Cross-checking information with other interviewees and written sources was a necessity. The 
same critical approach regarding context and motives was needed when reading documents.  
Interviews raise a number of ethical questions. Kvale & Brinkmann (2009, pp. 79 – 97) called for the 
researchers to apply Aristotelian phronesis, a practical wisdom that seeks to understand situations in 
their context. A starting point for my reasoning about ethics is that I did not explore the private lives 
or seek sensitive personal information. All the participants were interviewed in their professional roles 
about events that have public interest. They received information about my purpose and consented to 
participate. As long as I sent transcripts for approval, I offered them full control over what written in-
formation would be kept afterwards. I promised them to keep their personal information anonymous 
when using the information in my papers, but I indicated that I might refer to their roles and institu-
tions. My judgement is that there are minimal personal consequences for the interviewees of consent-
ing to make selected information public this way. However, perceptions of the institutions they repre-
sented could be affected, particularly in Canada where implementation results were meagre. The most 
difficult issue to me was how to store the information for potential future uses. Until better guidelines 
appear, I will keep the transcripts and sound files with me for eventual future uses, according to the 
conditions set for my research by the Norwegian Data Protection Official for Research.  
5.6 Analysis of data 
Juridical interpretation  
In Paper 1, standard judicial techniques are applied for the interpretation of legal sources. The paper 
starts with a review of the relevant legal sources according to the selection criteria established (see 
Section 5.4). Usually, the most important thing in such reviews is to distinguish between what is often 
termed hard law and soft law. Hard law is binding and may be the basis for sanctions in case of 
breach. Binding rules are established through international treaties, which a sovereign state must ratify 
or assent to by other mechanisms in order to be bound,47 and customary law, which is applicable to all 
states that have not consistently objected to it. Soft law provides normative guidance and is of a more 
voluntary character. Examples are general principles of law that have not attained customary status, 
resolutions of international bodies and the teachings of legal scholars.48  
It may be more unusual that I also paid attention to the specificity of the norms and provisions under 
review. This was inspired by Neil Craik, who has argued that “whether a norm is legally binding or 
                                                     
47 Vienna Convention on the law of Treaties (1969), article 11 
48 See Statute of the International Court of Justice (1945), art. 38. 
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not, is of secondary importance where the norm itself lacks the necessary detail to influence behavi-
our” (Craik, 2008). Therefore, the status of EIA and SEA in international treaties was examined in the 
article according to three levels of specificity: (1) explicit provisions of EIA and SEA, (2) general as-
sessment obligations and (3) implicit/indirect assessment obligations. This demonstrated that there is a 
predominance of unspecific instruments. In the subsequent analysis, I therefore tried to enunciate spe-
cific requirements to the assessment process and content by interpretation.   
International law should not be interpreted in isolation, but considered as a whole (Boyle, 2007). This 
raises the issue of the status of different and potentially competing provisions from different legal 
sources. There are several juridical techniques available for settling this. The Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties is fundamental in this respect. According to jurisprudence, evolutionary interpreta-
tions must be limited to the intentions of the parties at the time of, for instance, the negotiations of a 
treaty (Boyle, 2007). The preparatory work of a treaty is important for understanding such intentions.49 
This calls for caution, for instance when interpreting the obligation to “assess” in the Law of the Sea 
Convention (LOSC) art 206, since the parties may not have meant EIA and SEA (Craik, 2008). How-
ever, the whole array of international law at the time of enactment must be taken into account (Boyle, 
2007). This led me to the conclusion that for the five Arctic Ocean coastal states, it is not unreasonable 
to interpret the obligation to “assess” as meaning EIA and SEA.  
Another common principle of interpretation is that a specific law (lex specialis) takes precedence over 
a more general law (lex generalis). I applied this several times in the analysis. However, such analyses 
must also take into account provisions that restrict the possibility of reservations or modifications be-
cause the treaties try to create integral regimes (Boyle, 2007). The LOSC is a prominent example.50 It 
has a constitutional character, meaning that other instruments can enact specific provisions as long as 
they are not against its object and purpose.51 Thus, specific provisions on EIA and SEA from other 
treaties, such as CBD, may fill in for the general provision to “assess” in LOSC.  
Finally, I tried to find out whether EIA or SEA could have achieved a special meaning from a legal 
point of view.52 Despite finding scholars who argued that EIA has, it did not bring more about clarity 
into the interpretation in this case.  
The final part of the legal analysis was a suggestion of what may be the gaps in the existing legal re-
gime for EIA and SEA. I based it on an analysis of the geographical and thematic scopes of the con-
ventions, partly on the needs for a more stringent regime to meet new industrial activities in the Arctic 
Ocean.   
Analysis of interviews and documents  
The interview transcripts and documents from the studies of BSMP created a large volume of infor-
mation. It was a typical situation after data collection, calling for sorting and reduction of the infor-
mation (Creswell, 2013; Ringdal, 2018). I tried using NVivo as a tool for organising and analysing the 
data. Documents and interviews were loaded into the programme as PDF files. I developed two sets of 
                                                     
49 Vienna Convention, art. art 32 
50 Art. 309 restricts the right to reservations, whereas article 311 restrict the right to conclude new agreements to 
issues that do not cause derogations from the convention’s objects and purposes 
51 LOSC art. 311 
52 Vienna Convention, art 30(4) 
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codes, which I manually assigned to sections of the texts. One set consisted of a hierarchy of relevant 
themes, and the other identified actors and organisations. I experienced the same as Creswell (1980): 
Benefits such as reading the texts more systematically and finding information more easily did not off-
set the effort of trying to learn the programme, develop the codes and code the texts. The number of 
texts after all was not bigger than what I managed to keep a fairly good overview of manually. I there-
fore decided not to invest more time in the programme for the research in Canada. I see the utility of 
NVivo and similar programmes in projects with more information and more researchers and in ad-
vanced uses such as text mining. For eventual future uses, I have a coded material about BSMP. 
After coding and taking notes, I started to combine information from different sources. The first task 
was to use this for writing an overview of the processes. For analysing the implementation of BSMP, I 
had descriptions of follow-up activities for each of the 157 measures, collected from interviews and 
documents. I put this into a table and analysed it manually. It would have been beneficial if I, at an 
early stage, had worked more with criteria for transforming this information into an interval scale: 
fully/mostly implemented, partly implemented, weakly/not implemented and unknown. I also used the 
tables for classifying each measure according to the type of instrument applied (see summary in Table 
1 in Paper 2). 
The most difficult part of the analysis was to develop explanations of the achievements. I analysed the 
relevant parts of the data carefully and searched for repeated patterns in different sources. In retro-
spect, I may call it analytical, theory-driven induction. I had good information about how many indi-
vidual processes had evolved, including participants’ own explanations of causation. Thus, I had fun-
damental elements for descriptive process tracing, even though I did not apply the tool formally, in-
cluding its logical tests for causal interference (Collier, 2011; Bennett & Checkel, 2015, pp. 20 - 35). I 
had several candidate explanations that I excluded before concluding with what I assumed to be the 
most important ones. This means that I evaluated the inferential powers of the information, however, 
without any formal test methods.  
5.7 Writing up the papers 
There is limited room for thick descriptions and multiple perspectives in the condensed format of jour-
nal articles (Flyvbjerg, 2006; Creswell, 2013). I experienced the need to compromise towards what 
may be ideal requirements on issues like the number of variables I could invoke, the depth in my ex-
planations of each and the methodology.  
I have written all my articles according to a traditional outline for scientific articles. Mostly, I present 
myself as the omniscient, distanced writer (Flick, 2009, p. 415; Creswell, 2013, p. 178). My only at-
tempt to position myself clearly in the text, was to write in first person where I found it natural to dem-
onstrate my responsibility for choices and interpretations. However, the reviewers of both the case 
studies disliked that, so I had to re-word. The only place where I insisted on using “I” was in the meth-
odology sections, where I found it completely strange not to signal who had made the choices.  
I brought other voices than my own into all of the texts: a couple of legal scholars in the analysis of 
EA norms, as well as several interviewees in the case studies. Mostly, I used embedded quotes to 
make the text float easily. Longer quotations were limited because of the limited space; I deleted sev-
eral during the final editing. Such choices limit the authenticity of the text and conceal the less stream-
lined and more diverse reasoning by some of the interviewees. They also leave the impression that I 
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use the sources to a less extent than what I actually did. However, I relied heavily on the information 
from the interviews, even when there are no quotation marks. The multiplicity of sources distinguishes 
the article from the majority of the writings about BSMP and ESSIM. It is common that the authors 
write according to their own experiences and views, mostly after participating in the planning pro-
cesses.53 Typically, these papers contain no or only very brief methodology sections, often not a the-
ory section either. The perspectives of certain participants surely are valuable, but the lack of other 
sources limits the trustworthiness of judgements in the texts.     
I did not involve interviewees much in my interpretations. A few core informants received complete 
draft manuscripts for comments, but only two of them responded. I also showed longer textual context 
to those who should approve quotes. There are several recommendations for involving interviewees 
and the public in the analysis, for instance by the use of focus groups to discuss interpretations (Kvale 
& Brinkmann, 2009; Creswell, 2013, p. 209). I did not attempt to involve the interviewees more ac-
tively due to practical reasons such as access, travelling and time. In hindsight, I see that dialogues 
with interviewees can be useful and can strengthen the final interpretation. However, throughout the 
process, I had extensive dialogues with representatives of another community important for validation, 
the research community. In the later stages of the research, this involved organised discussions based 
on my oral presentations, later, also drafts of the manuscripts.   
I distributed the papers to the interviewees and encouraged them to send me responses. Those who did 
responded positively, although that does not rule out the possibility that there also may be negative re-
actions. Beyond involvement, the main reason for doing this was to give back to the interviewees for 
their time and effort (Creswell 2013).  
5.8 Reliability and validity 
There are a plethora of approaches to evaluate qualitative research.  Process oriented approaches in-
clude recommending strategies for research practice (Creswell, 2013, pp. 207 - 209), good workman-
ship (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009, pp. 253 - 258) or quality management (Flick, 2009, pp. 409 - 412). 
Most efforts seem to be invested in formulating evaluation criteria that are specific to qualitative in-
quiry, not simply applying terms and underlying epistemic assumptions from quantitative research. 
The many different stances and lack of general accepted standards invite criteria shopping, whereby 
each researcher choses his/her own standards. Despite the objections and alternative propositions 
raised to the terms, I will nevertheless reflect on my research along the lines of reliability and validity. 
I will come back to generalisations in the next chapter.    
Reliability is related to the consistency and trustworthiness of the data. It is often explained as the ex-
tent to which results may be reproduced by other researchers. In my case, this applies primarily to in-
terviewing, which is a method sensitive to differences in approaches. For the consistency of the re-
search, it is beneficial that I conducted all the interviews, based on a rather standardised interview 
guide, and later transcribed and analysed them (George & Bennett, 2005). As regards replicability, 
other researchers might have reached different results. Firstly, their questions might have been differ-
ent. I influenced my interviewees by raising the agenda of implementation and by distributing pre-for-
mulated questions. Other sets of questions might have produced different results. Publishing my own 
                                                     
53 Some prominent exceptions from this are Knol (2010b) on BSMP, and Flannery and Ó Cinnéide (2012) and 
Guénette and Alder (2007) on ESSIM. 
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interview guide is an attempt to mitigate that problem in the future. Secondly, even though other re-
searchers would have posed the same questions to the same interviewees, there is always a risk that 
they might have obtained different answers. Personal relations, trust in the interviewer, time and the 
context of the interview always play a role. My response to this problem was to reflect upon the inter-
view situations, subjectivity of the interviewees or biases that may stem from my questioning, as I did 
above, whilst analysing and writing up the papers. The most important to me was data triangulation 
(Blaikie, 2010, pp. 262 - 270): I always checked the information from interviewees with that of other 
interviewees, documents and previous research. The information in the papers is always based on mul-
tiple sources, unless I clearly refer to one specific interviewee.      
Validity in quantitative sciences refers to the ability to measure (and draw conclusions about) the phe-
nomenon that is studied. In opposition to positivist research, scholars have introduced a large number 
of alternative concepts, for instance, trustworthiness, credibility, authenticity and accuracy (Creswell 
2008, pp 202 – 206). As referred to in the start of this chapter, I believe that there is a degree of social 
construction in most of our knowledge. This position makes it hard to rely on validation criteria based 
on the comprehension that there could be objective correspondence between reality and knowledge. 
Kvale and Brinkmann (2009) suggested an alternative, where validity is based on three criteria: evalu-
ation of the quality of the craftsmanship, communicative testing of different claims of knowledge, and 
pragmatic judgement of how the knowledge contributes to action. Regarding craftsmanship, I have ac-
counted for my procedures above. I feel quite confident about my descriptions of how the three cases 
evolved; this is based on extensive cross-checking of information and has been confirmed by some 
key informants. However, others may dispute my interpretations of the explanations for the achieve-
ments. It could be possible to provide different explanations, even on the basis of my own data. If that 
is possible, this will make the second criterion about communicative validation relevant. It means that 
the validity of the research would be established in dialogues over the knowledge produced, with the 
purpose that the involved will learn and possibly change. Here, I relied on traditional scientific valida-
tion by various peers. Since much of my interpretations builds on the accounts of interviewees, a more 
wide-ranging participatory validation than I have tried could be interesting. This could have tested my 
interpretations and eventually led to modifications or completely new ones. The same applies to wider 
validations by the public. However, whilst I see the merits of such dialogues, I also believe that the 
ultimate text is my responsibility. In case such processes would have led to differing views, I would 
have been flexible as regards corrections on more factual sides of the text, but more reluctant to 
change the interpretations. I rather believe that it would be fair to opponents and interesting to the 
reader if different views appear in the text. This is a better approach in my opinion than trying to write 
completely open texts (see Flyvbjerg referred in Section 5.3). Finally, the last validation criterion is 
related to the extent to which words from scientific texts also have the power to change behaviour; if 
they do, this will be a positive sign of validation. On this point, I believe that the questions raised by 
implementation research are highly relevant for eventually changing practices to the better. This is a 
challenging criterion. Many researchers, including me, hope to see such results of our activities. How-
ever, we have little control over such processes beyond distributing our articles and by other means 





6 Results, discussion and future work 
 
In this final chapter, I will start with a summary of the answers to research questions 1 and 2, which 
are addressed in this introduction as a context for the papers. Then follows a summary of the three pa-
pers, which in the case of Papers 2 and 3 also are the short answers to research question 3. I then turn 
to a discussion of the results before I point to some possibilities for further research.  
6.1 Characteristics of ecosystem-based management 
The first research question about the emergence of the EBM concept, and the characteristics of the ap-
proach, was addressed primarily in chapter 2. From its origin in terrestrial planning in the US, EBM 
has spread as a global concept and today has a stronger position in marine planning than on land 
(Engler, 2015). Despite the diverse uses and contexts in which it is applied, there seems to be agree-
ment on basic definitions. EBM aims at achieving the good health and sustainable use of ecosystems 
by assessing cumulative impacts and taking action on negative influences. It is a holistic approach to 
managing human activities that integrates across ecosystem components, industries and their admin-
istrations, and different sciences and knowledge holders. The more detailed it is defined or described 
with principles and approaches, the more room there is for different interpretations.  
Despite the many contexts into which EBM must be adapted, there are guidelines for how to proceed 
from international organisations. Recommendations are clear on the need to assess the ecosystems. 
The problems arise when moving from diagnosis to treatment. The fundamental need to formulate pol-
icy measures and implement them effectively is not clearly recognized or described in several guide-
lines (CBD, Arctic Council, LME approach). The UNEP recommendations are clear on the need to 
identify and implement measures, but provide only very general guidance for how to proceed.  
Long-standing debates in planning theory may be useful for positioning practical cases of EBM. There 
is a tension between the scientific ambitions of achieving a comprehensive understanding of the eco-
system and steering by objectives in a long-term perspective, and more pragmatic approaches that are 
willing to decide and act based on uncertain knowledge and adaptive management. Another tension is 
related to the role of experts. On the one hand, EBM is knowledge-intensive, in practice, having privi-
leged ecological expert knowledge. On the other hand, EBM is inclusive towards different stakehold-
ers and types of knowledge, and reliant on political deliberations and decision-making. Discussions of 
power relations and conflicts, which have been important in planning theory and political sciences, 
seem to be mostly neglected in the marine EBM literature.      
EBM sets the environment first, even though socio-economic considerations are also taken into ac-
count. It can be characterised as primarily the environmental pillar of fully integrated management for 
sustainability, in which social and economic objectives are considered on equal terms with environ-
mental objectives. EBM may be implemented by spatial approaches, such as marine spatial planning, 
as well as non-spatial approaches such as pollution abatement, essential parts of fisheries policies and 
climate change policies. There seems to be a tendency that marine spatial planning is seen as a practi-
cal way of implementing a vague and complicated notion of EBM. The risks are that the links to eco-
system considerations become lost and that marine spatial planning simply becomes a vehicle for in-
troducing new industries into the oceans by zoning of physical ocean space. Similarly, there is a ten-
dency that designation of marine protected areas take over for prior ambitions of implementing EBM. 
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Marine protected areas is insufficient for marine conservation purposes unless supplemented by 
broader approaches, such as EBM.   
6.2 Paper 1: Legal obligations for environmental assessments 
The second research question addressed the role of environmental assessments in EBM and their legal 
status. Environmental assessments are adapted to different tiers of public policy, with specific methods 
for each. Strategic environmental assessments (SEA) are the most relevant to EBM since it is an ap-
proach for assessing strategic initiatives (policies, plans and programs). It is well suited for appraising 
cumulative impacts in regional assessments, which corresponds to a key task in EBM. Moreover, SEA 
attempts to integrate assessment into the preparation of strategic initiatives in a flexible manner, adap-
ted to the needs for assessment. This is an important role for incorporating the results from EBM plan-
ning and decision-making into strategic initiatives of different sectors. Environmental impact assess-
ment (EIA) is a tool for assessing the impacts of concrete projects, which can be conceived of as the 
lowest tier. If deliberately linked to higher tiers, EIA can build upon prior SEAs and higher level, eco-
system-based plans when assessing projects prior to their possible adoption. 
Both SEA and EIA are tools for the prior assessment of impacts of proposed developments before de-
cisions are taken. EIA has attained the status of customary law, whereas SEA has not. The problem 
with customary law, along with most international agreements relevant for the Arctic Ocean, is that 
the assessment obligations are unspecific; it is unclear what they imply. EIA and SEA may be rele-
vant, but so may other approaches. The Law of the Sea Convention is an important example with its 
obligation to undertake an “assessment”.  The Biodiversity Convention is specific on SEA and EIA, 
whereas the International Seabed Authority has made regulations for EIA for deep seabed mining. The 
Espoo convention on transboundary EIA and its SEA protocol are specialised assessment instruments.  
A regional assessment regime for the Arctic Ocean can be found when interpreting all the legal 
sources in connection. The legal trigger for undertaking an assessment is the likelihood that an initia-
tive may cause significant harm to certain values, which each treaty defines more specifically. Among 
the treaties that contain specific assessment obligations, the Biodiversity Convention is the only one 
that is transnational across all the maritime zones, for the specific purpose of assessing harm to biodi-
versity. The EIA regulations for deep seabed mining apply to the High Seas and the Area (the deep 
seabed), whereas the Espoo instruments apply to areas within coastal state jurisdiction only. Going on 
interpretations only, it may be argued that there is a transnational obligation to undertake EIA accord-
ing to its standard form, also for other purposes than biodiversity assessment. Apart from the Biodiver-
sity Convention, there are very few requirements for SEA in the Arctic Ocean.      
In the article, I suggested that the regional assessment regime contains the following weaknesses:  
• Insufficient acceptance of existing instruments. 
The US is in a very peculiar position by not being a party to i.a. the Law of the Sea Convention, 
the Biodiversity Convention and the two Espoo instruments.  
• Major sectors have either no or uneven assessment obligations beyond the minimum requirements 
in the Law of the Sea Convention and the Biodiversity Convention. Inside the high seas regulatory 
area of the North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC), there are requirements for as-
sessing the impacts of new and exploratory fisheries on vulnerable marine ecosystems on the sea-
floor. They do not apply to pelagic fisheries, or to any fisheries outside the NEAFC regulatory 
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area. There are no requirements to assess shipping and marine tourism. Only parts of the oil and 
gas activities are covered by specific assessment obligations.  
• Domestic areas are not covered well by specific treaty obligations.  
• Weak coverage of areas beyond national jurisdiction. 
There are strong legal obligations to avoid transboundary harm. This includes assessing the likeli-
hood for such harm to occur. It is striking to note the lack of specific rules for assessing harm orig-
inating in areas under coastal state jurisdiction towards the high seas and the Area.  
• The specialised Espoo instruments for SEA and EIA have low relevance in the oceans due to the 
listing of sectors and activities to which they apply.  
• Strategic initiatives are not covered well by specific assessment obligations. There is a mismatch 
between this situation and the expected expansion of economic activities in the Arctic Ocean, and 
the assessment obligations in EBM and the regular process for the World Ocean Assessment.   
The weaknesses may be addressed both globally in the negotiations on a new legally binding instru-
ment on biodiversity beyond national jurisdiction, and in a regional process under the Arctic Council. 
Important improvements would include the creation of a more specific default mechanism for prior 
assessment of marine activities, and closer linkages between assessments and substantive goals. 
6.3 Paper 2: Implementing policy for the Barents Sea  
The government has presented the Barents Sea Management Plan (BSMP) in the form of white papers 
to the parliament. Most of the 157 individual measures from the 2006 plan and the 2011 update have 
been put into practice. This has occurred despite the lack of a statutory basis for management plans, 
and several breaches of traditional advice for successful implementation: the objectives were unclear, 
there were only loose mechanisms for overseeing the sectoral administrations’ implementation of a 
partly contested policy, and there was no pre-allocation of funds. However, it not possible to tell 
whether the delivered results of implementation, i.e. the output, contributed to a desired outcome. The 
reason is that the plan and subsequent monitoring do not establish linkages between the selected policy 
instruments and the outcomes. 
A part of the explanation for this somewhat unexpected result is the Norwegian context, with a politi-
cal system characterised by a consensus-seeking political culture, a professional administration, and 
the high freedom at the national level to act on ocean affairs. It should also be noted that the plans had 
a political origin in a long-lasting political conflict over petroleum policy and enjoy bipartisan political 
support. Further explanations for the implementation results are:   
• The insights and political legitimacy achieved by a strong reliance on knowledge. The proce-
dures employed, with broad mobilization of government agencies across sectors and public 
review of their assessments, have been important for the judgement of the system. This 
matches an appreciation of knowledge-based policy-making in Norway.  
• The collaborative style of involving the ministries. The government set up an inter-ministerial 
group of civil servants from the relevant ministries. This fostered better understandings, trust 
and relationships, and gave ministries access to the others’ resources. The ministries had to 
suggest policy responses within their own purviews as a response to challenges described in 
the assessments they had jointly commissioned. This created higher acceptance and avoided 
the common division between those formulating and implementing policy. 
• The handling of conflicts with authoritative decisions from a coalition government that was in 
a parliamentary majority position. The political parties in the coalition negotiated major con-
flicts on oil, fisheries and the environment at the highest political level in the cabinet, often by 
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making compromises through package deals. The politicians had heard the opinions of stake-
holders prior to making the decisions.  
 
6.4 Paper 3: A comparison of Canadian and Norwegian approaches  
The Canadian government delegated the responsibility for making management plans to the regional 
branches of the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO). They were supposed to work with other 
government bodies and stakeholders according to collaborative planning principles. Both the Eastern 
Scotian Shelf Integrated Management Plan (ESSIM) and Placenta Bay/Grand Banks Integrated Man-
agement Plan (PB/GB) became strategic plans. The plans have not led to the implementation of any 
new measures.  
A conspicuous explanation is that the content of the Canadian plans created a poor impetus for imple-
mentation: Their objectives made it unclear what they wanted to achieve, the designation of strategies 
made it open-ended as to what was to be done, nobody was responsible for following-up and resources 
were scarce. The reasons for this unclear design can be summarised in two properties of the policy for-
mulation process. Firstly, the Canadian federal government did not attempt to overcome administra-
tive fragmentation by a “whole-of-government” approach. Other departments considered the planning 
as a DFO initiative, so DFO had to persuade them to participate voluntarily. It also turned out that they 
were not willing to accept integrated ocean planning as an overarching framework over their sectoral 
mandates. Secondly, nobody had the authority to take decisions in the consensus-based collaborative 
planning. The participants concealed disagreements and conflicts in high-level and non-committal 
statements, and pushed concrete solutions forward to a next phase of action planning that never took 
place. The federal government played a crucial role for the termination of the two planning processes. 
A conflict over the planning area in ESSIM brought the initiative in conflict with the minister in DFO. 
PB/GB terminated because of a change in the national ocean policy, whereby the government dropped 
the ambitions of integrated ocean management in the Oceans Act. Voluntary commitments from other 
participants did not compensate for the lack of support from the federal government.    
The concluding cross-case analysis highlights the striking difference in the leadership of the two gov-
ernments and the way they organized for the planning. The Norwegian government led the planning in 
a traditional top-down government manner. The Canadian government relied on a governance ap-
proach and delegated the entire task, with unclear linkages back to the top. While the Norwegian gov-
ernment built organisational structures for trying to act more coherently across sectors, the Canadian 
government allocated the task to one sector alone, with insufficient supplementary co-ordination 
mechanisms. In the Norwegian model, the government listened to stakeholders and took decisions af-
terwards, ultimately negotiating compromises over conflicts in the Cabinet itself. The Canadian col-
laborative planning model made the heterogeneous group of stakeholders and government representa-
tives equal in terms of decision-making power. This is a major reason why the ESSIM partners de-
signed a policy that was not implementable, whereas the BSMP policy was. Important differences in 
policy design were BSMP’s setting of specific ecosystem targets with indicators, and designation of 
specified measures, as opposed to open-ended strategies in ESSIM. The different approaches taken 
reflect different national policy styles. Another explanation relates to the different political and eco-
nomic contexts, which create different motivations for the two governments to engage consistently in 
ocean planning and resolution of conflicts.   
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6.5 Discussion  
States have wide freedom to manoeuvre according to their own wishes in EBM since the approach is 
only contained in soft law arrangements. Paper 1 demonstrated that this is the case also when it comes 
to SEA, which is the most relevant instrument for assessments in EBM. Thus, there is a mismatch be-
tween the urgent needs for strategic assessments in the oceans, i.a. for EBM, and the weak legal status 
of SEA in the law of the sea. Strengthening SEA for the oceans will be an indirect way of strengthen-
ing EBM. The legal options available include requiring SEA in sectoral regimes, extending the marine 
scope of the SEA protocol, and entering into regional agreements (Paper 1). However, the negotiations 
of a legally binding treaty on biodiversity beyond national jurisdiction seems like the most interesting 
option now (Sander 2018c). 54   
Paper 1 contributed to clarifying the status of international law prior to these negotiations. It does not 
only review international norms one by one, but is an attempt to interpret across the legal sources to 
define an assessment regime for the Arctic Ocean. The constellation of regional treaties and states here 
is specific, like it is in any other ocean. This affects the ability to generalise analyses across regions. In 
this case, however, it is not a problem since there are almost no regional treaties in the Arctic contain-
ing specific provisions on SEA and EIA.55 The analysis therefore will be essentially the same if ap-
plied to other regional oceans that lack regional treaties containing specific assessment obligations (it 
must only be adjusted to the constellation of regional states and their accession to global treaties). 
Where assessment relevant regional treaties exist, they must be taken into consideration on top of my 
analysis. The most relevant ones are those that I excluded because of their geographical scopes: the 
EU directives on EIA and SEA, the Madrid protocol with EIA provisions for Antarctic waters and Re-
gional Seas Conventions, whose geographical scope mostly is limited to areas within national jurisdic-
tion. With these exceptions, the analysis is mostly applicable to other areas beyond national jurisdic-
tion.56 
The other issue worth mentioning about paper 1 is that it tries to incorporate experience from the 
wider assessment literature, particularly about the effectiveness of EIA and SEA, into an article mostly 
based on legal reasoning. There are many unrealistic expectations as to what environmental assess-
ments can deliver. It is therefore important to understand its roles and to draw lessons from the litera-
ture researching what it may achieve.  
Paper 2 and 3 are rare examples of implementation theory, in the form of Winter’s framework, applied 
to an ocean policy. There are lessons to be learned from this, both for implementation theory and for 
EBM. For implementation theory, the studies broaden the knowledge base for the tradition, and may 
generate insights that can contribute to generalisations across different policy areas. The papers also 
                                                     
54 Information about the negotiations can be found at the UN website https://www.un.org/bbnj/.   
55 The only EA relevant treaty pertaining specifically to the Arctic used to be the Polar Bear Treaty, which only 
contains an implicit requirement for assessment. The more recent NEAFC rules on the protection of vulnerable 
marine ecosystems do contain assessment obligations, however, based on global FAO guidelines (cf. paper 1). 
The difference to other oceans therefore will be the extent to which the global FAO guidelines have been incor-
porated into the regulations of a regional fisheries management organisation.   
56 The article is about to be published in an edited book with papers from the International Journal of Marine and 
Coastal Law, made especially for these negotiations (Freestone, 2019). 
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demonstrate the importance of extending the focus of implementation studies beyond the implementa-
tion process alone, which many studies do despite advice of a broader focus (Sætren, 2014). In fact, 
the two papers find explanations for the implementation results in most parts of Winter’s framework 
(see conclusions in Paper 3). Moreover, the two papers demonstrate the importance of the national 
government taking an active leadership role by engaging all relevant sectors and deciding in conflicts. 
The relevance of a classical top-down approach is noteworthy in the aftermath of the governance turn, 
which also influenced implementation studies.  
For EBM, possibly also broader ocean policies, the framework is valuable because it introduces a the-
oretical platform for studying implementation processes as an alternative to each researcher finding his 
or her own angle. The terminology is clear and focussed on explaining how previous processes may 
explain the delivered results, not on understanding the processes for their own sake. Leaning on a 
long-standing theory tradition gives possibilities for learning from previous studies, for instance by 
finding explanatory variables that can be tested in an ocean context.   
The combination of implementation theory and case study methodology applied in Paper 2 and 3 
demonstrates an approach for generating empirical knowledge about which approaches that are condu-
cive to the implementation of EBM under which circumstances. Possibly, this can also lead to theory 
development. Such knowledge should be fed back to practice by updating the advice given in recom-
mendations for how to apply EBM in different contexts. The empirical support for EBM guidance 
seems at the best unclear, and in several cases, not fit for the main purpose of EBM, the adoption and 
the implementation of policy measures.  
A critical question is how to advance from assessment of an ecosystem to formulation and implemen-
tation of policy. The cases examined demonstrate that this is a political process, not a technical issue 
or something that can be taken for granted. Participants in planning processes can get the same infor-
mation about the ecosystems. That may create some joint understanding about the need for something 
to be done, as illustrated by the BSMP case. Still disagreement remained on what should be done by 
whom. Participants filter the information through their own lenses, and have different interests they 
want to secure. Stakeholders can also be divided by deep conflicts with a long history, as in the case of 
petroleum activities in the Barents Sea. Thus, it is inevitable that disagreement will arise, both on the 
understanding of the situation and on what should be done. If not managed properly, the results may 
be conflicts that can block progress towards solving outstanding ocean problems. The prevention and 
resolution of conflicts therefore is a key issue in EBM, as it is in planning for other purposes. If the 
stakeholders have conflicting views, maybe even after negotiating between them for a compromise, 
the cases demonstrate the importance of having legitimate decision-making processes for taking a po-
sition in conflicts. In the Norwegian political system, there is no doubt that this means elected political 
bodies. 
EBM has long suffered from an implementation problem, for various reasons: an ecosystem is a com-
plex management object; it is hard to coordinate planning and harmonise policies as required for its 
management; and there are a number of dilemmas and conflicts that need to be resolved. Still, I agree 
with Murawski (2007) and many others who have argued that it is possible to implement EBM. Nor-
way, and arguably also the European coastal states, demonstrate this. They have not solved all ocean 
problems and once and for all achieved the objectives of EBM. What they have done, is to establish 
regular processes and routines for EBM. That is likely to put them in a better position for addressing 
ocean problems in the future. It is a warning sign when those who used to be the frontrunners, such as 
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the Biodiversity Convention, Canada and Australia, in practice leave their former ambitions of integ-
rated, ecosystem-based ocean management. There is a risk that EBM ends up as an overarching princi-
ple in itself, a high-level discourse to be mastered, but not implemented for practical purposes. If I 
should highlight one key element for success from the Norwegian case, it is pragmatism. The high-
level discourse on EBM, with all its principles, is overwhelming. There is a need to drag them down to 
earth and find practical approaches. If that is combined with a political will to address ocean problems 
in an integrated manner, there is a good chance that EBM may take off.  
6.6 Further research 
The work with the thesis has given several ideas for further research. A common theme is the need for 
empirical investigations of EBM. For many of the topics below, there are already a plethora of studies 
and theories available, developed in other contexts. The task is to apply these as background for stud-
ies related to EBM.     
The relationship between SEA and EBM deserves more attention than in Chapter 3. An empirical ba-
sis for further research would be to study different uses of assessments in EBM in order to explore the 
assessment methodologies applied and how they function in planning and decision-making processes. 
With the scant interest in the assessment community for marine assessments, it would be useful to 
look into different ocean industries to see what types of strategic plans that have been made, to what 
degree these have been assessed for their (environmental) impacts and the uses of different assessment 
tools. Linked to the UN biodiversity negotiations, there is a need to follow the negotiation process, an-
alyse the proposals, and communicate findings and reflections back to the negotiations.   
The implementation studies can be followed up in many ways.  
Firstly, as reflected in the conclusions of Papers 2 and 3, there is a need to follow the same research 
approach on more cases in order to expand the scope of the conclusions. New cases should be selected 
carefully in order to test applications under different conditions, and to study different approaches to 
all the elements in Winter’s framework. For instance, my studies have not focussed on different app-
roaches for studying the effects of policy instruments after they are put into practice, and how that 
may generate learning and adaptation of instrumentation. Such a research programme would benefit 
from going deeper into the general implementation theory and from using the results of comparable 
studies. It would be useful to see how studies have been designed, and what results and explanatory 
variables they have found. This can be used for generating hypotheses that may be tested on new cases 
of EBM. It would also be useful for defining variables more precisely than what I have done. Moreo-
ver, future studies should try to find the effects of implementation on policy outcome, not only output, 
which I have studied.   
Secondly, political processes are key for achieving results of EBM, but seem to be little studied and 
clearly underestimated in the recommendations and frameworks for how to proceed in practice. An 
important topic is which mechanisms that are useful for achieving collaboration and coordination 
across sectors and levels of governance. Processes for suggesting, selecting and implementing policy 
instruments are of special interest. Are these processes supported by scientific advice, and in case yes, 
what kind of advice? The roles of industries and other stakeholders in planning processes, lobbying, 
alliance formation and decision-making is another topic. What are their interests, how do they mano-
euvre to affect the policy-making, and how do their activities influence the adopted and implemented 
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policies? The cases that I have studied demonstrate that it is important to study the mechanisms for 
attempting to resolve disputes and conflicts that inevitably will arise in EBM.  
Thirdly, the relevance of planning theory to EBM should be investigated more deeply. Collaborative 
planning has a strong status in many recommendations for EBM. However, it was an important reason 
for the lack of results in ESSIM. As pointed out in Chapter 2, EBM was coined in the US, which also 
was an important cradle for collaborative planning (Innes & Booher, 1999). One of the questions is 
what implicit assumptions collaborative planning holds from a US context that may not hold in other 
contexts, for instance, on the role of governments. Even the neighbouring Canada is different from the 
US, and differences to Europe may be even larger (Rudd et al., 2018). This may explain why criticism 
of collaborative planning has been strong in Europe (Innes & Booher, 2015). However, even in the 
US, there are opposing views on how collaboration works (Innes & Booher, 1999; Layzer, 2008; 
Margerum, 2014). The conflicting views on the conditions under which collaborative planning and 
consensus-seeking may function should be assessed. This should be a background for empirical stud-
ies of EBM processes. Koontz and Thomas (2006) raise a fundamental question for such inquiry: To 
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A B S T R A C T
Ecosystem-based management (EBM) should lead to policy that effectively addresses major negative impacts on
the ecosystem in order to solve the problems identified. So far, there is little empirical knowledge about what is
conducive to the formulation and implementation of such policies. The article suggests that implementation
theory is an appropriate theoretical platform for acquiring such knowledge. General implementation theory is a
starting point that gradually can be specified for implementation of EBM through carefully selected case studies.
The article describes the theory and demonstrates its applicability by analysing the implementation of the
measures in the Barents Sea Management Plan. Despite a policy design that violated several traditional re-
commendations for successful implementation, most measures in the plan were actually put into practice. The
explanation lies in the Norwegian political-administrative system, the mobilization of knowledge, the colla-
boration created by involving a group of ministries and the authoritative handling of conflicts by the cabinet. All
these explanations refer to processes occurring during the formulation of the policy, thus illustrating the need for
a broader focus than the implementation process itself when studying policy implementation. The political
leadership of the Norwegian government was decisive, demonstrating that EBM can be effectively implemented
in a top-down fashion.
1. Introduction
Ecosystem-based management (EBM)1 has been widely recognized
as a strategy for the sustainable management of all the world's oceans.
Integrated management of all human activities affecting an ecosystem is
one of its core characteristics (Arctic Council ministers, 2013). This
distinguishes EBM from traditional single-sector management. More-
over, EBM defines the whole ecosystem as the management object, not
selected species, habitats or concerns. These holistic ambitions make
EBM a complex undertaking that has been slow to move from con-
ceptual ideas to practical approaches and implementation.
A substantial EBM literature has emerged (Curtin and Prellezo,
2010). Much of this is normative, defining the concept and potential
approaches (Arkema et al., 2006; Grumbine, 1994; Juda and Hennessey,
2001; Levin and Lubchenco, 2008; Sutinen and Hennessey, 2005). Em-
phasis has been placed on understanding ecosystem properties and
finding ways to assess cumulative human impacts upon them. However,
for EBM to reach its objective of sustainable use of ecosystem goods and
services, ecosystem knowledge must be translated into politics and
management, ensuring that the findings from assessments are met with
effective responses that are put into action. It is therefore a problem that
both the normative and empirical literature on EBM pay less attention to
political processes, the content of policies and how to manage multiple
human activities in an integrated fashion (Arbo and Thuy, 2016). In
order to understand such issues, EBM should be studied through the
analytical lenses of a variety of social science disciplines. Implementa-
tion theory should be particularly appropriate on the background of the
many calls for implementation of EBM and the obstacles encountered
(Sætren, 2014; Winter 2012). However, literature searches show that
implementation theory has not yet been applied to EBM, and probably
rarely on marine issues at all. Implementation theory has achieved
substantial knowledge about what facilitate or hinder the successful
implementation of public policies. This is a solid platform for studies also
in the marine realm in order to reach empirically based conclusions for
specific marine policies. Challenges are significant when coordination of
different policy sectors and levels of governance is required, as is the
case for EBM. As a point of departure, it would be reasonable to expect
limited success, as indicated in the title.
This article introduces implementation theory as an analytical tool
for empirical studies of attempts to apply EMB. This offers a theoretical
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basis enabling a move from atheoretical accounts to carefully designed
case studies that may lead to more systematic accumulation of knowl-
edge, potentially also a contingent theory for implementation of EBM
(George and Bennett, 2005). The Norwegian Barents Sea Management
Plan (BSMP) is used as a case. This is a rare example of a mature system
for EBM where political decisions have been implemented and systems
for monitoring and revision are put in place. Implementation theory has
been applied in asking questions to the case, and it has structured the
presentation of the article. The findings thus are conveyed in a way that
can facilitate later cross-case comparisons in order to test if the con-
clusions can be generalized to different contexts. Consecutive Norwe-
gian governments have presented one white paper introducing a na-
tional ocean policy founded on EBM (ME, 2002) and three white papers
on the BSMP (ME, 2006, 2011, 2015), which became the model for
similar plans for the Norwegian Sea (2009, 2017) and the North Sea
(2013). The major research question here is to examine the extent to
which the measures in the BSMP have been implemented, and explain
the results. As will be seen, addressing this requires an understanding of
the characteristics of the policy formulation process, the selected policy
and the implementation process. This distinguishes the article in several
respects from the previous literature on the BSMP (for instance Knol,
2010b; Olsen et al., 2007; von Quillfeldt et al., 2009). It focuses on the
policy and results of the plan, not on the initial assessments. Political
actors play the main roles in the story, not experts. Moreover, the in-
formation is based on extensive interviews.
The article starts with a presentation of implementation theory, and
a description of the methods applied. The subsequent sections are
structured according to the theoretical framework before a discussion
addressing explanations and a conclusion summarizing findings and
putting the case into perspective.
2. Implementation theory
Studies of the implementation of public policies emerged at least as
early as the 1950s (Sætren, 2005), but is often attributed to Pressmann
and Wildavsky's influential book “Implementation” from 1973
(Pressman and Wildavsky, 1984). They studied a federal program in the
US that aimed to provide jobs for minorities, but with meagre results. A
major explanation was that too many actors had to coordinate or give
their consent in long sequences of decision and veto points. Such ex-
plorative studies of single cases were typical for the first generation of
implementation studies, which frequently concluded that implementing
public policy resulted in fallacies and failures. However, when followed
over a longer period of time, researchers found that implementers
learned from initial problems and adapted their approaches so that
performance improved (Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1983, pp. 274–282).
It also became evident that it was insufficient only to study the im-
plementation process and blame the implementers when results did not
live up to expectations. Success or failure also depends on the wider
policy process, particularly the processes of formulating the policy, and
the content of the policy itself (Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1983;
Palumbo and Calista, 1990, pp. 5–17). Instead of continuing with
searches for failures, more nuanced questions arose about the criteria
for success or failure and what could explain either of these results
(Hupe and Sætren, 2015).
Several attempts have been made to synthesize results, specify
causal relationships and develop a general theory of policy im-
plementation that could guide research and explain implementation
results (Goggin et al., 1990; Hill and Hupe, 2014, pp. 44–59; Winter
2012). Despite such efforts, there is still no general theory across all the
particular contexts (Sætren, 2014). Winter has argued that aiming for
such a theory is utopian (Winter, 2012). Instead, researchers should
develop and test partial theories and hypotheses by a diversity of
methods and clearer use of concepts. His own contribution is a frame-
work for implementation studies (Fig. 1). It is meant as a roadmap for
analysis, not a theory itself; different theories may apply to different
parts of it.
Policy formulation is the phase where policy is developed, discussed
and finally adopted. Conflict is one critical issue, and may lead to un-
clear compromises with vaguely described or inconsistent goals. That
gives unclear guidance for action and wide leeway for implementers to
modify the policy. Unresolved conflicts that persist in the im-
plementation process may turn this into a new arena for continuous
struggles. A core issue in the political bargaining is the selection of
means to reach the ends. An effective policy must build on a valid
causal theory and select means that work. Such a theory may not exist
or be unknown to policy makers. They may also disregard its re-
commendations due to ideology, habit or interventions from stake-
holders. Or they may resort to symbolic policy instead of substantive
action because it can be advantageous to create a favourable image of
themselves by demonstrating intentions, ideology or alliances (Winter
and Nielsen, 2008, pp. 58–70).
The policy design, or adopted policy, typically contains objectives
and measures consisting of policy instruments, designation of institu-
tions in charge of implementation, and allocation of resources for sol-
ving the tasks (May, 2012). Traditional advice says that it is conducive
to good implementation if objectives are clear, the degree of required
change is low, and effective instruments and simple administrative
structures are chosen (Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1983). This has been
criticized as unrealistic. The political system routinely produces policies
with ambiguous goals (Matland, 1995). Regarding the effectiveness of
policy instruments, the way individual instruments work depends on
the context, and there is little knowledge about the interplay when
instruments are combined into packages (May, 2012). Moreover, des-
ignating simple administrative structures is not easy when governments
increasingly get involved in solving complex problems where many
public and private organizations have to find joint solutions (O'Toole,
2012). A more realistic advice is to design a policy that creates in-
centives for the implementers to take requisite actions by building their
capacity, increasing their commitment to the basic policy goals, and
signalling desired courses of action (May, 2012).
The implementation process: The management of relationships be-
tween organizations plays an important role in explaining the im-
plementation of complex policies. Cooperation and coordination entail
costs and benefits. On the cost side are reduced autonomy and sub-
stantial transaction costs, most evidently time and resources spent on
establishing and maintaining the relationship. Different interests may
also lead to conflicts and dysfunctional strategic games, like free-riding
or turf wars (Lundin, 2007b; Winter and Nielsen, 2008). One common
reason why collaboration still occurs is that the organizations involved
are linked under the same hierarchy – for example ministries under a
cabinet. A hierarchy can impose and support coordination with the
authority needed. However, usually there are strong barriers towards
involving the highest level when problems and conflicts arise (O'Toole,
2012). Organizations can also be convinced about the advantages of
cooperation voluntarily. Sharing common goals is one reason for this.
They may also get the advantages of resources in other organizations,
such as access to funds, information, human resources and political
legitimacy. Trust between the partners also plays a fundamental role
(Lundin, 2007a). These assets must be continuously cultivated. Skilful
administrators in complex organizational settings typically interact
with counterparts in other organizations and stakeholders to build
support, persuade, negotiate and coordinate, sometimes also to fend off
disruptive influences. Networking this way can improve collaboration
and the performance of policies (O'Toole, 2012).
There are two major options for selecting the dependent variable in
implementation studies, or what should be explained: output or out-
come (Hill and Hupe, 2014, pp. 141–143; Winter 2012). Output is the
immediate delivery of results in the form of services to the public or
exercise of authority. Outcome is the subsequent impacts, often mea-
sured as goal achievement compared with the policy's objectives. The
linkages from output to outcome can be seen as a series of causal-effect
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relationships, with many possible end points. The main problem in
linking output to outcome is that other circumstances, such as other
policies and external factors, occur simultaneously, supporting or
counteracting the desired results. Long time spans and varying geo-
graphical scope may also complicate evaluation. Due to these com-
plexities, implementation studies most often use output as the depen-
dent variable. That is also the case in this study.
3. Material and methods
The study is based on publicly available documents and interviews
that have been conducted according to a permission from the Norwegian
Data Protection Official for Research. The main documents considered
are white papers from the government and the recommendations to
these from the Storting.2 I conducted in-depth interviews with 30 in-
dividuals and made several requests to others to check details. The in-
terviewees included seven politicians from four governments and current
or former civil servants from the coordinating Ministry of the Environ-
ment (ME), the Prime Minister's Office, the Ministry for Petroleum and
Energy (MPE) and the Ministry of Fisheries and Coastal Affairs (MFCA).3
The questions addressed the processes that led to the formulation of the
plan, how measures had been followed up, the organization of the im-
plementation process, and general questions about attitudes towards the
management plans. I also approached some of their subordinate direc-
torates to ascertain the extent to which they had been involved in pro-
posing measures to the plan, and to review the implementation process
and its results. Moreover, I interviewed former leaders of the Norwegian
Fishermen's Association (Fiskarlaget), environmental NGOs (WWF and
Naturvernforbundet) and the Norwegian Oil Industry Association (Ol-
jeindustriens landsforening) about their attempts to influence the policy
before its adoption and during the implementation process. The inter-
viewees first received information about the purpose of the study. After
giving their consent to participate, they received questions in advance.
The interviews lasted between one and up to four hours when repeated.
Afterwards, the interviewees received transcripts with journalistic
editing, providing them the opportunity to clarify or add information.
The transcripts and the documents were coded in NVivo in order to get a
better overview of the extensive information. All the 157 measures
identified in the two white papers (ME, 2006, 2011) were put into a
spreadsheet along with information detailing what had been done to
follow up each of them. When searching for explanations to the im-
plementation results, the interviews gave good information about how
many processes had occurred, sometimes also participants' own ex-
planations of why results had been achieved. This was core information
for arriving at plausible explanations and evaluating their explanatory
power. The number of final explanations were limited in order to capture
main mechanisms common across the individual measures.
4. The formulation and implementation of the policy
4.1. Background
The initiative for the BSMP was completely political and came as the
result of decades of controversies over the future of the petroleum in-
dustry in Norway's northern seas (Andersen, 2017; interviews). The
three centre-right parties in the Bondevik government (2001–2005)
agreed in their political platform to prepare “a holistic management
plan” as a part of a package deal on petroleum in the Barents Sea. The
original petroleum agenda was substantially amplified when coupled
with Norway's international commitments to implement EBM in the
first formulation of a national ocean policy. In the resulting white
paper, the government presented a vision for clean and rich seas and
designated legally non-binding management plans as the major in-
strument for achieving this (ME, 2002). These cross-sectorial plans
were to contain impact assessments, ecological quality objectives and
guidelines for sectorial policies. The sectors, however, were to be re-
sponsible for implementing the measures needed to reach the
Fig. 1. An integrated framework for implementation studies (Winter, 2012). The parts of the framework concerning street-level bureaucrats are marked with grey because they have less
relevance for the BSMP-case.
2 In Norway, a white paper (Melding til Stortinget) is a document from the government
to the parliament (Stortinget) with information about a policy, but without a proposal for a
decision.
3 In 2013, the MFCA was dissolved, while the ME got new responsibilities and was
renamed. Since most of the events in this article concern developments before 2013, the
old names and functions are retained.
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objectives. Another important decision was to appoint the ME to lead
the work through a Steering Group with representatives from the re-
levant ministries. A first package of measures addressing most maritime
sectors was also described.
The Stoltenberg government presented the first BSMP in 2006 (ME,
2006; hereafter referred to as BSMP-2006). This was a coalition of three
centre-left parties emanating from a majority in the Storting between
2005 and 2013. The plan introduced a policy with management ob-
jectives and a program of measures for all relevant sectors. Due to
political controversies over the plan's compromise on petroleum activ-
ities, the government presented a selective up-date focusing on the
Lofoten area in 2011 (ME 2011; hereafter BSMP-2011).4 Despite this
restricted scope, the plan included a new programme of measures
covering wider areas and topics.
The Solberg government submitted another update in 2015 (MCE,
2015; hereafter BSMP-2015). The topic was the seemingly technical
issue of moving the defined location of the ice edge further north due to
ice melting. However, that would imply that petroleum activities could
move northwards as well, without breaking the political agreement
with two supporting parties that prohibited drilling in ice-infested
waters. The Storting sent the white paper back to the Government,
claiming that the normal procedures for making management plans had
not been adhered to. Instead, it called for an ordinary revision. This
white paper will only be referred to occasionally since it did not include
new objectives or measures.
4.2. Policy formulation
4.2.1. Scientific and technical reports
The preparation of the first plan started with the establishment of
the Steering Group with civil servants from four ministries, not politi-
cians.5 They commissioned a series of studies from their subordinate
agencies, starting with status reports and followed by sectorial impact
assessments leading into a cumulative impact assessment (Fig. 2). A
main conclusion was that the state of the Barents Sea was good. Fish-
eries had the greatest impacts on the ecosystems, while petroleum
production, increased maritime transport and climate change were fu-
ture risks. Other studies addressed objectives, valuable and vulnerable
areas, and knowledge gaps (Hoel, 2008; Knol, 2010b).
The agencies involved later were organized formally into one cross-
sectorial expert group, the Management Forum.6 Before the 2011 up-
date, the group delivered one single report in a response to all the tasks
commissioned by the Steering Group. For the 2015 update, the gov-
ernment wanted to save time and resources.7 The ME therefore as-
sembled the information itself instead of using the Management Forum.
4.2.2. Drafting the white papers
It was a clear premise that the scientific and technical reports should
provide a knowledge base for formulating policy, not propose policy
responses to the challenges identified. That was perceived as the poli-
tical realm and a task for the government. The Steering Group was
instrumental also in this task. Thus, their role changed from guiding
subordinate agencies to giving advice to the cabinet. Based on first
drafts by the ME, the group drafted the white papers including propo-
sals for packages of measures. Documents detailing the measures they
considered and the reasons for their selection are not publicly available.
The interviewees refer to almost no previous analyses of the effective-
ness of the instruments under deliberation. What the civil servants
believed would work, which is tempting to call “traditional managerial
knowledge”, seems to be the prevalent rational basis for selection. The
degree of consensus or conflict was however important
4.2.3. Conflicts and conflict resolution
The Management Forum was instructed to reach consensus to the
extent possible, and over the years there have been almost no dissenting
opinions in their reports. This reduced the scope for disagreements about
facts and the use of competing expertise in the ministries. The degree of
conflict between them varied by issue. Norway's tradition for addressing
pollution in international fora had universal support. Regarding mar-
itime safety and oil spill response, “there was broad agreement pro-
fessionally, between ministries and across the political parties” on what
should be done.8 The political disagreements concerned the willingness
to pay for risk reductions. The hardest issues to resolve involved a tri-
angle of interests related to fisheries, petroleum and the environment,
represented by three ministries. With respect to fisheries, overfishing
was no longer a big issue following a major overhaul of the fisheries
policy in the 1990s, whereas illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU)
fishing still was (Gullestad et al., 2014). The major conflicts arose over
the sector's responsibility for environmental damage, particularly to
benthic communities, and the use of marine protected areas (MPAs).
Regarding petroleum policy, the conflicts concerned accident risk, pol-
lution from regular activities, and access to new areas. The Lofoten area
was the centre of the political struggle because of its petroleum reserves,
rich ecological values and importance for fisheries. This marine dis-
course is mixed with wider arguments about climate change, the future
role of the petroleum industry in Norwegian economy and regional
benefits to Northern Norway (Jensen, 2012).9
In the co-ordinating ME, the politicians “considered at an early stage
that it would have been too demanding to have two big conflicts running
simultaneously”.10 They therefore decided to first negotiate most con-
troversies regarding fisheries bilaterally, in 2006 and 2011. An intended
political consequence was that the ministries for fisheries and for the
environment would focus on joint interests in the petroleum conflict.
Those issues were unresolvable in lower-level discussions with MPE.
The upper level of conflict resolution was to present the disagree-
ments in a cabinet memorandum and put it forward for a cabinet
meeting (Fig. 3). Considerable time in 2006 was spent by newly ap-
pointed cabinet members discussing how to structure processes before
substantial negotiations over the first management plan started, issue
by issue. Learning from this, the state secretary for ME in 2011 pre-
sented all major disagreements in one cabinet memorandum. The in-
tention was to facilitate negotiating package deals, which was a tech-
nique frequently used by the Stoltenberg government to reach
compromises (Kolltveit, 2014). However, “what we failed to come to
terms with in meetings between the state secretaries was seldom re-
solved in larger forums” such as the cabinet meeting.10 When that oc-
curred, “it was the practice in our government that the prime minister
concluded that the issue would be best served by delegating it to the
Cabinet Subcommittee11 (…). Alternatively, he could authorize a set of
4 The terminology about the Norwegian management plans distinguishes between a
revision, which is a complete review of the whole plan, and an update, which can focus on
selected themes or geographical areas.
5 Norway has a parliamentary political system, not a presidential. A typical ministry
consists of a permanent staff of civil servants, headed by a minister, a state secretary and a
couple of political advisors changing with the government.
6 Following several reorganizations, there is now one joint Management Forum
(Faggruppen) for all the three management areas, not one for each. Only one permanent
sub-group remains, the Advisory Group on monitoring.
7 State secretary.
8 Civil servant.
9 Climate change is defined as a separate, cross-sectorial policy field in Norway.
Mitigation of climate change therefore is not addressed in the management plans. Given
their distinct marine scope, adaptation to climate change could be included. So far, it has
not, apart from the initiative in the BSMP-2015 for moving the petroleum activities
northwards after the receding ice edge.
10 Former state secretary.
11 The Cabinet Subcommittee (Regjeringens underutvalg) is an informal inner cabinet in
Norwegian coalition governments. It has concentrated power from the broad collegial
cabinet to the prime minister and the coalition party leaders, supplemented by relevant
ministers. Similar developments can be found in many European cabinets (Kolltveit,
2014).
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Fig. 2. Overview of the studies undertaken 2002–2005 that provided the input to the 2006 white paper.
Fig. 3. Simplified map of the internal mechanisms in the Stoltenberg government for reaching agreement on policies before the final adoption of the complete plans by the Cabinet
collegium.
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ministries to settle the issue.”12 Thus, the prime minister and the party
leaders from the governing coalition negotiated the text in the BSMP-
2006 in meticulous detail, primarily with respect to the regime for
petroleum activities. Participants explain this level of involvement by
the high political stakes involved, the pioneering endeavour, and the
early days of the coalition. Five years later, a minister without a port-
folio at the prime minister's office led inter-ministerial negotiations.
Interviewees describe this as a simpler process than in 2006. It was an
update of a kind of plan that in the meantime had become more fa-
miliar, the Management Forum had not recommended major changes to
the petroleum regime, and everybody knew the political constellations
well. Since the Stoltenberg government had majority support in the
Storting, these internal processes in the coalition in reality settled the
issues.
4.2.4. Stakeholders’ activities
The Management Forum invited stakeholders to several workshops
in the beginning. Their assessments and reports later have system-
atically been submitted to public consultation. The processes of pre-
paring the white papers, however, were closed, with no formal oppor-
tunities for participation. Subsequent hearings in the Storting
committee were the only occasion to present an opinion on the policy
directly to decision-makers. The organizations also tried to influence
decisions through extensive use of media and direct lobbying, parti-
cularly directed at the political parties.
The organizations used the corporate channel too. The Oil Industry
Association had formalized contact meetings 2–3 times a year with the
minister for petroleum and leading civil servants (Topplederforum). The
Fishermen's Association also had regular meetings with their minster.
The environmental organizations, however, did not have the same
regular channels to the top of the ME. This corresponds to previous
findings of economic organizations having closer corporate links to the
government than environmental interests (Reitan, 2001). The Oil In-
dustry Association gathered the largest national industrial and labour
organizations in an umbrella organization (Konkraft) that developed
and harmonized policies among the members. The industry also tried
hard to come to an agreement with the fishermen's organizations. They
found many flexible solutions to conflicting uses. However, they could
only agree to disagree on the opening up of Lofoten and three other
areas for petroleum activities. The oil industry made no similar at-
tempts to reach agreements with the environmental organizations.
4.3. Policy design
4.3.1. Objectives
The objectives of the BSMP established in 2006 are complex (Fig. 4).
The purpose of the plan was to provide a framework for sustainable use,
while maintaining the structure, functioning and productivity of the
ecosystems. Nine general objectives address value creation, ecological
considerations, and co-existence between industries. These were sup-
plemented by specific targets for managing biodiversity, controlling
pollution, reducing risks, and ensuring safe seafood, branching into 15
sub-targets supplemented by indicators. The levels of target achieve-
ment based on monitoring on the indicators were assessed both in 2006
and in 2011 as a basis for the ministries’ designation of measures.
The general objectives reflect the problem of striking an appropriate
balance between conservation and use. They appear as a typical result
of a political process trying to reconcile different views in a compromise
where most stakeholders can find formulations supporting their inter-
ests. This gives weak guidance for resolving disputes. It opens for
multiple interpretations of what to achieve, of criteria for evaluation,
and of the direction of a marine policy. However, ambiguity reduces
conflicts and ensures that everybody is kept on board (Matland, 1995).
Sacrificing clarity in the general objectives, thus, can be understood as
necessary in order to keep all the ministries loyal to the process.
The broad, sustainability-oriented scope of the objectives is not re-
flected in the set of specific targets, which cover only the environment
and no socioeconomic issues. This reduces the utility of the targets in
the balancing of conflicting goals. Another problem with the targets
was that they only covered the state of the environment. Without ad-
ditional indicators for pressures on the environment and more specific
indicators for impacts, it is hard to explain observed changes (van der
Meeren, 2015). Neither can the system measure the effects of adopted
policies since there are no response indicators.
4.3.2. Measures
The measures were formulated in 122 action points in the BSMP-
2006 (“The Government will…”). The 2011-update comprised 57,
partly repeating and reinforcing the original ones, partly introducing
new ones. The measures contained a number of policy instruments.
That is the set of techniques that governmental authorities apply when
attempting to affect societal change (Bemelmans-Videc et al., 1998, pp.
7–50). The idea is that any policy consists of a limited set of basic ap-
proaches that are common across different policy fields. These are
adapted to the particular circumstances and often merged into
packages. The selection of policy instruments will reflect main lines of
political or administrative strategies referred to as policy styles, and
may vary between countries, sectors and periods (Bemelmans-Videc
et al., 1998, pp 2 and 39; Lascoumes and Le Gales, 2007; Winter and
Nielsen, 2008, pp. 43–71). One major change is what has been char-
acterized as a turn from vertical government to horizontal governance,
with partnerships, co-management and networks as core ingredients
(Salamon, 2002). In environmental policies, the so-called ecological
modernization introduced new instruments based on markets and in-
formation to consumers (Jordan et al., 2013).
The instruments are classified according to the columns in Table 1.13
The largest category by far is initiatives to improve knowledge. A back-
drop for this is the decision to base the studies undertaken in 2002–05 on
existing knowledge, and the subsequent identification of “knowledge
gaps” that were addressed in the plan (Knol, 2010a). The second largest
group is what is called government initiatives. This consists of the classical
regulations (laws, regulations, enforcement) and governmental plans, po-
licies and strategies. The third largest group is international initiatives. On
closer examination, the largest sub-category is initiatives to improve in-
ternational regulations on particularly contaminants and IUU fishing,
whereas other initiatives aimed at better collaboration and enhancing
common understandings with foreign actors.
The review of the measures leaves a clear impression of a traditional
governmental policy style. Regulations predominate, while there are no
attempts to influence actors in the markets by economic incentives, or
involve them in co-management. The high number of programs for
improving knowledge and the international initiatives are peculiar to
EBM. This reflects norms about applying the best available knowledge
and the need for collaboration across jurisdictions in EBM. The im-
plication for following up was clear: the government was the sole im-
plementer.
4.3.3. Funding
There were initiatives from members of the Stoltenberg government
to ensure commitments to funding for new initiatives in the white
12 Former minister.
13 This is inspired by Vedung (Bemelmans-Videc et al., 1998, pp 21–51). He re-
commends a minimalistic approach with only three categories: Regulations, economic
means and information. This should serve as a starting point for further sub-divisions and
adaption to the particular case. Here, regulations is linked to other government initiatives
in order to shed light on the government/governance dimension. Moreover, information
is split into the classical information from the government in order to influence actors, and
the information to the government in order to increase the knowledge base. Detailed
classification is available on file by the author.
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papers. This triggered a general conflict with the Treasury, which wants
to consider all appropriations holistically in the annual budget. The
Treasury view won, and the white papers only used the standard for-
mulations that the budgetary consequences would be clarified in the
budget.
4.4. The implementation process
In the 2002 white paper, it was established that the management
plans would constitute a framework for the sectors, which were to be
responsible for the measures. Thus the BSMP-2006 did not specify any
new organizational structure for the implementation, only for the sci-
entific advice. The main responsibility remained with the individual
ministries, often with assistance from subordinate directorates or
agencies. Many of the agencies were well prepared for the tasks since
they had been giving advice to their ministries during the preparation
of the policy.
To begin with, the Steering Group had no role in the follow-up; they
were busy preparing new plans for the Norwegian and the North Seas.
Contacts that had been established were useful for informal coordina-
tion, and issues could be brought up on an ad-hoc basis. They later
made a systematic overview of all the measures and all the allocated
responsibilities. Since then, the ministries have reported occasionally
on how they have followed up the measures.
At the political level, neither the Prime minister's office nor the
politicians in the coordinating ME established any systematic
mechanism to oversee the implementation. The politicians in the ME,
however, engaged eagerly in a number of issues, aiming to ensure a
consistent marine policy across sectors, implementation of the mea-
sures, and sufficient funding of strategic projects.10
5. Implementation results
In order to measure the extent of implementation, I have system-
atically interviewed civil servants about each of the 179 measures, and
consulted government documents. Some of the measures were akin to
aims, indicating the desired direction of processes instead of defining a
concrete deliverable. In such cases, it is harder to assess what has been
achieved, even though there generally have been substantial follow-up
activities. Concentrating on the majority of action points that have
more concrete demands for results, the overall conclusion is that most
of the measures have been implemented. Moreover, there seem to be
few adaptations of the measures during the implementation and few
completely breaches of intentions. Before discussing how this has been
achieved, some major results are highlighted.
5.1. Cross-sectorial EBM
The first group of measures in BSMP-2006 addressed how to make a
system for holistic EBM across the sectors. Coordinated, cross-sectorial
monitoring of the state of the ecosystem has been established, con-
sisting of indicators, reference values and action thresholds. The
Fig. 4. The structure of objectives and targets for BSMP with key words for formulated goals.
Table 1
Measures in the two BSMP white papers classified according to type of instrument.
Government initiatives Economic means Information: International initiatives Technology Organization Total
Regulations Plan, policy, strategy From government Better knowledge
BSMP-2006 21 13 0 2 45 32 2 7 122
BSMP-2011 7 7 0 2 34 3 3 1 57
Sum 28 20 0 4 79 35 5 8 179
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Management Forum provides comprehensive assessment reports every
third year and annual updating of each indicator on the Internet (van
der Meeren, 2015).
The BSMP-2006 stated that the management should be area-based.
This was followed particularly by the zoning of shipping and petroleum
activities (see below). However, a comprehensive system for cross-
sectorial marine spatial planning has not been established due to op-
position from several ministries.
It was an ambition in 2006 to establish a representative network of
MPAs by 2012. There were hard internal struggles in the government
on this issue. In the end, no MPAs were established in the Barents Sea.
This is the clearest breach of intentions encountered. The Storting is not
satisfied with the situation, and has called for a national plan for MPAs
from the government.
Another set of initiatives aimed at improving the common knowl-
edge base through expanded research and improved surveys. Three of
these are prominent: MAREANO is a comprehensive programme for
mapping the seabed that has cost 758 MNOK14 over its first 12 years of
operation (Buhl-Mortensen et al., 2015). SEAPOP monitors seabird
populations and has led to an additional expenditure of 103 MNOK in
the same period, on top of other ornithological programs in the Barents
Sea.15 A campaign for seismic exploration of the Lofoten area was
conducted at a cost of 518 MNOK. Moreover, a number of research
initiatives have addressed pollutants, climate change and marine
acidification, including the impacts on the Barents Sea ecosystem.
Several initiatives were directed at engaging Russia in establishing
EBM in their part of the Barents Sea. This has been a major task for the
bilateral Norwegian-Russian environmental collaboration. Joint scien-
tific assessment have been made. Russia is working according to a road
map that aims at establishing a pilot project for EBM in the Barents Sea,
based on new legislation.16
5.2. Initiatives towards the sectors
The second group of measures was aimed at preventing and redu-
cing pollution and safeguarding biodiversity. Here, policies towards
three important sectors are highlighted:
5.2.1. Petroleum activities
A new framework for the petroleum sector's access to areas was
introduced in 2006 (Fig. 5, left). Almost all the areas that had been
identified as particularly valuable and vulnerable were completely
closed for petroleum operations (Knol, 2011a). In the new compromise
in 2011, the conservation interests managed to maintain the most
controversial areas around Lofoten closed. The political prize for that
victory was that the oil industry got access to other areas where re-
strictions were lifted (Fig. 5, right), and that processes for legally
opening up new areas for their activities were initiated for the formerly
disputed area with Russia and off Jan Mayen. The Storting opened the
southeastern Barents Sea in 2013. The preparations for opening up the
areas around Jan Mayen have been put on a halt as a result of the
political negotiations over the platform for the Solberg government.
The other major issue was the physical zero discharges requirement
introduced in 2003 as a stricter condition for operations in the Barents
Sea. It was revoked in BSMP-2011 and replaced by the same require-
ment that applies to the rest of the Norwegian continental shelf: no
harmful discharges (Knol, 2011b). These requirements as well as time
and area based restrictions have been incorporated into the production
licenses and discharge permits issued to the oil companies.
5.2.2. Fisheries
The BSMP-2006 stated that the government would continue the de-
velopment of an ecosystem-based management regime that takes into
account how fisheries affect the whole ecosystem. The new Marine
Resources Act formalized this in 2008 by establishing the ecosystem ap-
proach to the management of wild-living marine resources as a principle.
The two white papers introduced several measures to protect sensi-
tive bottom habitats: the mapping of benthic areas, the presentation of
the results in nautical charts, and the development of less damaging
fishing gear. Following their new legal mandate, the fisheries authorities
have closed coral reefs to fishing and introduced rules for immediate
stop in operations when the intermixture of sponges and corals in the
catch exceeds defined limit values. The collaboration in SEAPOP has
reduced the conflicts over seabirds, but has not resulted in new measures
applicable to the fisheries. Many seabird populations are in severe de-
cline, and the Storting has called for an action plan for seabirds.
In the traditional fisheries management, the BSMP-2006 called for
an increasing proportion of stocks to be managed according to formal
management strategies with precautionary reference points. The
Fisheries Directorate argued that it would be too expensive to acquire
the knowledge needed, as compared to the value of the catch. Instead
they introduced a system of tables synthesizing knowledge about
stocks, fisheries, and the management of species that are not being
fished according to annual quotas (Gullestad et al., 2017). The in-
itiatives to reinforce control measures and deter IUU fishing in the
Barents Sea had a high priority. Norway particularly engaged with
Russia and the EU, and played an active role in the negotiations of the
2009 Port State Measures Agreement. The peak of IUU fishing of cod
and haddock in the Barents Sea was estimated to be 206,000 tonnes in
2005. Today, it is close to zero for these two largest commercial stocks
(Anon, 2015; ICES, 2016).
5.2.3. Maritime safety and oil spill response
The most important measures for improved maritime safety are the
establishment of a traffic service centre in Vardø, a mandatory routing
and vessel separation scheme along the coast (Fig. 6), and improve-
ments to the tugboat services. Restrictions on heavy bunker oil in
Svalbard were introduced to prevent oil spills. The government's oil
spill equipment has been completely modernized over the last few years
at a cost of approximately 400 MNOK.14
6. Discussion
The high level of implementation can seem surprising based on
traditional recommendations from implementation studies. There were
no legal obligations backing the process. The goals were unclear, no
funding was pre-allocated, and there were only loose mechanisms for
overseeing the implementation of a complex and partly disputed policy
based on distributed responsibility. What might explain this somewhat
unexpected result?
6.1. The context
A part of the explanation lies in what is the context according to
Winter's framework. First, the Norwegian unitary state has considerable
autonomy in ocean affairs. The agreement between Norway and the EU
about the EEA has geographic and thematic limitations that exempt
Norway from EU policies in most ocean affairs. At the national level,
the management of the oceans outside of the coastal zone is a national
responsibility that the state has not shared with municipalities and
counties.17 These circumstances give the state latitude and control.
14 MNOK=million Norwegian krones. All expenditure figures have been provided in
correspondence with the programme managers.
15 Intro to the programme: http://www.seapop.no/en/about/.
16 For more information, see http://www.barentsportal.com/barentsportal/index.
php/en/.
17 As a contrast, coastal areas out to the baseline + 1 nm (ref. the geographical scope
of the EU Water Framework Directive) are managed according to the Planning and
Building Act. The act gives municipalities a major responsibility for spatial planning also
in the sea.
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Second, the Norwegian political model is characterized by a co-
operative and consensus seeking policy style and relatively small dif-
ferences between the political parties. The population has a high level
of trust in the political system. There is a well-qualified staff of civil
servants with a professional ethos of loyalty toward parliamentary de-
cisions (Olsen, 1983).
6.2. Political ownership
It is noteworthy that the whole idea of management plans was po-
litical, not the result of the advocacy of professional organizations.
Since the Bondevik government coined the concept and shaped its basic
content, subsequent coalition governments have followed up and re-
fined the system. These governments together comprise all the estab-
lished political parties in the Storting. Recent events indicate that the
backing of parliamentarians has grown firmer. The Storting has decided
to revise the plans at least every 12 years, based on new knowledge and
a thorough process. Updates should happen every fourth year to check
goal achievement and eventually revise the measures.
It is suggested that there are three reasons for this political support
that also explain the high level of implementation:
6.3. The role of knowledge
The political system in Norway has a long tradition for appreciating
knowledge-based policies (Christensen and Holst, 2017). Almost all the
interviewees refer in some way to the knowledge production when
asked about ranking the most important achievements of the BSMP. A
CEO in the petroleum industry for instance stated: “(the management
plans) assemble much knowledge, and also new knowledge. Knowledge
(…) provides greater awareness of what the issues are rather than cheap
arguments. It does not mean that everybody agrees with everybody, but
it serves as a basis for discussions.” The Management Forum is highly
regarded in this respect. This was illustrated by the critique in the
Storting of the circumvention of the Forum in the preparation of the
BSMP-2015: “For the majority, it is important that revisions or updates
of the management plans only occur on a factual basis established by
the Management Forum, and after these reports have been put on
public review”.18
The trust put in expert knowledge raises several dilemmas. The in-
creasing influence of technical expertise challenges Norwegian popular
democracy (Christensen and Holst, 2017). The BSMP is a prominent
example, with the high dependency on expert advice and interpreta-
tions. On the one hand, the politicians want this advice. It gives them
necessary insights into science, but also tempting ammunition for jus-
tifying their own views by selectively picking science-based arguments.
Such strategic use of knowledge and repeated calls for new assessments
to achieve “sufficient knowledge for decisions”, have often over-
shadowed argumentation based on values and interests (Knol, 2010a).
On the other hand, it is interesting to observe that the Storting was
conscious about the need for a distinct political role versus the experts
when they argued for regular updates to the plans: “The political parties
too must be allowed to take part in the necessary and on-going work on
Fig. 5. The Framework for petroleum activities in BSMP-2006 (left) and BSMP-2011 (right).
18 Rigmor Eide in interpellation debate 7 April 2016.
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the management plans. (…) It must not become merely a scientific issue
that is not anchored in the parliament.19
6.4. The active involvement of relevant ministries
Many of the soft mechanisms in the Steering Group resonates with
the literature on what is conducive to collaboration between organi-
zations (Lundin, 2007a; May, 2012; O'Toole, 2012). The very estab-
lishment of a group of ministries implied a less hierarchical organization
more prone to collaboration and negotiations than if the task had been
allocated to one ministry alone. Mutual understanding and trust was
built by learning about the other ministries' areas of responsibility and
motives, and by the personal relationships evolving from working to-
gether for years. There are also several examples of ministries getting
access to the resources of others. The most apparent is the pooling of
expertise and money needed to run the Management Forum and fill
knowledge gaps. This produces credible and legitimate results that the
individual ministries would not have achieved by their own. Individual
ministries also could enjoy access to political resources, like access to
decision-makers in other ministries, support for their initiatives from a
broader group of ministries, and access to another standing committee
in the Storting. While interviews reveal a recognition of the way the ME
facilitated the processes, there were also complaints about the extra
workload. That is no surprise and probably a necessary cost in im-
plementing complex policies effectively (Lundin, 2007b).
The reports from the Management Forum influenced the perception
of the task in the Steering group. The reports defined common chal-
lenges that the ministries had to address jointly by proposing measures
within their own areas of responsibility. A former coordinator in the
MFCA said that their response was to propose “what we knew we could
implement”. This did not imply that their ambitions were low; rather,
it illustrates how the measures were rooted in their own system. The
involvement of the ministries in this way meant that the same minis-
tries that participated in formulating the policy were also responsible
for the subsequent implementation. That averted the split created
when an adopted policy is handed over to someone else for im-
plementation, thereby substantially increasing the risk of deviation
from the intentions (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1984). The active par-
ticipation is also important in explaining why the implementation by
the sectorial administrations ran smoothly without new organizational
structures.
6.5. Conflict resolution
The close involvement of the very top of the political hierarchy in
this case is extraordinary compared to how most organizations operate
(O'Toole, 2012) and what is normal for most policies in Norway. It
provided the selected policies legitimacy that prevented continuous
struggles that might have impeded implementation.
The two most prominent disputes played out quite differently.
Major conflicts regarding the fisheries’ responsibility for the environ-
ment and the distribution of authority between the fisheries and en-
vironmental administrations, were gradually addressed in a series of
Fig. 6. Traffic separation schemes from Vardø to Røst.
19 Marit Arnstad, interpellation debate 7 April 2016.
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political compromises in the Stoltenberg government20. Today these
developments are not disputed, but there are different opinions re-
garding whether the fisheries sector alone or also the management
plans should take credit for the changes. The ecosystem approach to
fisheries had evolved during the 1990s as a sectorial variant of EBM
that gradually was introduced in Norway (Gullestad et al., 2014). In-
terviewees from the fisheries administration acknowledge that the
management plans pushed them further and that the cross-sectorial
ecosystem approach was new to them. It seems fair to say that this is a
good national example of the international trend of co-evolution of the
regimes for fisheries and biodiversity conservation (Garcia et al., 2014).
Though there are continuous disputes over the environmental perfor-
mance of fisheries, they play out within a new framework that has wide
support.
As a contrast, the conflict over petroleum continues to be one of the
most prominent current expressions of a historical green cleavage in
Norwegian politics (Jansen and Mydske, 1998). Extensive programmes
that have produced new knowledge only seem to move the trenches to
new battlegrounds (Blanchard et al., 2014; Hauge et al., 2014). There
are two fundamentally opposing views colliding on access to new areas.
The petroleum industry sees the whole Barents Sea as a natural area for
expansion, whereas the environmental and fisheries organizations want
to permanently close particularly the Lofoten area to them. So far, the
BSMP has not approved any of the views since the restrictions in the
plans are limited in time by the next update, or until a new political
constellation emerges after a general election. The deciding factor is
that it has not been possible to establish new coalition governments
after 2001 without compromising on holistic package deals that make
concessions to those who want to restrict the petroleum industry's ac-
cess to especially the Lofoten area in exchange for increased activities in
other areas21.
The outer positions of the coalition partners in both the Bondevik
and the Stoltenberg governments reflected these incompatible views. It
was a political reality that they had to reach compromises in order for
the coalitions to survive. The consensus seeking political culture in
Norway played a role in the negotiations. “I was very determined not to
create winners and losers, but to try to find joint solutions”, the ex-
minister who negotiated internally in the Stoltenberg government ex-
plained. Other interviewees shared the impression that it was a fair
process and a reasonable compromise, given the power balance be-
tween the parties. “We won what we had to win. But we also had to lose
something”, the chief negotiator from one of the other parties sum-
marized.
Several interviewees have said that the powerful MPE at times has
been reluctant to participate in the management plan system and
strongly opposed to an area-based framework beyond their own con-
trol. However, non-participation is unachievable as long as the gov-
ernments and the Storting use the management plans as a key me-
chanism for conflict resolution. Neither is it an option not to implement
agreements, with politicians, stakeholders and the media attentively
watching.22 Though the petroleum industry has not been granted access
to Lofoten, the political compromises have assigned them access to
substantial new areas. This has been achieved by a process that enjoys
wide legitimacy, as opposed to the controversies when the MPE ran
similar processes alone (Andersen, 2017). The ministry has retained full
control over the licencing policy, and the activities are about to expand
into all the areas made available. These processes are viewed with
considerable mistrust by the environmental organizations.
7. Conclusion
The starting point for this analysis was that there is a need to un-
dertake empirical studies of the implementation of EBM policies. It was
suggested that implementation theory offers a platform for systematic
case studies that would enable accumulation of knowledge. In the case
of the BSMP, most measures have been put into practice as planned. To
explain why, the study applied Winter's framework for implementation
studies (Winter, 2012). The policy that should be implemented had
broad and ambiguous objectives. On the other hand, specific environ-
mental targets with indicators established a yardstick for appraising the
need for policy measures. The designated measures were to be im-
plemented by the government apparatus alone, however, without any
pre-allocation of funds for new initiatives, and only a weak mechanism
for overseeing the implementation processes that were handed over to
the sectorial administrations. When the implementation is successful
despite these breaches of traditional recommendations, the explana-
tions must be found in the policy formulation processes and the context.
In a political culture favouring knowledge as a basis for policy for-
mulation, there has been a broad mobilization of government agencies
and research institutions in delivering policy-relevant assessments. A
group of ministries has been instrumental in collectively finding policy
responses to the challenges in the assessments. Disagreements were
solved authoritatively in top-level negotiations between three political
parties that had to compromise and reach agreement if their majority
government should survive. The experiences have strengthened the
status of the Norwegian management plans as political tools for in-
formed decision-making and conflict resolution. An important con-
textual factor is that the Norwegian unitary state has wide freedom to
manoeuvre in ocean policies, reducing the challenges of multi-level
governance.
This paper's analysis demonstrates the importance of having a broad
scope when searching for independent variables in implementation
studies, as recommended by Winter's framework. Despite the wide
support for this (Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1983; Palumbo and Calista,
1990; Pressman and Wildavsky, 1984), most empirical studies focus on
the implementation process alone (Sætren, 2014). In the BSMP case, the
major explanations relate to what happened in the policy formulation
process. The analysis also illustrates the problem of selecting dependent
variable. The most common dependent variable in implementation
studies is output - the delivered policy, as opposed to the intentions in
an adopted policy. Here, a rather instrumental approach to output
measurement has been applied, the extent to which a measure has been
realized. In many cases, this raises immediate “so what” questions, for
instance when the measures are new government initiatives (regula-
tions, plans etc) or knowledge production. It is easy to argue that what
really matters is the outcome – the extent to which the policy reaches its
objectives or reduces the problems that motivated its formulation. The
BSMP illustrates the problem. The measures have been successfully
implemented. But neither ex ante assessments nor ex post evaluations
have demonstrated their contributions to positive outcomes. The im-
plemented policy may or may not build on a valid causal theory and
produce desired results; we do not know. In order to address this
missing link, there is a need for multidisciplinary evaluations. Social
scientists' contribution would be to link the use of policy instruments to
changes in human behaviour, including changes in patterns of sea uses.
That would be a starting point for natural scientists' evaluation of
ecosystem impacts. Without a strong focus on the efficiency and effi-
cacy of policy instruments, EBM will not contribute to fixing the pro-
blem of a deteriorating state of the oceans, as reported in many as-
sessments.
20 The cases involved were the Marine Resources Act (2008), the Norwegian Sea
management plan (2009) and the Nature Diversity Act (2009).
21 The most recent illustration of this mechanism occurred in January 2018, when the
Solberg government was broadened from two to three parties following the general
elections in 2017. The political platform of the new government prolonged the limitations
on the petroleum industry's access to new areas for the next four years (ref. section 5.2.1).
At the same time, a record high number of new exploration licenses was awarded in the
licensing round called TFO 2017.
22 This was demonstrated when the MPE in 2016 invited the petroleum companies to
nominate areas for the next licencing round in Lofoten. Such a blatant violation of the
political platform for the Solberg government became an embarrassing scandal, and the
invitation was withdrawn.
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The BSMP is also a clear-cut example of successful top-down im-
plementation, achieved by traditional, government-based policy in-
struments. The feasibility of this as opposed to bottom-up approaches
has been widely discussed in implementation theory. The discussion is
relevant to EBM as well, since a strong involvement of stakeholders
often is recommended, sometimes also bottom-up processes. The
Norwegian management plans are parts of a national policy style that
may be referred to as centralized consultation. Stakeholders enjoyed
wide opportunities for commenting the assessment reports, but had no
formal chances for commenting or discussing the policy before it was
published. Despite this limited role, the stakeholders interviewed ex-
pressed appreciation of the plans.
Finally, how much can we generalize from this single case?
Analytically, we can. The problem is that we do not know the scope of
the conclusions beyond the individual case yet. That can be gradually
expanded by a systematic selection of supplementary cases for cross-
case comparisons, for instance bottom-up approaches (George and
Bennett, 2005). Such studies may test the applicability of the in-case
explanations set out here and will certainly reveal additional explana-
tions and causal mechanisms. This is a building block approach to
building new theory on EBM implementation. As for the general im-
plementation theory, it is unlikely that a general theory of EBM im-
plementation can be found. However, reaching contingent conclusions
on circumstances under which EBM can be successfully implemented,
for instance based on typologies of cases, would be a helpful general-
ization for practitioners in the field.
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A B S T R A C T
A comparison of a Norwegian and two Canadian management plans reveals that most of the measures in the Norwegian plan were put into practice, whereas the
Canadian plans did not result in the implementation of any new measures. This paper applies implementation theory to explain the different results. First, there is a
striking difference in the leadership of the two governments and the way they organized for the planning. The Norwegian government led the process in a top-down
manner and tried to apply a “whole-of-government” approach. The Canadian government delegated the entire task to the regional branches of one ministry alone.
The different roles taken may be explained by different political and economic contexts that create different motivations for the governments to engage. Second, there
were different ways of deciding when conflicts arose. The Norwegian coalition government negotiated internal compromises in the form of package deals. In Canada,
the collaborative planning based on consensus concealed disagreements in high-level statements and pushed concrete solutions forward to later action planning that
never occurred. These processes reflect different national policy styles and resulted in policy designs that created a very different impetus for implementation. The
analysis demonstrate how theory-driven case-study methodology can lead to cumulative results.
1. Introduction
Ecosystem-based management (EBM)1 has become a key concept for
the management of the oceans. The purpose is to keep the ecosystem in
good health and to reduce user conflicts. In order to achieve this, all
human activities affecting an ecosystem should be managed in an in-
tegrated manner (Arctic Council ministers, 2013; Curtin and Prellezo,
2010). Thus, it is of vital importance to formulate and implement po-
licies that lead to necessary changes in the operations of relevant
human activities. Unfortunately, there is not much empirical knowl-
edge about how to achieve such changes (Arbo and Thủy, 2016). This
has motivated the current research on the extent to which policies
formulated in ecosystem-based plans for large marine areas are actually
implemented.
In a previous case study (Sander, 2018), implementation theory was
applied to evaluate and explain the results of the Norwegian Barents
Sea Management Plan (BSMP). This article follows up by a cross-case
comparison of BSMP with two Canadian cases, the Eastern Scotian Shelf
Integrated Management Plan (ESSIM) and the Placentia Bay/Grand
Banks Integrated Management Plan (PB/GB). The research in Canada
built on the same theoretical platform as the study of the BSMP and was
conducted in the same manner (George and Bennett, 2005, pp 67–73).
The first question to all the cases was to evaluate the degree to which
the measures in the plans were implemented. While the Norwegian
government system implemented most of the measures in the BSMP,
early in the investigation of the Canadian plans, it became evident that
they had not led to the implementation of any new policies or measures,
despite years of work. The main question for the research thus became
to explain why the results of the planning in BSMP differed so much from
those of ESSIM and PB/GB? After all, Canada and Norway share many
features affecting the governability of their ecosystems (Mahon et al.,
2010), and the two states started with EBM at about the same time
(Cicin-Sain et al., 2015, Hoel, 2008). Answering this question would
also help in identifying what is conducive to the implementation of
policies formulated in ecosystem-based plans in general.
The article starts with a description of the analytical framework for
implementation studies that has guided the research, before turning to
methods and materials, in particular case study methodology. Then, an
introduction to the cases follows, presented as chronological narratives.
The next section contains the comparative discussion of the cases,
structured according to the analytical framework. The focus is on the
Canadian cases, contrasted with the relevant findings from the previous
analysis of BSMP, finally being summarised in an explanation for the
Canadian results alone. The last section draws general conclusions
about variables that may explain the different results, structured ac-
cording to the elements in the analytical framework. In addition, some
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suggestions for further research on what is conducive to the successful
implementation of EBM plans are provided.
2. Implementation theory
Given the many calls for implementing EBM, it is surprising that
empirical studies of EBM have not applied implementation theory prior
to Sander (2018). In fact, literature and database searches indicate that
there are few applications thereof to marine policies in general. This
may be the result of marine sciences' tendency to build their own tra-
ditions at sea, disregarding experiences from land (Jay, 2010). Another
reason may be that there have been few cases of adopted EBM policies
to study.
Implementation studies primarily grew out of evaluation research in
the 1970s, in the aftermath of societal reforms in the US that did not
live up to the expectations (Winter, 2012). The field's first contribution
to explain why was to search for “failures” in the way policy inter-
ventions were actually performed (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1984).
Later, it became evident that there was a need to move beyond the
implementation phase and take the wider policy process, the policy
design and the context into consideration (Palumbo and Calista, 1990).
Researchers expanded upon their initial search for failures by in-
vestigating success stories as well, and more nuanced questions arose
about the criteria for evaluation. The core field of study thus is the
translation of public policy into practice and the reasons as to why the
results are achieved. Despite several attempts to synthesise the findings,
there is no general theory available, regardless of contexts and policies
(Goggin et al., 1990; Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1983; Sætren, 2014).
Winter (2012) has argued that aiming for such a theory is utopian.
Instead, there is a need for more specific theories and hypotheses. This
has inspired the current initiative to apply implementation theory
specifically to EBM plans.
Winter also has synthesised previous research in a frequently cited
analytical framework that covers the entire policy process (Fig. 1). It is
meant as a roadmap for investigations, presenting key factors and
mechanisms that often explain implementation results, not a determi-
nistic, all-inclusive theory (Hupe and Sætren, 2015; Winter, 2012).
The framework presents two main alternatives for evaluating the
results of a policy, which is the dependent variable. Output is the de-
livered results after implementation, often in the form of the exercising
of authority or services to the public. Outcome is the subsequent im-
pacts, often measured as goal achievement towards the policy's objec-
tives. An alternative measure for outcome is the effects on the problems
that motivated the policy's introduction. Relating policy interventions
to outcomes is more complex than explaining output. Other policies
may support or counteract the policy under study, and a number of
external factors beyond the control of policy-makers may occur si-
multaneously (market forces, climate change etc). Therefore, output is
often preferred in implementation studies, though both alternatives for
evaluation are needed (Winter, 2012).
The independent variables, which could explain the results, can be
found in the context, the policy formulation process, the design of an
adopted policy, and in the implementation process.
The context may cover numerous factors (Mahon et al., 2010).
Changes in socio-economic conditions, like economic cycles, may affect
the political perception of which problems that require attention, as
well as the resources available to address them. Changes in govern-
ments can also have profound effects on ongoing policy processes.
Policy formulation covers the political processes of agenda setting,
finding acceptable ways of addressing identified problems, and the final
decision-making leading to the adoption of a policy. Winter has high-
lighted three factors in this phase (Fig. 1). Conflicts will often arise
when actors with different interests and resources try to get their pro-
blem definitions and solutions accepted. An important question is
whether such parties would accept a final decision, or whether struggles
would continue during the implementation phase. For a policy to be
efficient, it is also important that the selected policy instruments work
in support of the objectives. This requires knowledge of cause-effect
relationships that often is unavailable, and a willingness by the deci-
sion-makers to select effective policy instruments. However, decision-
makers may be more engaged in symbolic behaviour, such as demon-
strating good intentions, ideology or alliances, than in designing po-
licies that actually solve problems.
A policy design will typically contain a description of problems, a
Fig. 1. Winter's Integrated framework for implementation studies (Winter, 2012).
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desired direction of change expressed in the form of a vision or objec-
tives, and a set of measures. Measures are usually a package of policy
instruments (Lascoumes and Le Gales, 2007), combined with an allo-
cation of responsibilities and resources for their implementation (May,
2012). Traditionally, policy-makers have been advised to set clear ob-
jectives for guiding the implementation (Mazmanian and Sabatier,
1983). However, that is unrealistic; policy-makers do not want to
achieve only one thing and uses ambiguity as a way of reducing con-
flicts (Matland, 1995). The selected policy instruments and organiza-
tional structures are the visible result of a political process in which
actors try to maximize their interests and achieve control over the
implementation process (Matland, 1995).
The implementation process covers the activities of one or several
organizations responsible for putting the adopted policy into practice.
Thus, this process transforms policy intentions on paper into delivered
results. Policy-making often continues in this phase and leads to mod-
ifications of the adopted policy, or the realization of only parts of it.
Such changes may lead the policy astray, but can also be necessary
adaptations to realities that were not foreseen during policy formula-
tion. The available resources and the motivation of organizations and
individuals play an important role. For complex policies, it is crucial
that several organizations can cooperate and coordinate their activities.
The parties can be dictated to do so from the top of a hierarchy, or take
the decision voluntarily because they find that the advantages exceed
the transaction costs involved (O'Toole, 2012). Particularly when a
policy delivers services, the discretion exercised by frontline workers
(“street-level bureaucrats”), caught between the agendas of their
managers and target groups, can be decisive for the delivered results
(Meyers and Nielsen, 2012).
3. Method and materials
A fundamental task in case study methodology is to specify what
types of cases are to be studied (Seawright and Gerring, 2008). This
corresponds with Winter's call for developing specific theories, as re-
ferred to above. In this article, it is EBM of large marine areas, such as
are globally defined by the Large Marine Ecosystem initiative,2 or by
the Arctic Council (Skjoldal and Mundy, 2013). It is also noteworthy
that all three cases under study take place within single national states.
Such cases pertain to a sub-class of EBM, different from initiatives in-
volving several states, smaller-scale initiatives for instance for a bay or
an estuary, or non-spatial applications in international or national
policy documents (Cicin-Sain et al., 2015; Wondolleck and Yaffee,
2017). Experiences gained from other EBM applications, or other re-
lated policies, may or may not be relevant; that is an empirical question.
Conversely, experience from this EBM sub-class is not necessarily gen-
eralizable to other case classes.
If the ambition is to attain generalisations, possibly also to build and
test theory, cases should be selected carefully within the wider popu-
lation. Cases should be representative and contain useful variations on
the dimensions of theoretical interest (Seawright and Gerring, 2008).
The three cases selected here are clearly representative of the applic-
ability of EBM to large marine areas. When searching for Canadian
cases for comparison with BSMP, I looked for areas with comparable
activities in order to reduce the variability. ESSIM was originally the
only Canadian case because it, like BSMP, was a national pilot project.
As such, there is a rich body of scientific literature about both of them.3
PB/GB was included later in order to test some important mechanisms
found in ESSIM on what was expected to be a more mature Canadian
plan. The research on PB/GB is not as thorough as on ESSIM, and is thus
used as a supplementary case.
Structured and focused comparison is the standard approach for
multiple-case studies (George and Bennett, 2005, pp. 67–73). I have
asked the same question to both the Canadian cases and BSMP re-
garding implementation results, as well as the planning processes and
the content of the plans. The criterion used for evaluating results was
the extent to which the individual measures or strategies in the plans
had been put into practice. The analysis of BSMP may be described as
analytical, theory driven induction based on insights achieved re-
garding working mechanisms and participants' own explanations of
causation. The research in Canada also had an element of deduction in
terms of testing out the Norwegian results (George and Bennett, 2005,
pp. 74–75; Bennett and Checkel, 2015, pp. 17–18). However, the
comparison also shed new light on BSMP. Certain features stood out as
even more important, while others that had seemed insignificant be-
came relevant.
The author stayed in Canada four months the autumn 2017 for data
collection. The sources of information are the plan documents,
Canadian policy documents and secondary literature about the cases,3
combined with interviews. The interview guides developed in Canada
followed the analytical framework, and also relied on the study of
BSMP (see supplementary material). I started with the co-ordinators of
the plans, and continued with additional interviewees based on
“snowball-sampling” and the intent to capture a broad spectrum of
participants. In total, I interviewed 19 individuals from the private
sector (fisheries, shipping, the oil and gas industry, community orga-
nizations, environmental organizations), and the government sector
(two provinces, a petroleum board, three federal ministries and a mu-
nicipality). For comparison, the research on BSMP involved 30 former
or current members of governments, civil servants and stakeholders
(Sander, 2018).
4. The cases
4.1. The Canadian policy background
In 1996, Canada adopted the Oceans Act. The Act made the
Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) responsible for integrated
ocean management. The minister of DFO was allocated the specific
mandate to lead and coordinate the development and implementation
of integrated management plans. However, the minister received no
additional authority and therefore had to cooperate with other federal
departments (ministries) and other jurisdictions (Calderbank et al.,
2006, p. 110; Juda, 2003).4
2 See the map at http://lme.edc.uri.edu/index.php/lme-introduction. This
article uses the expression “large marine areas”, not ecosystems, in order not to
exclude cases of EBM that deviate from the LME initiative on the criteria for
designating management areas, the size of the areas and the initiative's modular
approach.
3 The literature on ESSIM comprises overview articles (Hall et al., 2011;
O'Boyle and Worcester, 2009; Rutherford et al., 2005), analyses of specific
(footnote continued)
elements, such as integrated assessment methodology (Foley et al., 2013), ob-
jectives and indicators (O'Boyle et al., 2005; O'Boyle & Jamieson, 2006;
Walmsley et al., 2007) and participation (Arbour, 2009; Flannery & Ó Cinnéide,
2012). Most of the authors of the aforementioned articles participated in the
process. The plan has also been compared to an Australian case (Foster et al.,
2005) and a Chinese one (Yao, 2008). Moreover, ESSIM has been used as a case
in discussions of Canadian ocean policies (Chircop and Hildebrand, 2006;
Guénette and Alder, 2007; Jessen, 2011; Kearney et al., 2007; Rutherford et al.,
2010) and in developing indicators for measuring progress (UNESCO, 2006).
Note that this paper is the first to be written after the termination of the ESSIM
initiative. Searches for literature on PB/GB resulted in only one publication, a
master's thesis about participation (Tucker, 2011).
4 Canada is a federation, as opposed to Norway, which is a unitary state with
one legislature and one government. The national constitution shares power
and responsibilities between the federal level, 13 provinces and territories with
their own legislatures and governments, and indigenous (aboriginal) peoples.
Both states, however, are parliamentary democracies and constitutional
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The government issued several policy documents elaborating upon
the Act,5 leading to the designation of five Large Ocean Management
Areas (LOMAs) as priority areas for the preparation of integrated
management plans (Fig. 2). EBM should be a core principle.6 The Lib-
eral government that launched the new ocean policy was followed by a
Conservative one led by Stephen Harper (2006–2015). The Con-
servatives cut federal budgets substantially. From 2011-12, DFO had to
terminate or wind down administrative programmes and research ca-
pacity, laying off hundreds of staff members (Bailey et al., 2016). The
work with the LOMAs was vulnerable because of the Harper govern-
ment's anti-environment policy (Barnett and Wiber, 2018). Besides,
there were problems documenting the results (DFO, 2012b). However,
the Harper government did commit Canada internationally to establish
Marine Protected Areas (MPAs). Planning for MPAs became the re-
maining ocean initiative supported from the top, as long as it did not
require more resources or make political noise. Despite the cuts and
changed priorities, all of the LOMA initiatives but ESSIM survived. The
new Liberal government led by Justin Trudeau (2015 -) endorsed the
last one on the Pacific coast in 2016. As will be seen, endorsement was
no guarantee for the implementation of such plans.
4.2. Eastern Scotian shelf integrated management plan (ESSIM)
ESSIM started in 1998 because there was a need for additional
measures around Canada's second MPA, the deep-water canyon called
“The Gully”. The DFO headquarters in Ottawa (the capital) considered
its regional branch for the Maritimes Region to be innovative and to
possess substantial capacity to conduct planning. The project therefore
got wide leeway to find its own approaches as a national pilot project.
DFO practiced learning-by-doing and developed supporting science, as
well as policy, in parallel with practical experiments. The pioneering
experiences of ESSIM became important for the formulation of national
guidelines for integrated ocean and coastal management (DFO, 2002).
Except for DFO, no federal ministries mandated their regional re-
presentatives to participate in the planning. A fundamental task
therefore was to engage others and to organize their participation in the
planning process. DFO Maritimes started with other federal agencies,
and later extended the invitations to the Province of Nova Scotia and a
wide and complex array of industries and stakeholder groups (Arbour,
2009). It took approximately four years to reach agreement on who
should be represented and how they should be organized. The organi-
zation consisted of one government structure, led by senior executives
from federal and provincial organizations. An annual ESSIM Forum was
convened, which was open for anybody to attend. The most important
group, though, was the Stakeholder Advisory Committee. This became
the forum for dialogue between the government sector and selected
stakeholders. Assisted by the ESSIM Planning Office in DFO Maritimes,
this organization worked according to a collaborative planning model
(DFO, 2007, pp. 21–27). One major principle was that all decisions
were to be made by consensus.
DFO Maritimes defined the ESSIM planning area early in the process
(DFO, 2007, pp. 14–19). Along the coast, two boundary lines used in
fisheries management designated an area less intensively fished than
further southwest, and less complex in terms of fishing industry sta-
keholders. Seawards, the focus was outside the territorial sea, where
there would be no jurisdictional conflicts with Nova Scotia, and far
outside complicated coastal issues. “They designed the scope of their
project for potential success. (…) They didn't want to bite off more than
they could chew”, one stakeholder observed. However, there were two
tensions related to the designated area. One group of stakeholders were
mostly interested in coastal areas. They decided to stay in the project
for the lessons to be learnt should the federal government proceed with
a coastal plan.7 The Province was interested in coastal affairs too, and
responded to ESSIM's ocean focus by developing a coastal plan in
parallel, without, however, adopting it politically.8 The other conflict
related to the north-eastern boundary. In 2002, an arbitration panel
settled the maritime boundary between the provinces of Nova Scotia
and Newfoundland-Labrador for the special purpose of managing oil
and gas activities under the two federal-provincial Petroleum Boards.9
Late in the process, Newfoundland-Labrador representatives partici-
pating in ESSIM complained about others taking decisions in their area,
as the north-eastern delimitation of ESSIM went beyond the arbitration
line. They therefore wanted ESSIM to adjust its planning area accord-
ingly. Nova Scotia would not accept this, whereas DFO was flexible.
This conflict would become fatal to ESSIM.
ESSIM made a number of assessments and reports, most promi-
nently a state of the ecosystem report, an atlas with ocean uses, and
reports on governance and on setting of objectives (DFO, 2007, pp.
65–66). The project did not make final reports of impact assessments,
selection of indicators, and designation of ecologically and biologically
significant areas. The ESSIM Planning Office had scarce resources for
hiring consultants and prepared most of the reports itself. Where DFO
did not possess the data, they collaborated with scientific institutions,
other government agencies and sea users. There were no formal man-
dates for the work. DFO mostly presented ideas for what to do in order
to get feedback and input, and later drafts for discussion. When the
process moved from assessments to formulating a plan, a major conflict
broke out. The participants could not agree on whether they should
produce an action plan that could result in “change on the water”, as it
was formulated, or a strategic plan. It ended up being a strategic plan
with three overarching goals and 30 objectives describing what the plan
wanted to achieve, each with a set of strategies associated with it.
Action planning was postponed until a next phase.
Late in 2006, the various bodies of the ESSIM organization endorsed
the plan. When presented to the minister of DFO, Loyola Hearn, who
was from Newfoundland, he refused to sign it because of the dispute
over the planning area. The non-governmental organizations and the
ESSIM Planning Office tried for almost two years to convince him,
without results. Finally, the administrative level in the DFO head-
quarters accepted to make the plan publicly available. The effect of this
conflict on the participants' motivation was devastating: why continue
when the initiator would not accept the result? People ceased attending
the meetings or sent junior personnel instead of managers. Other(footnote continued)
monarchies. For more information, see http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.
ca/en/article/constitution/ and http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/
article/aboriginal-rights/.
5 A Liberal government in 2002 launched an Oceans Strategy accompanied by
a Policy and Operational Framework for Integrated Management (DFO, 2002).
This was followed up by the Oceans Action Plan in 2005. The Conservative
government narrowed down the focus in the Health of the Oceans (2007),
which nevertheless became an instrument for financial support for ministries
other than DFO for a while. See reviews of the Oceans Act and these policy
documents in for instance Chircop and Hildebrand (2006), Mageau et al.
(2015), Ricketts and Hildebrand (2011) or Rutherford et al. (2010).
6 The Norwegian ocean policy sets out EBM as the overarching approach, not
integrated ocean management. In practice, the difference between the two
states in this respect is not significant.
7 Interview with stakeholder(-s).
8 An interviewee who had a central role in the planning explained this with
changed political priorities after a provincial election. He also underlined the
lack of federal leadership in coastal management as an obstacle. Documents
from the process can be found at http://novascotia.ca/coast/.
9 The two provinces and the federal government are in principal disagree-
ment over the right to the resources on the continental shelf. They have agreed
to disagree and found a practicable way of managing the petroleum resources
and sharing the revenue through two Federal – Provincial Petroleum Boards
(Calderbank et al., 2006: pp 167–177 and 189–199). The arbitration panel's
decision can be found at https://www.cnsopb.ns.ca/sites/default/files/pdfs/
phaseii_award_english.pdf.
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abrasive factors also contributed to the project running out of gas:
“Remember we had been going on a long time on this. There were other
interests, people got distracted, ESSIM was not new anymore, it was not
exciting, and we did not see the benefit (…) because we were not de-
veloping action plans.”7 As a last effort, the Stakeholder Advisory
Council decided to evaluate the work itself in order to get re-
commendations for future initiatives (McCuaig and Herbert, 2013). In
2012, after the evaluation was finished, DFO Maritimes terminated the
initiative.
4.3. Placentia Bay/Grand Banks Integrated Management Plan (PB/GB)
From the late 1990s, DFO's regional office in Newfoundland-
Labrador engaged in several coastal initiatives, including the prepara-
tion of a plan for Placentia Bay.10 When it became clear that they
should also make a plan for a LOMA, Placentia Bay and Grand Banks
were merged into one planning area. Planning started in 2007, with the
neighbouring ESSIM as an inspiration in addition to the national
guidelines (DFO, 2002). The Province of Newfoundland-Labrador in
parallel adopted a coastal and ocean strategy, partly motivated by the
desire to feed into PB/GB based on priorities developed through ex-
tensive consultations.11
PB/GB was based on collaborative planning. The organization was
similar to ESSIM, with a structure for federal/provincial collaboration,
and a committee where the government representatives and stake-
holders met (DFO, 2012). However, the participation was not as broad
as that of ESSIM. There were fewer representatives from maritime in-
dustries, few environmental and no local organizations. A study un-
dertaken during the process found that participants had problems un-
derstanding the goals and processes, and did not buy in (Tucker, 2011).
DFO tried to engage other participants, but ended up doing most of the
work themselves. They also made more decisions alone than DFO
Maritimes did in ESSIM.
PB/GB fulfilled more of the tasks in the national policy framework
than ESSIM. The plan consisted of a vision and three overarching goals,
followed by 32 strategic objectives and 113 initial management stra-
tegies. Unlike ESSIM, the planners managed to prioritise, and ended up
with 14 final strategies. Some of them were broad and general, such as
“mitigate and/or prevent conflict” and “prevent pollution”, others more
focussed, like “rebuild Atlantic cod”. The intention was that the 14
priorities should result in 14 action plans with timelines and responsi-
bilities. There were also plans for implementation, evaluation of the
Fig. 2. Canada's five Large Ocean Management Areas (LOMAs). The two cases studied here are located on the Atlantic coast, outside the provinces of Nova Scotia and
Newfoundland-Labrador.
10 These early initiatives are presented at http://www.icomnl.ca/cma/.
11 The strategy was adopted in 2011 and guided subsequent implementation
(footnote continued)
by the Province until also their budgets for following up were cut. The docu-
ments are available at: http://www.fishaq.gov.nl.ca/fisheries/sustainable_
fisheries_oceans/coastal_oceans.html.
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effectiveness of the process and revisions every five years.
The minister of DFO endorsed the plan in 2012, even though the
south-western border was the same that had caused the former minister
Hearn not to endorse ESSIM. Unfortunately, this occurred at the same
time that the Harper government was effecting substantial cuts to the
oceans programs and called for a winding down of the LOMA initiative.
With DFO in the driver's seat and a lack of voluntary buy-in from other
participants, the intended action planning and implementation never
occurred. The interviews gave the impression that the participants had
shelved PB/GB; it was not relevant any more.
4.4. The Barents Sea Management Plan (BSMP)
The initiative for BSMP came in the platform for a coalition gov-
ernment in 2001 as a part of a compromise over a long-lasting political
conflict concerning the northward expansion of the petroleum industry.
A 2002 white paper amplified the scope substantially by introducing a
new ecosystem-based ocean policy, without a statutory basis (The
Ministry of the Environment, 2002). Cross-sectoral management plans
should create a framework for sectoral policies, whereas implementa-
tion should take place within the sectors. The government appointed a
group of ministries led by the Ministry of Environment to oversee the
work. The white paper was their only guidance, as the government
provided no additional policy documents.
The Steering group defined the management area (Fig. 3) and
commissioned a series of joint assessments from the ministries' sub-
ordinate agencies. Major issues were assessments of the impacts of
ocean activities, analyses of valuable and vulnerable areas, and en-
vironmental objectives (Hoel et al., 2008; Knol, 2010). The challenges
described in the reports provided a basis for formulating policy re-
sponses, not analyses of or suggestions for policy; that was defined as
pertaining to the political realm. The Steering group assisted the Ca-
binet in drafting white papers, according to interviewees, based on very
few analyses of the effectiveness of the policy instruments under dis-
cussion. The three political parties in the majority Stoltenberg gov-
ernment (2005–2013) negotiated over conflicts, ultimately making
compromises at the highest political level. Stakeholders had no formal
opportunities for discussing the policy before the government published
the white papers with the plan and the update five years later (Ministry
of the Environment, 2006; 2011). However, they had the opportunity to
comment on the assessments prior to the formulation of the policy.
Several of them were also engaged in lobbying and heated public de-
bates, particularly about the petroleum policy.
The policy contained a purpose and nine broad objectives, reflecting
an unclear compromise between ocean use and conservation. There
were 179 measures in total in the plan from 2006 and the update from
2011. A detailed review showed that most of them have been put into
practice, despite no indication of responsibilities and a decentralised
model for implementation (Sander, 2018). The first group of measures
introduced a permanent system for EBM. It formalised a cross-sectoral
organization of government agencies, the Management Forum, that
works according to the instructions of the inter-ministerial Steering
group. The agencies cooperate on monitoring the state of the eco-
system, reporting and evaluations, as well as making assessments for
updates and revisions of the plan. Moreover, as many as 79 measures
should address knowledge gaps, most prominently by mapping the
seabed, increasing the monitoring of seabirds and a seismic exploration
of Lofoten-Vesterålen. The second group of measures aimed at com-
bating pollution and safeguarding biodiversity. The most visible in-
itiative was the introduction of a new political framework for the pet-
roleum industry's access to areas. This was a compromise between
fundamentally opposing positions in the Stoltenberg government. It
maintained the closure of the most disputed areas in Lofoten-Vester-
ålen. The political prize for this was the expansion of the industry in
other areas, including the marginal ice zone (Steinberg and
Kristoffersen, 2017). Safety of navigation was improved primarily by a
traffic separation scheme and better surveillance. To prevent harm from
accidents, the government has modernised its oil spill equipment and
updated contingency plans. The legal introduction of the ecosystem
approach to fisheries has been applied particularly to reduce damage to
cold-water coral reefs and sponges. A major achievement was the near-
elimination of illegal, unreported and unregulated fisheries for the
largest commercial stocks. The most prominent breach of the intentions
is the failure to establish MPAs in the Barents Sea. Moreover, the im-
plemented plan did address certain spatial initiatives, but did not create
a holistic system for marine spatial planning.
5. Discussion: variables and mechanisms at work
The discussion makes a systematic comparison of the cases ac-
cording to the implementation framework. It starts with the ex-
planandum, the results. The next sections contain discussions about
explanations for the different results. The intention is to reveal me-
chanisms in the relevant parts of the framework that substantiate
causation (Bennett and Checkel, 2015). The discussion goes backwards
through the framework (Fig. 1), starting with the policy design before
addressing two factors pertaining to policy formulation, and finally, the
context.
5.1. What are the results?
The analytical framework describes alternative options for defining
implementation results. The criterion used here, the extent to which
measures have been put into action, is an output variable. Even though
the Norwegian government apparatus has implemented most of the
measures in BSMP, it is still an open question as to whether this has
contributed to the desired outcome, an improved state of the marine
environment. The reason is that neither the assessments prior to the
selection of measures, nor the feedback from monitoring afterwards,
have established a causal link between the selected policy instruments
and the outcome. Instead, the focus has been on the marine environ-
ment. Without such a causal link, it is not possible to say whether the
policy actually works as intended.12
ESSIM and PB/GB did not reach the implementation phase, thereby
illustrating a general problem with the LOMA plans (DFO, 2012, 2016).
Still, it is possible to identify certain later initiatives that conform to the
strategies in the plans. Interviewees, as well as the ESSIM review, at-
tributed these to the involved organizations pursuing their general
mandates and new initiatives, not to the impetus of the plans (McCuaig
and Herbert, 2013). The plans therefore did not result in any new po-
licies or measures being put into action. However, there are two other
types of achievements, which may contribute to the longer-term evo-
lution of EBM. The first is the value of the information and knowledge
products assembled. This is useful for other DFO purposes, such as
fisheries management and the ongoing MPA network planning. Outside
DFO, information has been used in environmental assessments and in
the sustainability certification of certain fisheries. The other type of
achievements is related to the effects of organizing multiple stake-
holders. All interviewees who participated in ESSIM highlighted the
initiative's inclusive and open approach. They met new people, learned
about different perspectives and had dialogues. The contacts estab-
lished have proved useful, particularly for DFO. The regional commit-
tees coordinating the federal and provincial departments continued
afterwards.13 However, the effects of the planning diminished over
12 The Steering group has asked for a review of the implementation of the
measures and an evaluation of the effects as a part of the preparations for a
revision of BSMP in 2020.
13 The Regional Committee on Ocean Management in Nova Scotia operated
until 2015. It broke up because of a recurrent conflict over MPAs, which the
Nova Scotian government feared could unduly affect oil and gas activities and
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Fig. 3. The Norwegian management plan areas. BSMP was the pilot project that became the model for similar plans for the Norwegian Sea and the North Sea.
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time: the social learning rested on individuals who in many cases had
left their former organizations. The information gathered was a snap-
shot in time. Last, but not least, integrated ocean management was not
a task anymore. BSMP illustrates that when EBM becomes a continuous
task, the information base is regularly updated, and there is a con-
tinuous cross-sectoral dialogue.
5.2. Policy design: what was there to implement?
All the three plans discussed are strategic with similar intentions.
Nevertheless, there are substantial content-differences that create dif-
ferent drives for implementation. A first noticeable difference is the
description of status and challenges. The ESSIM plan on a couple of
pages referred to rapid and large changes in the ecosystem. However,
there was no documentation of trends, explanations of changes or
linkage to human activities. Similarly, there were references to conflicts
between human uses, but almost no details on their nature and location
(DFO, 2007, pp. 16–18).14 PB/GB was somewhat more informative than
ESSIM, not least on socioeconomic issues, but the descriptions are still
at a general level. It is therefore hard to understand the issues that the
Canadian plans tried to solve. This is clearer in BSMP, which contained
separate chapters analysing the status of the ecosystem, impacts from
human activities, and conflicts between industries (Ministry of the
Environment, 2006, pp. 57–88).
The overarching objectives in all the plans contain many potentially
competing interests that, in sum, provide poor guidance for the direc-
tion of implementation.15 Based on the theory above, this should be no
surprise for such a broad and complex policy as EBM. In addition, BSMP
established environmental targets supplemented with indicators and
reference points (environmental quality objectives) in an integrated
monitoring system. This specified the desired outcome for the eco-
system. The assessment of goal achievement towards these targets was a
basis for formulating the policy. Similar yardsticks for what is accep-
table are absent in the Canadian cases, despite a special provision in the
Oceans Act about quality objectives16 and due attention to the topic
(DFO, 2002; O'Boyle et al., 2005; O'Boyle and Jamieson, 2006;
Rutherford et al., 2005; Walmsley et al., 2007). Integrated monitoring
of the ecosystems takes place in neither the ESSIM nor PB/GB areas,
only sectoral programs. This provides a weak foundation for EBM and
integrated, adaptive policy-making.
The planners formulated measures for achieving the objectives dif-
ferently. The BSMP designated mostly concrete actions, whereas the
two Canadian plans designated strategies. A strategy indicates a di-
rection of desired change and may guide a number of actions. It is
therefore unspecific as to what to do and depends on subsequent action
planning. When the action planning never occurred, ESSIM and PB/GB
remained aspirational, unspecific plans.
There is a common assumption that allocation of clear task-re-
sponsibilities is conducive to successful implementation (Mazmanian
and Sabatier, 1983). In fact, none of the plans allocated responsibilities.
The plans had fundamentally different ambitions as to who was sup-
posed to implement. The BSMP saw the Norwegian government appa-
ratus as solely responsible. Despite weak mechanisms for overseeing the
distributed implementation process, this worked because of the active
involvement of the relevant ministries in the prior planning (Sander,
2018). ESSIM and PB/GB aimed further, and intended to mobilize all
interests both within and beyond governments to voluntarily commit to
a joint policy and take on responsibilities. The advantage of this ap-
proach, as compared to the Norwegian, would have been the commit-
ments of industries and non-governmental organizations. However, this
was not achievable as long as representatives from government de-
partments were unwilling to commit, and there was no push from the
federal government.
5.3. The role of political leadership
Political will and support are important for the achievement of
marine policies (Balgos et al., 2015; Mercer Clarke, 2010). It is note-
worthy that BSMP was born out of a political conflict over petroleum
policy in 2001. Since then, management plans have proven to be a
useful mechanism, helping the political parties in reaching compro-
mises over that conflict and thereby reducing a threat against the sta-
bility of successive governments. Over the years, the political interest
also in other ocean issues has increased. Thus, in 2016, Parliament
(Stortinget) decided that the government should update the plans for all
the management areas every four years, and revise them thoroughly
every twelve years (ref. Fig. 3). In Canada, government interest and
efforts towards oceans and coasts have been characterised as ebbing
and flowing like the tides, following a pattern of raised expectations
and diminished hopes (Mercer Clarke, 2010). The problems with in-
tegrated ocean management started long before the Conservative
Harper government, as documented in prior reviews complaining about
the “glacial speed” of progress (Chircop and Hildebrand, 2006;
Guénette and Alder, 2007; Jessen, 2011; Juda, 2003; Ricketts and
Hildebrand, 2011). Since 2010, the internal order in DFO has been to
concentrate on concrete, tangible results like MPAs instead of in-
tegrated planning of bioregions,17 into which it has divided Canadian
waters (DFO, 2016). This neglect of the integrative ambitions of the
Oceans Act was still the case during the fieldwork for this article.18
The two governments' different engagement is visible in their fra-
meworks and support for the planning. First, the differences in how the
governments have organized themselves is an important explanation
for the different results. In Canada, the lack of a “whole-of-government”
approach is a major problem (Mercer Clarke, 2010; Ricketts and
Hildebrand, 2011; Rothwell and VanderZwaag, 2014, p. 401), despite
coordinating mechanisms both internally in the federal government and
between the federal and provincial governments.19 The Oceans Act
gives the mandate to lead and facilitate integrated management plan-
ning to the minister of DFO. For ESSIM, this meant, “it was always seen
as a DFO initiative. This was an Achilles heel for the project”.20 The
local planners had to persuade other government departments and
agencies to voluntarily allocate resources to ESSIM instead of using
(footnote continued)
fisheries. In Newfoundland-Labrador, there are still regular meetings at two
levels, mostly for information exchange.
14 There are some more details in the strategies and in the background
documents.
15 These reflections refer to ESSIM's and PB/GB's goals for sustainable human
use and healthy ecosystems. The third major goal, collaborative governance,
focus on the performance of the management processes. BSMP contains no such
“internal” objective.
16 Para 32 (d): (T)he Minister may, in consultation with (…), establish
marine environmental quality guidelines, objectives and criteria (…).
17 See map at http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/oceans/maps-cartes/bioregions-
eng.html.
18 The Trudeau government has increased funding and re-staffed DFO. The
top priority for the oceans is to increase the proportion of MPAs in Canadian
waters. Its initial ocean policy is found at https://pm.gc.ca/eng/minister-
fisheries-oceans-and-canadian-coast-guard-mandate-letter.
19 Internally in the federal government, there have been Interdepartmental
Committees on Oceans at various levels. Strategic coordination towards the
provinces and territories can take place within the Canadian Council of
Fisheries and Aquaculture Ministers (there are also regional committees for
such collaboration, ref. footnote 13). According to interviewees, the Harper
government almost shut down these collaborative arrangements, whereas the
Trudeau government has started actively using them again. This is sub-
stantiated by information in DFO (2012b). DFO (2016) concluded that “these
committees have not succeeded in fulfilling their intended function” and need
to be reestablished.
20 Interview with the ESSIM coordinators.
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them to fulfil their sectoral mandates and tasks. In BSMP, the partici-
pation of government agencies was not an issue; their superiors in the
ministries appointed the participants. The agencies received co-
ordinated mandates that ensured that the work would become policy
relevant and certain budgets to hire consultants. This broad mobiliza-
tion of knowledge from sectors with different interests created legiti-
macy. Policy-makers and stakeholders alike were therefore more in-
clined to accept the results as credible. In a political culture with
rationalistic traits in its faith in knowledge (Christensen and Holst,
2017), the reports became important for agenda setting and policy-
formulation (Knol, 2010). Later, the politicians could legitimise their
policy through science. Interestingly, interviewees in Canada did not
question the legitimacy and credibility of the assessments, even though
DFO had a dominant role in producing them. Nevertheless, the im-
pression from ESSIM is that facts attained from assessments did not play
the same role as in BSMP, and that more issues became the subject of
political bargaining amongst the participants.
Second, funding of the tasks following a new ocean policy was
challenging in both states. It required the reallocation of resources and
tasks, and seed money. For the implementation, it is noteworthy that
none of the plans allocated resources. The Norwegian government
mobilized internal resources from many ministries, during both plan-
ning and implementation. That ensured the basic capacity. Only major
new initiatives needed appropriations in the annual budgets. In Canada,
DFO alone had to change priorities to fund the new tasks during the
first eight years after the adoption of the Oceans Act. First then, the
Liberal government allocated funds for integrated ocean management,
followed up a short period by the Conservatives (Jessen, 2011; Mageau
et al., 2015). The experience of ESSIM was that such allocations moti-
vated some agencies to participate, but only as long as the money
lasted. The two approaches illustrate that the resource problem be-
comes more severe when the government does not mobilize all relevant
ministries with their internal resources.
Third, in BSMP, the ministries determined the boundaries of the
management area early in the process. The lack of nationally predefined
boundaries for the LOMAs caused much uncertainty in the ESSIM
process, and the later boundary conflict with Newfoundland-Labrador
and Minister Hearn. The later designation of all Canadian waters into
bioregions, based on scientific advice, ensures a more stable geographic
framework. The experience from ESSIM and PB/GB also accentuates the
need to define boundaries and nested approaches between ocean, near-
shore and coastal management areas (Mercer Clarke, 2010; Johnsen
and Hersoug, 2014).
Fourth, the duration of the planning, affected by the government
mandates, had consequences for the results. The Canadian government
set no deadlines for specified deliveries. Instead, the national guidelines
were concerned with allowing stakeholders enough time to express
their views, and building trust and consensus (DFO, 2002). Thus, the
ESSIM process lasted 14 years in total, the PB/GB five. The long
duration produced stakeholder fatigue, illustrated by a persevering
stakeholder who referred to herself as “an ESSIM survivor”. Another
consequence was that replacements of people in the participating or-
ganizations made it necessary to re-negotiate previous agreements.
Most severe, though, was that the projects became vulnerable to
changing political priorities. ESSIM suffered a peremptory blow from
the lacking endorsement of the plan, whereas budget reductions and a
move away from integrated ocean management stopped the im-
plementation of PB/GB. For BSMP, the ministries set deadlines when
commissioning specified tasks. The preparation of the assessments first
time took approximately three years, while the government spent al-
most a year formulating the policy in a white paper. This was a
learning-by-doing process too, with much uncertainty about what
would work. Compared to ESSIM, BSMP saved time because of clear
instructions about participation and deliveries, and a different model
for stakeholder consultation and decision-making.
5.4. Conflict resolution
The underlying premise for ESSIM's collaborative planning model
was that “a plan developed through collaboration will be broadly ac-
cepted and used by all”. The plan also assumed that it would prevent
conflicts (DFO, 2007). Though the selection of the planning area re-
duced the scope for conflicts, the ESSIM partners still had problems
dealing with disagreements. After the long and thorny process of
finding an organizational structure, new disagreements arose over the
plan's guiding principles. The coordinators then realised that it was
unrealistic to obtain consensus on action plans, as originally intended:
“We would have needed another five years if we should have done
that”.20 Though several stakeholders, as well as the DFO headquarters,
wanted something concrete, the only acceptable solution was to make a
strategic plan. Thereby “all the difficult issues, decisions and negotia-
tions required to achieve change” (Hall et al., 2011), were pushed
forward to the next phase of action planning.
One of the reasons for this was that several participants were un-
comfortable with the multi-stakeholder forum and the idea of an
overarching plan. “For example, the offshore fishing industry was very
clear in saying that we do not want to discuss our dirty laundry in front
of the environmental NGOs and other groups”.20 Another participant
observed: “It sounds great with open and consultative processes. In
reality, it was threatening for some of them.” Several interviewees
understood that the government sectors did not want a framework
imposed over their mandates, with a content defined in processes over
which they did not have full control.21 Correspondingly, interviewees
reported that many participants in PB/GB were present mostly to pro-
tect their mandates and interests.
The preferred alternatives for regulatory agencies and industries
were the traditional sectoral mechanisms. They ensured privileged ac-
cess to decision-makers and maintained prevailing power relations. It
became an objection that ESSIM was not the right forum. Support for
this goes back to the weak status of the Oceans Act regarding respon-
sibilities enacted to other ministries (Calderbank et al., 2006; Juda,
2003). Thus, the national framework stated that integrated manage-
ment “cannot be forced on anyone.” Moreover, “It will not infringe on
the legal authority of the participating decision-makers, [and] admin-
istrative and legal jurisdictions will be respected” (DFO, 2002). These
rules of the game, combined with consensus-based decision-making,
gave veto power to any department and agency wanting to preserve its
autonomy.
Though all participants interviewed appreciated the ESSIM dialo-
gues, there were limits to what could come out of them. If descriptions
of environmental impacts became too precise, or somebody suggested a
proposal too directed at a specific sector, that sector would often object.
This led to negotiations, ultimately line by line, until everybody could
agree upon the wording. The result was the lowest common denomi-
nator of what was acceptable. “I can recall all kinds of much, much,
much too much time spent on parsing sentences and worrying about
words and what this comment or statement or this small thing would
mean. Stuff that we just should have made a decision about and moved
on. But it seemed, if I recall accurately, that this was a convenient way
for people who didn't want the process to move on to specifics to slow it
down”.7 Similarly, interviewees from the PB/GB process reported about
“wordsmithing” to conceal disagreements in high-level, “feel-good
statements”.
The ability to solve disagreements and conflicts is closely linked to
decision-making, ultimately by the final endorsement of a plan. There
are no rules for how to endorse integrated ocean management plans in
Canada. The national framework did not foresee the endorsement of the
21 This is in accordance with a main conclusion in Guénette and Alder (2007)
and observations of the behaviour of federal departments as reported in
Flannery and Cinnéide (2012).
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minister of DFO, who does not possess this competence.22 ESSIM first
relied on the participants, receiving letters of support from some gov-
ernment agencies and non-governmental organizations. Later, the
project searched for ministerial endorsement in order to be positioned
for an eventual follow-up. The voluntary endorsement of the plan by
individual decision-making authorities, industries and stakeholders,
was according to the national framework (DFO, 2002). If a sectoral
interest had not already achieved what it wanted through the colla-
borative process, denying endorsement was the ultimate blockade
against intrusion into its turf.
Searching for consensus at all levels in the BSMP process was also
important. However, it was very clear that the Cabinet was the key
decision-maker because it would be answerable to Parliament for the
content of the white papers. Failures to reach consensus at lower levels
of government led the civil servants to hand the conflicts over to their
political superiors. The highest level in the Cabinet, led by Prime
Minster Stoltenberg personally, negotiated compromises in the begin-
ning. This illustrates the political importance of this particular plan
(Sander, 2018).
The different decision-making procedures also raises the issue of
who could legitimately make the trade-offs necessary when formulating
a broad, ecosystem-based policy. The broad array of decision-makers
foreseen in the Canadian framework could only decide upon the affairs
for which each of them were (legally) responsible. No political bodies
were envisaged to take a holistic decision regarding the plans, as in
Norway, whereby different interests could be balanced against each
other. The Canadian government in reality devolved the decision-
making to its underlying bureaucratic structures and invited stake-
holders. These, in turn, watered down issues of potentially high poli-
tical interest until there was almost no political content left.
5.5. Contextual explanations
To what extent may different contexts explain the different en-
gagement and approaches of the Canadian and Norwegian govern-
ments?
About two-thirds of Norway's export revenue originates from ocean-
based industries, particularly petroleum products and fish. Thus, a clear
bipartisan recognition of the need for political engagement in ocean
management and industries has emerged. At the same time, there is
political deadlock over the northwards expansion of the petroleum in-
dustry, making it impossible to form coalition governments after 2001
without making political compromises in package deals. The creation of
the management plans therefore met urgent economic and political
needs. For Canada as a whole, the corresponding export value is of an
order of magnitude lower than that of Norway. This may partly explain
why Canada, according to Ricketts and Hildebrand (2011), “sees itself
primarily as a terrestrial rather than a maritime nation”. Several of my
interviewees referred to the same. Their concern was the differences
between the maritime Atlantic region and the majority inland economy
and population, including the capital. Though ocean affairs could be of
high regional importance, they felt that the oceans only play a marginal
role in the national political scene.
A federal constitution, such as in Canada, often creates a more
complex governance situation than in a small unitary state, such as
Norway,4 particularly when federal and provincial responsibilities
intertwine. However, as a rule of thumb, the federal level in Canada has
jurisdiction over ocean affairs outside the low-water mark (Calderbank
et al., 2006).23 In Norway, the national level (staten) has the sole
management responsibility for oceans outside the coastal zone, where
municipalities and counties exercise delegated powers for marine spa-
tial planning (Johnsen and Hersoug, 2014). Both national governments
thus have a similar latitude in ocean affairs. Still, one enters into con-
sensus-based collaborative planning with lower levels of government,
while the other decides after first having listened to lower-level poli-
tical-administrative units. Different policy styles therefore may be a
more plausible explanation for this difference than the constitution and
national division of responsibilities.
5.6. An explanation of the Canadian cases
The discussion above can be summarised as parallel to Sander's
(2018) in-case explanation to BSMP. Following Winter's framework, the
first and evident explanation to the lack of implementation results is
that the two strategic plans lacked the impetus for implementation.
Their objectives were unclear on what they wanted to achieve, the
designation of strategies made it open-ended as to what was to be done,
nobody was responsible for following-up, and resources were scarce.
Two factors in the policy formulation process explain this vagueness:
the lack of leadership exercised by a co-ordinated Canadian govern-
ment and the model for collaborative planning. First, integrated ocean
management was seen as a task for DFO alone. Other federal depart-
ments considered their participation to be voluntary, and had to be
convinced to do so locally. They were not willing to accept integrated
management plans as an overarching framework. Instead, they pro-
tected their traditional ways of solving issues within their own forums,
by virtue of sectoral mandates and tasks. The lack of a whole-of-gov-
ernment approach clarifying fragmented governance issues prior to
planning thus led to the continuation of the traditional, piecemeal
sectoral management (Flannery and ÓCinnéide, 2012; Jessen, 2011).
Second, the consensus-based collaborative processes, in which nobody
had the authority to take decisions, did not resolve conflicts. Instead,
participants concealed disagreements by wordsmithing and pushed
their solution forward to a next phase of action planning. This phase
never took place due to lack of political support from the minister in
DFO and changes in the government's political priorities. Voluntary
commitment from the local participants was not strong enough to en-
sure that further planning and implementation nevertheless continued.
The power play between the participants during policy formulation led
to a policy that was the least common denominator of what was ac-
ceptable and almost void of political substance.
6. Conclusions
Implementation theory has inspired research into two fundamental
questions of ecosystem-based policy, as expressed in plans for large
marine areas: what are the results of putting a policy into practice, and
what can explain the achievements? The research has been guided by
Winter's integrated framework for implementation studies (Fig. 1).
When applied to BSMP in a single-case study, the policy formulation
process and some contextual factors explained why most measures in
the policy had been put into practice, whereas the implementation
process was not significant as explanans (Sander, 2018). The current
exploration of ESSIM and PB/GB finds explanations in the same parts of
the framework, though with new mechanisms, but also in the policy
22 The Oceans Act art 31 says that the minister of DFO shall “lead and fa-
cilitate” the development and implementation of plans in collaboration with
others, but says nothing about endorsement. Since the minister's purview only
extends “to matters assigned by law to the Minister” (art. 32 a), his/her en-
dorsement raises the question of how the interests of other ministries are
safeguarded and whether an endorsement is on behalf of the whole govern-
ment. When the Trudeau government endorsed the Pacific LOMA plan
(PNCIMA), it solved these uncertainties by getting letters of support from six
ministries.
23 Newfoundland is one exception with its three nautical miles territorial sea.
The province achieved this due to its accession to the Canadian federation in
1949, after the evolution of the territorial sea as a legal concept. Ref also
footnote 9 about different views on the right to the natural resources of the
seabed.
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design. The implementation process was still not significant, this time
for the obvious reason that it turned out that such processes had not
occurred. Thus, the policies in ESSIM and PB/GB were not put into
practice. The three cases therefore are diverse, with an almost maximum
variation on the dependent variable (Seawright and Gerring, 2008).
This was fortunate for identifying variables and mechanisms that can
explain the different achievements, here summarised chronologically
according to the relevant parts of the analytical framework:
Context: Two sets of variables seem to have influenced the different
approaches of the two governments. First, the Norwegian politicians
were prompted to create the management plans to loosen-up political
deadlock, which in turn affected industries of high economic im-
portance. Conversely, it is hard to identify an urgent need for federal
governments in Canada to make integrated ocean management a
prioritised political project. Second, despite different constitutions,
both governments had a similar latitude in the oceans. Their different
approaches towards lower levels of governance instead seem to reflect
typical national policy styles.
The cases also shed light on the continuous debate on the role of law
versus political approaches. A comparative study of national ocean
policies contended that those formally embedded in law tend to be
more successful in the longer term than those solely based on executive
action (Balgos et al., 2015). Such a general conclusion is not supported
neither by the successful implementation of the entirely policy-driven
BSMP, nor by the non-implementation of the legally based Canadian
plans. The Canadian Ocean Act definitely has inherent problems, most
apparently the allocation of responsibility to one minister alone, the
unclear relation to sectoral legislation and the absence of decision-
making power (Calderbank et al., 2006; Chircop and Hildebrand, 2006;
Foster et al., 2005; Juda, 2003). However, the Trudeau government
demonstrates that there is room for political manoeuvring within si-
milarly unspecific legal provisions by its active engagement in desig-
nating MPA networks.24 Avoiding a breach of the international ob-
ligations on MPAs has evidently prompted the political will to push for
results.
Policy formulation: The active leadership from the top of the
Norwegian government, as opposed to the almost complete absence of
political engagement in Canada, is a striking difference between the
cases. A major challenge for EBM is to overcome fragmentation of po-
licies. In order to act more coherently, the Norwegian government in-
troduced new cross-sectoral organizational structures involving both
ministries and governmental agencies. In Canada, the mechanisms for
coordination with the relevant federal sectors and provinces were not
strong enough to prepare for the planning through a whole-of-govern-
ment approach. The Norwegian government led the planning process
top-down, eventually formulating the plan itself. In Canada, the re-
sponsible ministry delegated the entire planning to its regional bran-
ches. It was up to them to engage participants within and beyond
governments in collaborative planning. As regards decision-making, the
cabinet decided in Norway, and actively negotiated agreements in
conflicts that were unresolved at lower levels of government. In
Canada, the participants in the local planning processes were supposed
to take decisions by consensus and later endorse the plans individually.
However, the participants did not resolve conflicts, but instead watered
down the content of the plans by wordsmithing and non-committal
statements. The long duration of the planning led to stakeholder fa-
tigue. It also made the plans vulnerable towards changed political
priorities, which in turn hindered implementation. The comparison also
demonstrates that an advance clarification of a plan's status in relation
to the sectors prevents insecurity and conflicts, as does an early and
authoritative designation of planning areas.
These results are consistent with negative experiences of consensus-
based planning in related areas, such as terrestrial and aquatic EBM in
the US (Layzer, 2008) and integrated coastal zone management in
Europe (McKenna and Cooper, 2006). Collaborative planning can lead
to maintaining status quo and lower protection of the environment and
other public goods than traditional decision-making. Asking stake-
holders to generate consensual plans relieves policy-makers of “the
burden of making politically risky decisions” (Layzer, 2008, p. 290).
Instead of empowering the public, the equalisation of all parties in
decision-making effects paralysis, which enables powerful players to
exploit the situation (McKenna and Cooper, 2006). There are many
recommendations for participatory approaches in EBM (Ehler and
Douvere, 2009; Gimton et al., 2010; Kearney et al., 2007; Oates and
Dodds, 2017; UNESCO, 2006). It should therefore be an important re-
search task to identify if and under which conditions collaborative
consensus-based planning, as applied to large ocean areas, might avoid
such pitfalls.
Policy design: Planning in all the three cases produced ambiguous
objectives, thus confirming what one would expect of a complex policy
like EBM (Matland, 1995). However, the comparison singled out other
mechanisms pertaining to policy design that could contribute to more
clarity. One is to describe the desired outcome by virtue of more spe-
cific targets and indicators, such as environmental quality objectives
(BSMP). Different ways of formulating the measures also play a role.
Formulating strategies provides direction for actions, but does not
specify what is to be done (ESSIM and PB/GB). Actions concretely de-
fine what is to be done (BSMP), and give even more impetus for im-
plementation if specifying the allocation of responsibilities and re-
sources. Moreover, designating actions implies a response to decision-
dilemmas, in which policy-makers have to balance different interests
against each other. This will reveal their real preferences better than
general objectives.
This cross-case comparison and the previous single-case study
(Sander, 2018) demonstrate how theory-driven case-study metho-
dology can lead to cumulative results (George and Bennett, 2005). They
have gradually filled the general analytical framework with content
that is specific to the class of events under study, EBM plans for large
ocean areas. For further investigations on what is conducive to the
implementation of policies resulting from such plans, researchers
should select additional cases carefully. For instance, it would be in-
teresting to analyse cases with different implementation processes and
different feedback-mechanisms than those of BSMP. New cases could
test the explanations found so far, amplify the scope of prior conclu-
sions by introducing more variability on existing variables, define
variables more exactly and identify new ones. Hopefully, we are at the
start of a systematic exploration of what is conducive to the im-
plementation of ecosystem-based policies. It is not satisfactory if plan-
ning for designated ocean areas only becomes a learning process pro-
ducing even more policy-on-paper. Substantive results requires the
implementation of measures that work in solving identified problems.
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